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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Internet as a prominent communications medium
was welcomed with excited declarations of the new technology's power to
transform democracy and society. It was exalted as "the most transforming
technological event since the capture of fire"' and "the most participatory
form of mass speech yet developed.Q More recently, observers credited it
with ushering in "the most profound change since the advent of literacy"

1. Forum, What Are We Doing Online?, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1995, at 35, 36
(quoting John Perry Barlow).
2. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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and "a new renaissance." 3 Not since the dawn of broadcasting has a new
technology generated such hopeful predictions. Radio was touted as a
"new miracle," 4 and television was the "great radiance in the sky," 5
expected to catalyze political engagement and enrich American democracy
if put to good use. Like broadcasting before it, the Internet was expected to
deliver a renewed and vibrant democratic culture to the nation.6
The United States government played an instrumental role in the early
development of both broadcasting and the Internet-incubating early forms
of both technologies, partly for purposes of national defense, and then
privatizing much of the control of each medium.7 Although broadcasting
and the Internet were exalted as essential-new instruments for enhancing
democratic engagement and enriching the marketplace of ideas-the
government took two very different approaches in orienting itself to
broadcasting and to the Internet, approaches rooted in divergent free speech
traditions.
In devising a licensing and regulatory regime for broadcasting, Congress
and the early Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
appealed to a communitarian, civic republican, and ultimately
instrumentalist conception of the First Amendment that values public
deliberation as the highest form of democratic engagement.' The purpose
of broadcasting regulation was to generate programming that elevates
American democracy and cultivates localized civic engagement. But the

3. Tim O'Reilly, Luminaries Look to the Future Web, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2008,
http://news.bbcco.uk/2/hi/technology/7373717.stm.
4. ROBERT W. DESMOND, THE INFORMATION PROCESS: WORLD NEWS REPORTING TO
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 370 (1978).
5. LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 167 (1995) (quoting Edward R. Murrow); see also id. at 166 ("Radio
was to serve as a massive force for political enlightenment in our democratic society.");
RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 29 (1999) (quoting broadcasting pioneer David Sarnoff as touting
television as a "torch of hope in a troubled world"). A local broadcaster extolled that "the
most outstanding of the contributions that television can be expected to make to further
democracy ... will be its unique usefulness as a means of public information." Id. (citing
JEFF KISSELOFF, THE Box: AN ORAL HISTORY OF TELEVISION, 1920-1961, at 171 (1995)).
6. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 166-69; see also DAVIS, supra note 5, at 27-32, and
MARK LLOYD, PROLOGUE TO A FARCE 107-10 (2006) (describing the democratic aspirations
undergirding the broadcast regulatory regime).
7. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN

COMMUNICATIONS 333-38 (2004); Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging
Divides: The Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation,
6 MINN. J. L. ScI.&TECH. 1, 10-12 (2004).
8. See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance,
Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389,
1394-95 (2004); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101,
1204-06 (1993); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of
Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 100-01 (1994).
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commercial marketplace was not certain to provide such a forum. 9
Although the cadre of broadcast licensees was to be comprised almost

entirely of private entities, their licenses came with affirmative duties to
operate stations "as if owned by the public."' 0 Congress charged the FCC
with regulating broadcasting in the furtherance of "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity,"" delegating to the agency itself the task of
defining what those terms meant as the broadcast industry matured.
The FCC has struggled to articulate a durable and coherent set of public

interest requirements since its creation.

Recognizing, and perhaps even

cowed by, the power of broadcasting to assume an unprecedented centrality
in American political and cultural life, the agency set out to ensure that
broadcast licensees used the public spectrum to create a universally
accessible electronic free marketplace of ideas-ideas that would inform,
enlighten, and engage citizens; foster political debate; strengthen local
communities; and generally deliver a more vibrant and deliberative
democracy. 2 Broadcast policy assigned to the government a proactive role

in ensuring that broadcasters not merely satisfy the audience's tastes for

9. See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
BROADCASTERS 21 (1998) [hereinafter DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/piac/piacreport.pdf.
Empaneled by President William J.
Clinton to recommend how the broadcast public interest obligations should evolve with the
migration of broadcasters to the new lucrative digital format, the Advisory Committee, also
known as the "Gore Commission," concluded that from its inception "broadcast regulation
in the public interest has sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and
culture, over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide." Id; see also
Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels Earning
Wings, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 619 (2004) (noting that the broadcast public interest standard
"has been used to serve the needs of American citizens and to cultivate many localized
public forums with diverse viewpoints facilitating citizen participation in our democracy").
10. Schaeffer Radio Co., F.R.C. No. 5228 (June 5,
1930) (unpublished),
http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-bin/assemble?docno=301201 1, reprintedin part in John W. Willis,
The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast
Licensees, 11 J. FED. COMM. B. ASS'N 5, 14 (1950) (citation omitted).
11. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)). The 1934 Communications Act
alternates the phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity" with "public convenience,
interest, or necessity" throughout subchapter III. E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 302a(a), 307(a) (2000).
12. See supra note 9; see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 63 (1991)
(positing that the "American system of broadcast regulation has been built on two
phenomena: a fear of the power of television and radio to control the content of public
discussion, and a concomitant belief in the inability of the market to adequately control that
power"); R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic
Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting:A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties
of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 271 (1993) (describing objectives of broadcast
regulation as promoting "the dissemination of information pertinent to democratic
decisionmaking" while "prevent[ing] the political abuse of the broadcast license" and
"diminish[ing] some of the.., less desirable effects of the commercial mediation of mass
electronic communications").
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programming but proactively elevate those tastes by presenting audience
members with politically and culturally enlightening and enriching fare.
Broadcasters were to expose viewers and listeners to programming that was
more democratically and culturally enriching than what they otherwise
demanded. 13 Although the FCC has vacillated in its specific requirements,
the consistent overarching goals of the broadcast public interest standard
have been the enhancement of civic life, democratic engagement, and
citizen self-expression by means of the provision of universally available,
locally oriented, and topically diverse programming from a multiplicity of
commercial and noncommercial sources. 14
As expected, broadcasting assumed a central importance in American
political and cultural life.' 5 Even in households with Internet access,
broadcasting-and especially television-continues to serve as a point of
common focus.'

6

While broadcasting's potential for ubiquity and

dominance in the nation's information ecology was fulfilled, the hopes that
it would serve as a vehicle for democratic and political engagement,
exchange, and education have yet to be realized. The broadcast medium,
both by technological design and commercial imperative, has proved to be
a flawed instrument for democratic enrichment with a structure incapable
of supporting the electronic free marketplace of ideas regulatory optimists
had envisioned.' 7 The broadcast public interest standard itself has fallen far
short of compensating the American public for the licensees' use of
lucrative and scarce public spectrum. Plagued by an array of vexing
definitional, constitutional, commercial, and regulatory challenges, the
broadcast public interest standard has become what former FCC

13.

See Goodman, supra note 8, at 1404-15 (describing the importance of "common

exposure" and "public elevation" in media and especially broadcast policy); Cass R.
Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 501 (2000) ("There is a
large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.").
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. In 1968, reportedly distressed by the details exposed by CBS News anchor Walter

Cronkite about the American military's troubles in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson was
quoted as saying, "If I've lost Walter... I've lost middle America." BARBARA W.
TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY: FROM TROY TO VIETNAM 352 (1984). A quarter-century
later, social critic Camille Paglia wrote, "Television is America's kingmaker." CAMILLE

PAGLIA, Television and the Clintons, in VAMPS & TRAMPS 172, 172 (1994). Paglia also
famously posited, more generally, that "Television is America." CAMILLE PAGLIA, Sontag,
Bloody Sontag, in VAMPS & TRAMPS, supra, at 344, 346.
16. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AUDIENCE SEGMENTS IN A CHANGING NEWS
ENVIRONMENT: KEY NEWS AUDIENCES NOW BLEND ONLINE AND TRADITIONAL SOURCES 7,

49 (2008),

http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/444.pdf (reporting results showing that

television "remains the most widely used source" for news, with 52% of those surveyed
regularly receiving news from local television stations); see also LLOYD, PROLOGUE TO A
FARCE, supra note 6, at 217 (discussing how broadcasting has remained prominent in the
complex modem media landscape).

17. See infra Parts I.B.3 & I.C.
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Commissioner and law18 professor Glen 0. Robinson calls "vague to the
point of vacuousness."'
The Internet's regulatory provenance is different from that of
broadcasting. Whereas the broadcast public interest standard was rooted in
a vision of the First Amendment assigning to government a proactive role
in cultivating a democracy-enriching free marketplace of ideas, the Internet
emerged into an era of deregulation and the exaltation of the commercial
marketplace as the arbiter of the public interest. Although the Internet was
born of massive government research subsidies and common carrier
regulation, the government's orientation toward it evolved into one that is
anti-interventionist, embodying an autonomy-based vision of the First
Amendment-one that views the proper role of government in the digital
speech market as absent.' 9 The role of government in relation to the
Internet now is largely a reactive one. In 1996, Congress announced that it
would be the policy of the United States "to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
20
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."
With the exception of mostly unsuccessful attempts to curb access to
pornographic online content, 2 1 modest programs to subsidize Internet
access in schools and libraries,22 and incidental regulations on telephonylike broadband services (such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)), 23 the

federal government has since maintained a nonregulatory orientation
toward the Internet.
Although broadcasting remains a dominant medium in the nation's
information ecology, the Internet has begun to rival its centrality and

18. Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at
3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); see also R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1959) (arguing that the public interest standard "lacks
any definite meaning" and "the many inconsistencies in decisions have made it impossible
for the phrase to acquire a definite meaning in the process of regulation").
19. See infra Part ILA; see also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781,
785 (1987) (describing the autonomy-rooted view of the First Amendment "as though a
zone of noninterference were placed around each individual, and the state [alone] were
prohibited from crossing the boundary").
20. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
21. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down as violative of the
First Amendment the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which criminalized knowing
posting, for commercial purposes, of content "harmful to minors"); United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding authority of the United States to withhold
E-Rate Internet access subsidies to public schools and libraries that refused to install web
filtration software on library computers); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking
down anti-indecency provisions of the Communications Decency Act).
22. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. See infra note 157.
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dominance. 24 Today broadcasters, as digital content producers themselves,
are only one source of content in the broadband realm.25 It is the Internet,
and not broadcasting, that today is considered the technology that is
revolutionizing politics, democratic engagement, and society as a whole.26
Moreover, the migration of attention from broadcasting to the Internet is
accelerating with the aging of the populace. In July 2008, the New York
Times reported that the average age of the American broadcast television
viewer today is fifty, 27 whereas the Internet has become "a leading source
of campaign news for young people. 28

24. For example, this year approximately 194 million Americans (two-thirds of the
nation's population) are online and the online population is expected to grow to 217 million
(71%) by 2012. Lisa E. Phillips, U.S. Online Population, EMARKETER, Feb. 2008,
http://www.emarketer.com/report.aspx?code=emarketer_2000486. It is expected that by the
end of 2008, online advertising revenue will overtake radio advertising revenue and that by
2011, the Internet will supplant the newspaper industry as the top recipient of advertising
revenue. Id.; see also CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, CHANGING DIGITAL MEDIA
BEHAVIORS, THE GROWTH OF INTERACTIVE SERVICES AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA IN
TRANSITION: A CRITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2008),

availableat http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/newmediapubinterest.pdf.
25. See Tom Shales, Transmission: Impossible, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2008, at M1
(observing that "[w]e don't watch television; instead, we access program material through
content providers" so that "TV now seeps into our lives" through a myriad of digital devices
not identified as television sets).
26. See infra Parts II.A, II.B & II.B.1; see also Internet Now Major Source of
Campaign
News,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER,
Oct.
31,
2008,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1017/intemet-now-major-source-of-campaign-news (noting that
while "[t]elevision remains the dominant source" of campaign news, the percentage of
Americans "who say they get most of their campaign news from the internet has tripled
since October 2004 (from 10% then to 33% now)").
27. Virginia Heffernan, Prime Times, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2008, at 22.
28. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL NETWORKING
AND ONLINE VIDEOS TAKE OFF: INTERNET'S BROADER ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008, at 1 (2008),
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/384.pdf; see also id. at 1 (documenting how the Internet,
and especially social networking and online video services available through broadband, is
playing an increasingly dominant role in the provision of political content for eighteen- to
twenty-nine-year-olds while the influence of broadcasting is weakening); PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, AUDIENCE SEGMENTS IN A CHANGING NEWS ENVIRONMENT: KEY NEWS AUDIENCES

Now BLEND ONLINE AND TRADITIONAL SOURCES 2 (2008), http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/444.pdf (noting that the youngest of the surveyed users (median age of
thirty-five) "rely primarily on the Internet for news" and are nearly twice as likely to view
online news clips than watch nightly news broadcasts). According to Pew Research Center,
"At a time when a declining number of young people rely on television for most of their
news about the [presidential] campaign, a sizable minority are going online to watch videos
of campaign debates, speeches and commercials." Id. at 2; see also Alex Mindlin,
Preferring the Web Over Watching TV, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2008, at C3 (reporting results
of a study conducted by DoubleClick Performics and concluding that "the computer is a
bigger draw than the TV set for the youngest teenagers"); AARON SMITH & LEE RAINIE, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AND THE 2008 ELECTION, at ii, v (2008),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP 2008_election.pdf (reporting that 46% of surveyed
Americans are using digital media to engage in the 2008 elections, while adults under thirty
are most dependent on the Internet "to get or share information about the candidates and the
campaign").
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Much of the public affairs programming that had been traditionally
available on broadcast media has migrated to online and pay-television
platforms. For example, during the presidential primary in 2007 and 2008,
many of the political cognoscenti and regular citizens with broadband
Internet access, pay-television access, or both, complained that they were
growing tired of the plethora of candidate debates. 29 However, the great
majority of those debates-roughly three-quarters-were not available at
all to households solely dependent on free broadcast television.3 °
Broadcast coverage of public affairs and governance matters also is scarce,
whereas such material is abundantly available via pay-cable and broadband
subscriptions.3'
Citizens with high-speed broadband Internet access live in a
fundamentally richer, more diverse, and more interactive information
environment than those dependent primarily on broadcasting for political,
informational, and other democratic content.32 Broadband households can
(1) access an abundance of information concerning government and
politics; (2) build upon that information by means of commentary in
personalized blogs, vlogs, or postings to others' websites; (3) pose
questions and challenges to elected officials or candidates for office;
(4) disseminate new ideas and calls to action; and (5) form novel, online
and virtually no expense
communities of interest-all with little effort
33
subscription.
broadband
the
of
cost
beyond the
29. See, e.g., David Yepsen, Op-Ed., Stop the Madness! Change Rules of Election
Game-by 2016, DES MoiNEs REG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 1 (complaining that "we are awash in
presidential debates"); Allan Louden, Is Anyone Listening? When Are There Too Many
2007,
Oct.
19,
DEBATESCOOP,
Debates?,
http://www.debatescoop.org/story/2007/10/19/202519/02.
30. Of the forty-eight Democratic and Republican party primary debates, only thirteen
debates were broadcast on free over-the-air television stations, and an additional two were
broadcast only in New Hampshire. See Memorandum of Karolina Lyznik Summarizing
Presidential Debate Television Coverage Research (July 21, 2008) (on file with author); see also
Peter Brown, Too Many Debates, Too Little Impact, REALCLEARPOLrICS.COM, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/too manydebates too little im.html
(bemoaning the proliferation of debates and acknowledging that "[t]he myriad debates are
being aired on cable news channels"). In addition, whereas the free television networks
traditionally offered gavel-to-gavel coverage of the presidential nominating conventions, the
broadcast coverage of the 2004 and 2008 presidential nominating conventions were at an
all-time low, with each of the major networks devoting only one hour of airtime per night
for each of the party nominating conventions. See David Zurawik, Networks Rethink
Conventions, BALT. SUN, Aug. 25, 2008, at 11 (stating that the major broadcast networks
offered "an hour a night starting at 10 [p.m. E.D.T.] Monday through Thursday during both
conventions"); Joanne Ostrow, Party Confabs Falling to Cable, DENVER POST, July 22,
2004, at 3F (noting that reduced coverage will mean that those without cable will see "more
canned speeches," "less primetime analysis," and "fewer of the odd, defining moments that
reveal who the parties really are").
31. See infra Part I.B.3.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See A. Michael Froornkin, Technologies for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE 3,
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In light of how the Internet has begun to displace broadcasting as the
nation's central media platform, this Article examines why and how the
federal government should adjust its disposition toward the Internet, and
particularly broadband, from one of laissez faire nonintervention to one that
more affirmatively and comprehensively promotes democratic and First
Amendment values online by means of a broadband public interest
standard. My central argument is that, although the broadcast public
interest standard fell far short of its aspirations, the principal goals
valorized by that standard-universal service, localism, diversity,
noncommercial content, and the promotion of democratic engagement in a
competitive marketplace of ideas-should serve as a template for more
Such a
proactive federal interventions into the broadband realm.
broadband public interest standard would apply the lessons learned by its
broadcast progenitor in a manner that would more effectively yield the
democratic, social, and political goals that the broadcast public interest
standard attempted, but mostly failed to deliver, while helping to mitigate
some of the Internet's antidemocratic, atomizing tendencies.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the historical,
theoretical, and regulatory foundations of the broadcast public interest
standard, offers an assessment of its current condition, and suggests reasons
why it has fallen short of its core objectives. Part II discusses the Internet's
past and current regulatory statuses, and examines the ways in which the
Internet promotes and undermines free speech and democratic values. This
Part demonstrates how the government's noninterventionist disposition and
reliance on the private marketplace alone have failed to realize the
Internet's potential as an instrument for true deliberative democratic
engagement and free expression. Part III discusses a set of interrelated and
proactive federal legislative and regulatory interventions that can form the
foundation of-and operationalize-a new broadband public interest
standard. Just as the broadcast standard attempted to do in broadcasting,
this new standard would work to optimize the democracy-enhancing
qualities of the Internet while helping to mitigate its harms. This Part is
subdivided into two subparts. The first calls for a much more proactive and
direct federal role in the proliferation of broadband Internet service, and
discusses both supply- and demand-side interventions toward broadband
universality. The second discusses content-neutral initiatives to help
cultivate digital democracy and expression, such as federal financial and
technical supports for local public online deliberative spaces and subsidies
for noncommercial locally oriented online content. This subpart also
9-17 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) (describing the variety of online tools for facilitating
democratic engagement and participation).
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briefly analyzes the implications of network neutrality on online democracy
and expression. Finally, Part IV looks at how a broadband public interest
standard-designed around the affirmative interventions discussed in Part
III-would avoid some of the constraints and complications that bedeviled
the broadcast standard, while promoting and at last realizing the broadcast
standard's important values.
I. THE BROADCAST PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

A. Statutory and Regulatory Foundations
The broadcast public interest standard was created as one manifestation
of the public interest theory of administrative governance, which emerged
as the dominant approach to regulation at the height of the New Deal and
its immediate aftermath. Its earliest advocates were Louis Brandeis,
Charles Francis Adams, and John M. Landis. 34 Landis's ideas about public
interest regulation of railroads later were generalized by many scholars 35 as
well as Supreme Court Justices 36 who promoted public interest
administrative governance after having contributed to the building of New
Deal institutions earlier in their careers. 37
The public interest approach to regulation was novel in that it construed
the federal agency's role as "exercis[ing] its discretion in implementing
statutes with a view to the national interest or general welfare, rather than
yielding to factional pressure at the behest of one or another powerful
interest group.
An early and persistent challenge to public interest
regulatory theorists and adherents was the articulation of a cogent and
durable definition of the "public interest." Professor Mark Niles notes that
34.

See generallyTHOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984).

35. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1056 (1997) (citing the work of Clark Byse, Kenneth Culp
Davis, Louis Jaffe, Walter Gellhorn, Nathaniel Nathanson, and Bernard Schwartz).
36. See id.at 1059 (listing Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed, Murphy, Douglas, and
Fortas).
37. Thomas Merrill posits that this notion of regulating in the public's interest was the
"mindset of the men (they were almost all men) in their thirties and forties who had served
in the New Deal, and who fanned out to fill administrative, academic and judicial posts in
the 1950s and early 1960s." Id. at 1048.
38. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
558 (2000); see also Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative
Evolution 15 (Sept. 4, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (positing that
public interest regulation was rooted in an "endemically positive faith in the potential of
government, and particularly administrative government, to serve the common good").
According to Thomas Merrill, the theorists and officials who extolled public interest
governance had "faith that complex problems can be mastered by human reason" and that
the administrative agency was "specifically designed to achieve this ideal" since it "is a
centralized source of governmental authority that can bring coordinated solutions to social
and economic problems throughout its jurisdiction." Merrill, supra note 35, at 1048-49.
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"the public interest theorists sought not to define the public interest so
much as to create and protect structures which allowed an organically
defined version 39
of the public interest to percolate naturally to the top of the
political arena.,

It was in this regulatory milieu that Congress in 1927 created the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC), the FCC's predecessor-one of many new
regulatory agencies charged with identifying and enforcing the public
interest in a number of burgeoning areas of commerce, including shipping,
food and drugs, energy, and commodities trading.40 In enacting the 1927
Radio Act, Congress responded to calls for more federal oversight over a
radio industry threatened by excessive signal interference by charging the
new FRC with the authority to regulate broadcasting4' 1in furtherance of an
undefined "public interest, convenience, or necessity.
B. Defining "PublicInterest" in Broadcasting

The history of the broadcast public interest standard has been called "the
search for the holy grail. 42 Former FCC Chair Newton Minow has
suggested that the term was used in the legislation to provide an
overarching regulatory standard to direct the government's interventions
into the wholly novel and uncharted territory of broadcasting.43 Congress
39. Niles, supra note 38, at 17.
40. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 3, 9, 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166-67,
repealed by Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, tit. VI, § 602(a), 48 Stat.
1064, 1102. The 1927 Radio Act created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) for an
initial trial period of one year, with the primary purpose of adjudicating broadcast licensing
and technical permit applications. See ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION

12-13 (3d ed. 1982).

41. See Radio Act of 1927 §§ 9, 11 (enunciating the public interest standard as serving
"public convenience, interest or necessity" in § 9 and articulating the more common, abovequoted standard in § 11).
42. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard.- The
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 605 (1998). Senator Clarence Dill (DWA), a principal drafter of the Radio Act of 1927, recalled that the source of the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity" language in the Radio Act was a Senate Commerce
Committee staffer who previously had worked at the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which itself was charged by Congress to further the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" in regulating railroads.
PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC

MEDIA 67 (2001). Senator Dill recalled that he and his colleagues thought that the language
"sounded pretty good, so we decided we would use it, too." NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L.
LAMAY,

ABANDONED

IN

THE

WASTELAND:

CHILDREN,

TELEVISION

AND

THE FIRST

AMENDMENT 4 (1995). Newton Minow surmises that a junior lawyer from the ICC, loaned
to the Senate to help draft the new communications legislation, had proposed the "public
interest" term because he had seen it in other federal statutes dealing with regulated
industries. Krasnow & Goodman, supra, at 610.
43. See NEWTON N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME 8-9 (1964). Judge Henry Friendly traced the
origins of "public convenience, interest, and necessity" to the Transportation Act of 1920,
where it "conveyed a fair degree of meaning" in directing authorizations for new railroad
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incorporated the language again in creating the more powerful FCC by
means of the 1934 Communications Act. 4 The Supreme Court later
characterized these terms as "explicitly and by implication left to the
Commission's own devising., 4' According to the Court, they constituted a
delegation of "expansive powers" by means of a "comprehensive mandate"
to make the best use of the public airwaves. 46
What became known as the broadcast public interest standard, also
referred to as the "public trustee doctrine," was intended to be a malleable,
"supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which
Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy.

'47

Defining and

pursuing the "public interest" was a challenge across many New Deal
agencies with specialized "public interest" missions.48 In the FCC's case,
Congress has referred to the public interest in delegating regulatory
authority to the agency across broadcast as well as nonbroadcast areas.4 9
But for the agency, fulfilling its public interest mandate in broadcasting has
proved especially vexing, given the industry's technological, commercial,
and constitutional peculiarities.
Analyzed in the broadest terms, the broadcast public interest standard
has evolved through three eras defined by shifts in the balance between
predominantly proactive regulation in pursuit of democratic objectives and
a more reactive, deregulatory posture rooted in neoliberal free-market
views of government oversight. 50 The FCC's regulatory vacillations

construction.
quoted in T.

HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54-55 (1962),
BARTON CARTER, MARC A. FRANKLIN & JAY B. WRIGHT, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF THE MASS MEDIA (9th ed. 2005). Judge

Friendly asserts that it conveyed less meaning when used in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, "but under those statutes there would usually be
some demonstrable factors." Id. He concludes that "[t]he standard was almost drained of
meaning" when it was included in the 1934 Communications Act. Id.
44. See, e.g., The 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (empowering the
Commission to prescribe rules and regulations "in the public interest").
45. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
46. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); see also Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (characterizing Congress's "mandate to the FCC to
assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest" as "a broad one").
47. Pottsville Broad.Co., 309 U.S. at 138.
48. Niles, supra note 38, at 12-14.
49. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(3) (regulatory forbearance authority in
telecommunications); id. § 201(a) (services and charges applicable to common carriers);
id. § 214(e)(2) (designation of telecommunications carriers eligible for universal service
support); id. § 573(a)(1) (open-video-service certifications).
50. For an excellent and much more detailed history of the broadcast public interest
standard, see Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 813, 825-47 (2008). See also PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 12-21 (1999); Howard

A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the
Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371 (2006); Varona, supra note 7, at 18-32.
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notwithstanding, the FCC's overarching objective in administering the
public interest standard always has been to "meet certain basic needs of
American politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace may or
may not provide," in order to "cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater
democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population,
and more robust, culturally inclusive communities." 5 1
1. 1930s Through 1960s-ProactiveRegulation "to Promote and Realize
the Vast Potentialities" ofBroadcasting
In the first four decades of American broadcast regulation, the FRC and
then the FCC attempted to define both the government's relationship to
broadcasters and the content of public interest programming. In 1930, the
FRC declared that the broadcast public interest standard had at its core the
democratization of information and the competitive exchange of ideas in a
broadcast marketplace of ideas.5 2 Once in place, the FCC-with
congressional acquiescence-interpreted its mission in regulating
broadcasting as invigorating the political life and democratic culture of the
nation. In a 1949 report, the FCC stated that the goal of broadcast
regulation "in a democracy is the development of an informed public
opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the
vital public issues of the day. 53 Underscoring the importance of localism,
the FCC dictated that broadcasters must "devote a reasonable percentage of
their broadcast time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to

51. DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 9, at 21; see also CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (describing government's role as "an

'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
384-86 (recounting evolution of the fairness doctrine and the public interest standard); see
also Rainey, supra note 12, at 271 (discussing the "dissemination of information pertinent to
democratic decisionmaking" as the key purpose of public interest broadcast regulation).
52. Great Lakes Broad. Co., F.R.C. No. 4900 (1928), reprintedin 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32,
33 (1929), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930). The FRC interpreted the public interest standard as, inter alia,
requiring in "all discussions of issues of importance to the public.., ample play for the free
and fair competition of opposing views." Id.at 33. In another proceeding, the FRC offered
the earliest elucidation of the public trusteeship model in broadcasting regulation directing
that "the station itself must be operated as if owned by the public.... It is as if people of a
community should own a station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this
injunction: 'Manage this station in our interest."' Schaeffer Radio Co., F.R.C. No. 5228
(June

5,

1930)

(unpublished),

http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-bin/assemble?docno=291101,

reprinted in John W. Willis, The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service
Responsibility of BroadcastLicensees, 11 J.FED. COMM. B. Ass'N 5, 14 (1950).
53.

Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).

In this Report, the

Commission formally announced the fairness doctrine by recognizing "the paramount right
of the public in a free society to be informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or
rejection the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often
controversial issues." Id.
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the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the
community served by the particular station" to satisfy the "right of the
public to be informed. 54 Professor Philip M. Napoli notes that the
Commission's early commitment to localism was not "an end in and of
itself' but rather an objective "motivated by both political and cultural
concerns" and the promotion of "political participation and education
among the citizenry. 55
The FCC also gradually articulated a nuanced approach to the diversity
principle. It justified many of its programming and multiple- and crossownership regulations by emphasizing the importance of competition
among providers of broadcast service, as well as the related values of
diversity in viewpoint, programming sources, formats and content, and the
racial, ethnic, and gender statuses of licensees. 56 Although not often
discussed in the early years of broadcasting regulation, the notion of
"exposure diversity" gained preeminence in relation to the marketplace of
ideas concept.57 It is not enough that a participant in the ideas marketplace
have access to a diversity of ideas from a plethora of sources since access
alone does not ensure consumption. For the marketplace of ideas to
function well as an instrument for democratic self-government, the
participants actually must be exposed to a diversity of competing ideas.5 8
The Supreme Court generally deferred to the FCC's early interpretations
of its democracy-enhancing regulatory mission in broadcasting. In its 1943
NBC, Inc. v. United States decision, the Court upheld the FCC's laterrepealed "chain broadcasting" rules, which the agency adopted in the
interest of promoting diversity and localism.5 9 Rejecting the broadcast
54. Id.
55. Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle in Communications Policymaking and
Policy Analysis: Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Empirical Neglect, 29 POL'Y STuD. J.372,

380 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
56. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627-37 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
Order] (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) (reviewing various forms of
diversity in broadcast policy). For an excellent and detailed discussion of the FCC's
varying interpretations of the diversity principle, see Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180
F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (recognizing that the national policy that "there be competition
in the radio broadcasting industry" is closely related to the diversity principle); NAPOLI,
supra note 42, at 128-57 (discussing variants of diversity principle and competition);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace ofIdeas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813.
57. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 146-48.
58. See CASS R. SUJNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 3-18 (2007) (discussing the dangers
of narrow filtration of media); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Proactive Media Policy in an
Age of Content Abundance, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS
366 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (discussing the importance of exposure diversity in the
digital media marketplace).
59. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198 (1943).
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networks' argument that the rules were an improper restraint on commerce,
the Court reasoned that the Communications Act "[did] not restrict the
Commission merely to supervision of the [broadcast] traffic. It put[s] upon
the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic." 60 According to the Court, the "avowed aim" of the 1934
Communications Act was "to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all
the people of the United States" by "endow[ing] the Communications
Commission with comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast
potentialities of radio. 61
The 1934 Communications Act required the Commission to assign
broadcasting licenses in such a way as to blanket the nation with
In
universally available and locally oriented broadcast service. 62
proliferating VHF television service in the 1940s, the FCC allocated
stations even to small towns whose economies were thought too meager to
support broadcasting service so as many Americans as possible could
access broadcasting.63
a. Attempts at Specific Requirements: The "Blue Book" and the 1960
ProgrammingStatement
Emboldened by judicial deference and the broad congressional
delegation of authority,64 the FCC set out to adopt a detailed and durable
set of programming requirements. In response to the criticism that its early
descriptions of public interest programming were too vague,65 the FCC in
60. Id. at 215-16.
61. Id. at 217; see also id. ("Section 303(g) [of the 1934 Communications Act]
provides that the Commission shall 'generally encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest."').
62. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2000) (requiring that,
in overseeing commercial broadcasting, "the Commission shall make [the] distribution of
licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each
of the same"); see also id. § 396(a)(5) (addressing public television and declaring that "it

furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which will be
responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and throughout the United
States ... which will constitute a source of alternative telecommunications services for all
the citizens of the Nation"); Napoli, supra note 55, at 374 (pointing out that the principle of
locally oriented broadcasting emerged as a national imperative from both the Radio Act of
1927 and the Communications Act of 1934).
63. See Napoli, supra note 55, at 374-75 (arguing that the FCC's distribution
principles sought to prioritize "the autonomy of local broadcasters, as opposed to
encouraging the development of national networks").
64. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard. Is It Too Indeterminateto Be
Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 428-29 (2001) (arguing that such a broad
delegation of authority violated the nondelegation doctrine).
65. See Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC's Weak
Track Record in Interpretingthe Public Interest Standard,60 N.C. L. REV. 1057, 1061-62
(1982) (arguing that it was in part because the FCC was primarily concerned with matters
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1946 issued a list of affirmative programming obligations that became
popularly known as the "Blue Book., 66 The Blue Book required broadcast
licensees to provide a "reasonable" amount of live and locally originated
noncommercial programming, to cover issues of local importance, andupon penalty of license nonrenewal-to air programming in certain
categories, including "discussion," "education," and "talks. 67 Faced with
a loud backlash from the already-potent broadcast lobby that attacked the
Blue Book as a violation of broadcasters' First Amendment rights, the FCC
largely ignored the Blue Book and very rarely referred to it in subsequent
enforcement and rulemaking proceedings.6 8
The FCC tried again fourteen years later by adopting the 1960
Programming Statement.69 Unlike the Blue Book, the 1960 Programming
Statement did not attempt to prescribe a national, one-size-fits-all public
interest programming menu but instead reminded broadcasters that as
public trustees they had to ascertain the particular "public interest, needs,
and desires of the communit[ies]" in which they were licensed and had to
air programming responsive to those needs.70 The content of public interest
programming was dictated less by the FCC than by the public itself. The 1960
Programming Statement provided that such programming could include
content that provided "opportunity for local self-expression," "public affairs
programs," "political broadcasts," "service to minority groups," and
This attempt at a comprehensive set of public
"educational programs.'
interest requirements was somewhat more effective than its 1946 predecessor,

other than detailed review of public issue programming during the 1930s and 1940s).
66. See generally FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, REPORT, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY
OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946) (outlining the FCC's new policies for more detailed
review of station performance when examining license renewal applications).
67. See Chamberlin, supra note 65, at 1063 n.24 (discussing the programming
requirements evident in the FCC's new license renewal application after the publication of
the Blue Book).
68. See Anthony E. Varona, Out of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum
Analysis to Redeem American BroadcastingRegulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 156
(2006) (describing how the FCC gave in to outside pressures and the Blue Book "bombed").
An especially telling sign of the FCC's retreat from the Blue Book was its renewal in 1950
of station WOAX's license despite the station management's explicit refusal to air any of
the public interest programming required by the Blue Book. Id.
69. Commission Programing [sic] Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (report and statement
of policy) (en banc).
70. Id. at 156-58. The ascertainment requirements, elaborated upon in a separate
rulemaking proceeding, provided guidelines for broadcasters on how to execute and
document ascertainment efforts. See Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad.
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 (1971) (clarifying the meaning of certain language in
the FCC's broadcast license application which had been given different meanings by
different applicants).
71. Varona, supra note 68, at 157 (quoting Commission Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C,
at 2314).
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but the FCC rarely referred to it in reviewing license renewal applications.7 2
b. More Specification, the FairnessDoctrine,andNoncommercial
Broadcasting
Smaller scale attempts at elucidating the public interest requirements
came in 1965, when the FCC standardized the 1960 Programming
Statement's licensing decision criteria,73 and again in 1976, when it
declared that licensing applications proposing less than 5% "local" or
"informational" programming would not qualify for streamlined
consideration. 74 Then, in 1974, the Commission issued the FairnessReport
in which it reiterated the importance of uninhibited, "robust, wide open"
deliberation of public issues on the airwaves, and defended the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters to
(1) "devote a reasonable percentage of time to coverage of public issues";
an opportunity for the
and (2) cover these issues fairly by "provid[ing]
75
presentation of contrasting points of view."
Concerned that the broadcast public interest standard still did not
optimize the democratic, cultural, and educational value of broadcasting,
Congress enacted the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, which
created a capital grant fund for public, noncommercial broadcasting.76 Five
years later it enacted the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which created
the publicly funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) with the
mission of 77facilitating "the full development of educational
broadcasting."
72. The FCC, in fact, continued granting broadcast license renewals in large groups,
without any reference to the 1960 Programming Statement guidelines nor the apparent
failure of the applicants to provide any public interest programming in satisfaction of the
guidelines. See, e.g., Renewals of Broad. Licenses for Ind., Ky., & Tenn., 42 F.C.C.2d 900,
900 (1973) (granting the license renewal applications of 374 station licensees); see also
Varona, supra note 7, at 25 & n.98 (providing more examples of en masse license renewals).
73. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broad. Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965)
(noting that the statement was issued for the purposes of "clarity and consistency of
decision" and eliminating "time-consuming elements not substantially related to the public
interest").
74. See Amendment to Section 0.281 of the Comm'n Rules: Delegations of Auth. to
the Chief, Broad. Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 492 (1976) (fixing a low percentage
requirement for certain programming types rather than leaving the meaning of the term
"substantial" up to the individual discretion of the licensee).
75. Fairness Report of 1974, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7, 9 (1974) aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978).
76. See Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 390 (2000)
(declaring that the purposes of the Act were to facilitate diversity in availability, operation,
and ownership of public broadcast services and to strengthen existing service to the public).
77. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2000) (amended in
1978 to replace "educational broadcasting" with "public telecommunications"); see also
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c. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: The Public'sFirstAmendment
Rights as Paramount
At the end of this era of proactive FCC engagement in public interest
programming, the Supreme Court, in 1969, again reaffirmed the
constitutionality of the broadcast public interest standard with a strong
endorsement of affirmative government interventions into the speech market
to promote democratic values. In the unanimous Red Lion BroadcastingCo.
v. FCC case, the Court upheld the fairness doctrine and the related
7
Rejecting the
regulations on political attacks and editorializing.
broadcasters' First Amendment challenge, the Court reasoned that, because
the radio-frequency spectrum is a scarce national resource, the First
Amendment would allow the government to condition the use of licensed
spectrum on compliance with affirmative public interest programming
requirements. 79 The objective of broadcast regulation, according to the
Court, was "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
'0
market, whether it be by the Government itself or of a private licensee.
This was especially so since broadcasting had "supplant[ed] atomized,
relatively informal communication with mass media as a prime source of
national cohesion and news." 8' That power of broadcasting to attract the
public's attention as a modem, electronic Agora, by means of the public's
own resource, rendered the speech rights of the licensees subordinate to
and listeners,
those of the audience members: "It is the right of the viewers
82
paramount."
is
which
broadcasters,
the
of
right
the
not
But Red Lion did not only make reference to scarcity-dependent
The Court also reaffirmed the
regulation of broadcasters' speech.
importance of government's role, more generally, in endeavoring to present
the public with democracy-enhancing information, especially given the

Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing how in
1970 CPB and a group of noncommercial licensees formed the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR)).

78. 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (interpreting such regulations as an enhancement of free
speech rather than an abridgement).
79. See id. at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish.").

80. Id. at 390 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)); see also

Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 (applying the Sherman Act to the newspaper industry and

declaring that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public").
81. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 386 n.15.
82. Id. at 390.
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unique value of broadcasting to serve as a convener and central focus of
public attention. Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court noted that
"[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. 8 3 The people, the Court reasoned, would
become better citizens by virtue of government's facilitation of "the
presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and
concern to the public. 8 4
2. 1970s and 1980s-The Taming of Red Lion by the Invisible Hand
The regulatory tides at the FCC began to turn in the 1970s, with
mounting public skepticism of government's ability to realize the public
good. The Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers controversy, Watergate, and
especially President Richard Nixon's efforts to strong-arm the FCC into
penalizing broadcasters that aired programs critical of his Administration
soured the public on government and specifically its influence on the
media.85 The nation looked for alternatives to governmental pursuit of the
public interest and spotted the invisible hand.
In a law review article coauthored with Daniel L. Brenner, President
Reagan's FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler proposed "a new direction for
governmental regulation of broadcasting" that relied "on the broadcasters'
ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal
mechanisms of the marketplace. 8 6 Fowler and Brenner insisted that
Congress and the FCC should regard "broadcasters not as fiduciaries of the
public, as their regulators have historically perceived them, but as
marketplace competitors. 8 7 Later defending his deregulatory animus,
Fowler famously quipped that broadcasters should face no particularized
regulation whatsoever, since "television is just another appliance. It's a
toaster with pictures."88 Fowler's demand for a more market-driven
approach to broadcast regulation was manifestly rooted in the thenprevailing Chicago School theories of free competition advocating that the
commercial marketplace was better at delivering the public interest than
83. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
84. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 385.
85. See Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1215, 1218

(1999) (discussing the threat to television from censorship both by state actors and by actors
within the television industry itself).
86. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207, 209-10 (1982) (arguing that the marketplace approach
better serves the public in an environment increasingly defined by new media and
"technological plenty").
87. Id. at 210.
88. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money: The FCC's Big Giveaway Show, 241
NATION 402, 402 (1985) (quoting remarks by Mr. Fowler in an address to radio and
television executives).
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regulatory dictates. 89

The Reagan Era deregulation of broadcasting was swift and
comprehensive. The FCC eliminated many requirements, including some
multiple-ownership
restrictions,
radio
programming
guidelines,
requirements for documenting the ascertainment of community
programming needs, program log requirements, and mandatory minimum
quantities of public affairs programming.9" It lengthened the television
license terms from three to five years and radically streamlined the license
renewal process so that licenses were conferred under a "postcard renewal"
mechanism devoid of any meaningful review of a licensee's public interest
programming. 9' Just a few years before Reagan, in 1974, the FCC
characterized the fairness doctrine as "the single most important
requirement of operation in the public interest-the sine qua non for grant
of a renewal of license. 92 But the FCC eliminated the fairness doctrine in
1987, reasoning that it was having the counterproductive effect of
inhibiting the speech of broadcasters, who were avoiding the coverage of
controversial issues of public importance in order to stay clear of the
fairness doctrine's balancing requirements.93
3. 1990s to Today: ContinuedDeregulationand a Modest Revival of
PublicInterest Regulation (Red Lion Roars Again)
Congress and the FCC continued to eliminate or weaken some broadcast
public interest regulations throughout the 1990s, while promulgating new
requirements in the name of the public interest. In 1993, the Commission
89. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 665
(1998) (explaining Chicago School theorists' preference for rational-choice models over
regulatory structures); see also Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Take on Shasta County and the
"New Chicago School," 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2003) (discussing the popularity of
rational-choice models among legal theorists following Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and
Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623
(1986), but noting the limits of this perspective and espousing the benefits of critical
theory).

90. See Varona, supra note 7, at 27-28 (detailing then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's
deregulatory policies and their effects on the broadcasting market).
91. Id. at 28.
92. Fairness Report of 1974, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 926
(1978).
93.

See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-52 (1987)

(finding that the fairness doctrine inhibits broadcasters' coverage of controversial issues and
concluding that it should be eliminated), recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff'd sub
nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In 2000, the D.C.
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the FCC to repeal the personal attack and
political editorializing rules that were closely related to the fairness doctrine and were
upheld in Red Lion. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (issuing the writ).
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announced that home-shopping television stations that air only satellitedelivered product advertising and no local public affairs, news, or other
locally-oriented programming still "are serving the public interest,
convenience and necessity" and qualify for mandatory carriage on cable
systems as local stations under the 1992 Cable Act. 94 Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Telecom Act), which constituted
the most sweeping revision of federal communications law since the 1934
The 1996 Telecom Act eliminated some
Communications Act. 95
ownership restrictions, including the national cap on AM and FM radio
station ownership, 96 and increased the national television multiple-station
national audience reach (set in
ownership limit from a 25% maximum
97
1985) to a 35% audience reach limit.

The significant liberalization of longstanding station ownership
restrictions enabled broadcast group owners to grow exponentially. Clear
Channel Communications increased its radio station holdings from fortythree stations before passage of the 1996 Telecom Act to 1,200 radio
stations in 2004.98 The hazards of the ensuing media consolidation were
illustrated vividly in January 2002, when a freight train derailed in Minot,
North Dakota (population 37,000), spilling large quantities of anhydrous
ammonia fertilizer and creating a lethal and suffocating toxic vapor cloud. 99
94. See Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321, 5328-29 (1993) ("[A]s long as a home
shopping broadcast station remains authorized to hold a Commission license, it should be
qualified for mandatory carriage.").
95. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)) (amending the Communications Act of
1934).
96. See id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 ("The Commission shall modify section 73.3555
of its regulations (47 C.F.R. § 73.3555) by eliminating any provisions limiting the number
of AM or FM broadcast stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity
nationally."). At the local level, the 1996 Telecom Act allowed same-entity ownership of
up to eight commercial radio stations in markets with a total of forty-five or more
commercial radio stations, up to seven commercial radio stations in markets with thirty to
forty-four of such stations, up to six in markets with between fifteen and twenty-nine of
such stations, and up to five in markets with fewer than fifteen of such stations.
Id. § 202(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 110; see also Leonard M. Baynes, Race, Media Consolidation,
and Online Content: The Lack of SubstitutesAvailable to Media Consumers of Color, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 199 (2006) (analyzing effects of 2003 media-ownership rulings on
communities of color); Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Law on the Borderland of
Language and Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-Language Radio Market? A
Case Study of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic BroadcastingCorporation,40 U.S.F.
L. REV. 381, 386-89 (2006) (discussing liberalization of the radio ownership rules and its
deleterious effects on the radio-dependent Latino/a community).
97. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat.
56, 111.
98. John Helyar, Radio's Stern Challenge, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 2004, at 123, 124.
99. Jennifer S. Lee, On Minot, N.D., Radio: A Single Corporate Voice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2003, at C7 (discussing the incident in Minot as an example of the potentially

2009]

TOWARD A BROADBAND PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

When the emergency responders telephoned the local radio stations, they
were unable to reach anyone because Clear Channel owned twenty-three of
the eighty commercial stations in North Dakota, including six stations in
Minot, all of which were airing satellite feeds from Clear Channel's
headquarters in San Antonio, Texas.100
Undeterred, the FCC in 2003 decided to increase the national television
ownership cap to a total national audience reach limit of 45% (up from
35%).101 It did this after having received approximately 800,000 public
comments, 99% of which were in opposition to the proposal.10 2 The FCC's
action created so much public protest that Congress responded by rolling
back the new national ownership rule to 39% of national audience reach.' 3
In addition, the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC rejected
the "diversity index" devised by the FCC in justifying a number of its
changes to the media ownership rules as "arbitrary and capricious" and
relying on "irrational assumptions and inconsistencies," including that the
for local programming and source diversity in
Internet is a fitting substitute
4
local broadcast markets."1
a. The BroadcastPublic Interest StandardSurvives (Tattered, but Still
Alive)
Despite the aggressive deregulation of broadcasting, the government
continues to rely on the public interest standard-and its localism,
diversity, universal service, and democracy-building principles-both in
enforcing the vestigial public interest regulations and promulgating new
ones. Congress itself has appealed to these principles in enacting new
For example, in enacting the 1990
proactive broadcast legislation.
deleterious effects of FCC deregulation).
100. Id.
101. See 2003 Order, supra note 56, at 13,814.
102. See Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: HearingBefore the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 198th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of
Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Federal Communications Commission) ("Of the nearly three
quarters of a million comments we have received, nearly all oppose increased media
consolidation-over 99.9 percent.").
103. See Powell Sees No Fast End to Media Rules Debate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at
C4 (discussing the attempt by the FCC to relax regulations and the subsequent constriction
of the regulations by Congress). For a detailed survey of the broadcast ownership rules, see
Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, in MEDIA
DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM 9, 22-24 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (outlining the ownership
rules).
The Commission's desire to lift ownership
104. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
restrictions has not abated. In June 2008, the FCC lifted the newspaper-broadcast crossownership rule. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, MEDIA
OWNERSHIP, No. 07-216 (2008), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-081310Al.doc (informing small businesses of the recently relaxed broadcast ownership
requirements).
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Children's Television Act (CTA), Congress declared that "as part of their
obligation to serve the public interest, television station operators and
licensees should provide programming that serves the special needs of
children."' 0 5 The CTA requires the FCC to "consider the extent to which
the licensee ... has served the educational and informational needs of
children" in its programming. 10 6 Citing that authority, the FCC in 1996
adopted new regulations aimed at enhancing children's educational
programming, providing certain license renewal benefits to television
broadcasters demonstrating that they have aired a minimum of three hours
per week of educational and informational programming for children ages
sixteen and younger.' 0 7 Broadcasters also are required to comply with
certain advertising restrictions in programming primarily directed to
children. 10 8 In addition, Congress and the FCC have appealed to
television's effects on children by increasing penalties for the airing of
indecent material from $27,500 to $325,000 per incident, particularly
following the 2004 Super Bowl
halftime show in which Janet Jackson
09
breast.'
a
exposed
momentarily
The federal government's interest in universal access for free
broadcasting also has survived the deregulatory era. In 2006, Congress
appropriated $990 million for the subsidization of a program to distribute
up to two $40 discount coupons to low-income households for the purchase
of digital-to-analog retroconverters for citizens who could not afford a new
digital television set and would like to use their analog television sets to
receive free over-the-air broadcast signals after broadcast stations ceased
transmitting on analog frequencies.1 1°
105. 47 U.S.C. § 303a (2000).
106. Id. § 303b(a).
107. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Revision
of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,660 (1996)
(report and order) (adopting abbreviated renewal application procedures for broadcasters
who air at least three hours of children's programming per week, reducing the burden of the
full renewal process on such broadcasters).
108. Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2000). For
example, television licensees are prohibited from incorporating more than twelve minutes of
advertising per children's programming hour during weekdays and more than ten-and-a-half
minutes per hour on weekends. Id. § 303a(b).
109. CBS's fine was overturned by the Third Circuit in July 2008. CBS Corp. v. FCC,
535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008).
110. See Title III of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3002,
120 Stat. 4, 21 (2006) (enacting these requirements). Section 3002(a) of this statute
required analog full-power television broadcasting to cease on February 17, 2009, while
§ 3002(b) requiring the FCC to terminate all full-power analog station licenses on the
following day.
This same statute charged the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) with administering the converter program, with part of
the funding for the discount coupons coming from the forthcoming auction of the analog
broadcast spectrum returned to the government once the analog-to-digital conversion is
complete. See id. § 3004 (establishing a fund for this purpose in the Treasury of the United
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In a 2004 Notice of Inquiry on broadcast localism, the Commission
declared that "[e]ven as the Commission deregulated many behavioral rules
for broadcasters in the 1980s, it did not deviate from the notion that
[broadcasters] must serve their local communities."1' 11 It reaffirmed that
"[b]roadcasters, who are temporary trustees of the public's airwaves, must
use the medium to serve the public interest, and the Commission has
consistently interpreted this to mean that licensees must air programming
that is responsive to the interests and needs of their communities of
license."' 12 In January 2008, the FCC proposed a number of new measures
aimed at improving "broadcaster efforts to provide community-responsive
programming such as news and public affairs, and programming targeted to
'
These
the particular needs or interests of certain segments of the public."113
needs
on
the
the
station
to
advise
advisory
boards"
range from "community
of local viewing audiences, local audience surveys, and the adoption 11of
"public interest minimums" for public affairs and political programming. 4
Driving the FCC's interest in rejuvenating the broadcast public interest
standard, no doubt, are recent studies showing that local public affairs and
political programming on free broadcast television are generally scarce and
altogether nonexistent on many stations. A study of 285 broadcast
television stations by Fordham University's McGannon Communications
Research Center found that 59% of the commercial stations surveyed aired
no local public affairs program during the two-week survey period.115 And
a 2004 Lear Center study on local news coverage of the 2004 campaign
11 6
found a paucity of broadcast coverage of local political campaigns.
Ironically, despite the shortage of political coverage on broadcast
stations, broadcasters profit enormously from political advertising. As part
of their public interest duties, broadcast licensees must give "reasonable
access" for the "purchase of reasonable amounts of time" to "legally
qualified candidate[s] for Federal elective office"' 17 at the "lowest unit

States); see also NTIA Rules to Implement and Administer a Coupon Program for Digitalto-Analog Converter Boxes, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,097 (Mar. 15, 2007) (adopting regulations to
establish and administer the coupon program).
111. Broad. Localism, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425, 12,425 (2004).
112. Id.
113. Broad. Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324, 1326 (2008) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
114. Id.at 1343-44.
115. Id.at 1341-42.
116. See id at 1351 (noting that only 8% of news programs surveyed contained any
local political coverage at all).
117. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312a(7), 315 (2000); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (2007) (equal
opportunities). In addition, should a licensee "permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station."
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
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charge."' 8 During the 2004 campaigns alone, television stations earned
$1.6 billion in political advertising revenue. 19 For the 2008 election,
revenues for broadcasters were expected to exceed
political advertising
120
$3 billion.

Although broadcasters must abide by a number of other rules rooted in
the public interest standard,121 the standard has fallen far short of the
democracy-affirming goals of Congress and the early regulators. As early
as 1961, at a time when broadcasters were airing significantly more public
affairs programming than today, FCC Chairman Newton Minow had
declared the broadcast standard a failure and the broadcast landscape a
"vast wasteland" that offered little in the way of cultivating democratic
engagement in their communities of license. 122
C. Why Did the BroadcastPublic Interest StandardFall Short?
Elsewhere I have discussed reasons why the broadcast public interest
standard has had such a troubled history. 23 Other scholars and media law
practitioners have offered their own criticisms.124 Aside from receiving
118. 47C.F.R. §73.1942.
119. Mark Memmott & Jim Drinkard, Election Ad Battle Smashes Record in 2004, USA
TODAY, Nov. 26, 2004, at 6A (citing a report by the nonpartisan Alliance for Better
Campaigns, which based its findings on research conducted by TNS Media
Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis Group).
120. Mark Preston, PoliticalTelevision Advertising to Reach $3 Billion, CNN.coM, Oct.
(citing research
15, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/15/ad.spending/
conducted by TNS Media Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis Group).
121. For example, the broadcast public interest standard also is used as justification for
the Commission's prohibition on obscene broadcast content. Pub. Interest Obligations of
TV Broad. Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,634 (1999). The public interest standard also
supports the restriction on airing "indecent" content between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and
10:00 p.m. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2007). In addition, the standard serves as the regulatory
basis for requirements concerning equal employment opportunity at licensed stations
(47 C.F.R. § 73.2080), closed-captioning (47 C.F.R. § 79), and the identification of
sponsorship (47 C.F.R. § 73.1212).
122. Newton N. Minow, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Address to the National
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in MINow & LAMAY, supra note 42, at 188
app. 2.
123. See Varona, supra note 7, at 52-89 (noting the tension between the First
Amendment and the FCC's regulatory mandate); see also Varona, supra note 68, at 162-72
(arguing that the concept of television broadcasting as a marketplace of ideas is not readily
applicable to commercial broadcasting).
124. See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People
of Color by the BroadcastNetworks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming,45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 293 (2003) (arguing that the FCC has failed to prevent the negative portrayal of
minorities through pejorative stereotypes); Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest
Regulation in the Digital Age, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 97 (2003) (discussing the
application of the public interest standard to digital television broadcasting); Henry Geller,
PublicInterest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341 (1998)
(analyzing how the public interest standard should continue to apply in an era of digital
television); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee
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very little congressional direction, the FCC was hampered by legislation
that is internally inconsistent.' 25 The Communications Act on the one hand
directs the Commission to regulate broadcasters "consistent with the public
interest"' 126 but on the other hand commands that "no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated.., by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication." ' 27 The Commission has increasingly avoided walking
this "tightrope"' 128 altogether, particularly in light of the persistent and
broad-based criticism levied against the scarcity rationale, which-in light
of digital29spectrum management technologies-rests on increasingly weak
footing. 1
Structural impediments also have bedeviled the broadcast public interest
standard. The aspiration that commercial broadcasting stations serve as
electronic platforms for a ubiquitous marketplace of ideas ignored both the
unidirectional, noninteractive structure of the medium as well as its

Viewers, not public interest programs, are the
economic realities.
130
commodities that are traded on the commercial broadcast airwaves. 31
consumers.'
Advertisers, not the audience members, are broadcasting's
And the many broadcast licensees owned by public corporations act as if
they were more accountable to profit-driven shareholders than to the

Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101 (1997)

(arguing that vested interests of Congress and the FCC prevent meaningful reform of the
public interest standard); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm
for Assessing the Constitutionalityof Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687 (1997)
(arguing that regulation requiring broadcasters to provide public interest programming is
justified by the government's grant of spectrum frequencies); Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989) (refuting the
scarcity rationale on grounds that it fails to justify a lower threshold of First Amendment
protection for broadcasters); Sunstein, supra note 13 (theorizing causes of the dysfunctions
in public interest broadcasting regulation and proposing a variety of reforms).
125. See CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (discussing the
FCC's attempts at balancing the public interest with First Amendment values).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2000).
127. Id. § 326.
128. CBS,412U.S. atl7.
129. For a more detailed and complete analysis of the debate concerning the scarcity
rationale, see Varona, supra note 68, at 164-68.
130. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 514 (discussing the relationship between
broadcasters, viewers, and advertisers in the marketplace); see also C. EDWrN BAKER,
ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 25-87 (1994) (arguing, primarily through an
economic analysis, that the media's financial dependence on advertising affects the
substance and distribution of nonadvertising content and ultimately leads to a less free and
less democratic press).
131. See BAKER, supra note 130, at 25-87; see also JEFF CHESTER, DIGITAL DESTINY 3
(2007) (noting that a survey of 118 broadcast news directors revealed that more than half
reported being pressured by advertisers to run positive stories or kill negative stories for the
advertisers' benefit).
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1 32
viewers and listeners for whom they hold their licenses in trust.
Commercial broadcasters have succeeded at keeping this dysfunctional
regulatory model in place, giving back very little public interest quid for
the quo of their lucrative licenses, by exercising their unparalleled lobbying
muscle in Washington. The FCC's "capture"'' 33 by the broadcast lobby and
the symbiosis between airtime-dependent members of Congress and the
local broadcasters back home 134 have conspired to keep the broadcast
public interest standard intact and impervious to meaningful reform.

II. THE INTERNET AS MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Despite the Red Lion Court's characterization of broadcasting as a
"marketplace of ideas," 135 the metaphor never quite fit the medium. As the
seminal image in First Amendment philosophy, the marketplace metaphor
is widely attributed to John Milton, who in his Areopagitica rejected the
government licensing of publishers in favor of a "free and open encounter"
of ideas, 136 and John Stuart Mill, who in On Liberty promoted "the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
37
error."1

The marketplace of ideas image has long been criticized for its allusion
to the inapposite analogue of laissez-faire economic markets. Implicit in
the metaphor is the assumption that a free and full discussion would best
reveal truth by keeping the marketplace free of government intrusion and
dependent solely on the trade in ideas by private, rational, autonomous

132. See Krotoszynski, supra note 124, at 2116 ("[A] station group or network executive
cannot place the public interest ahead of the shareholders' interests without potentially
violating a fiduciary obligation to the corporation.").
133. The agency capture concept, conceived by Marver Bernstein in 1955, posits that an
agency can grow so interdependent with the industry it regulates that it ultimately is
captured or controlled by the regulatees themselves. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79-97 (1955); see also Merrill, supra note 35, at
1043 (describing agency capture as "meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely
susceptible to domination by the industry they were charged with regulating").
134. Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. makes this point especially well, writing that
commercial "broadcasters provide the incumbent politicians with the media exposure they
need to remain in office and, in return, the officeholders keep the Commission at bay."
Krotoszynski, supra note 124, at 2117.
135. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
136. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Sir Richard C. Jebb ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1918) (1644), availableat http://www.uoregon.edu/-rbear/areopagitica.html.
137. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 102, 104 (H.B. Acton ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1863).
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is credited with incorporating the marketplace metaphor into
American free-speech jurisprudence by means of his 1919 Abrams v. United States dissent,
where he wrote that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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actors. 138 Two years before Red Lion was decided, Professor Jerome
Barron dismissed the notion as a "romantic view," arguing that "if ever
a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to
there were
9
exist."

13

In light of the antipathy of corporate media to unpopular and unorthodox
ideas, the absence of government from the marketplace of ideas does not
alone make it free. 140 And in fact economic markets tend to operate more
14 1
efficiently and effectively with some amount of government intervention.
Other scholars have made similar arguments, criticizing the metaphor for
assuming equality in access to the marketplace where none exists 142 and
taking for granted the rationality of marketplace actors when in fact they
are rendered irrational by the manipulation of the commercialized mass
media.143 Professor Ed Baker in particular has argued convincingly that the
commercially dominated market does not satisfy preferences as much as it
generates and manipulates them. 4 4 Yet despite the inherent problems with
the metaphor, it persists as our core rationale for the freedom of speech and
as the means to the ends of human dignity, autonomy, and effective selfgovernance.145 The FCC continues to declare that "[a] diverse and robust
' 46
marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our democracy."'
138. See Weinberg, supra note 8, at 1138-39 (arguing that the marketplace of ideas
metaphor is flawed because of its inherent generalizations); see also ROBERT TSAI,
ELOQUENCE AND REASON 60-68 (2008) (analyzing the libertarian roots of the marketplace
of ideas metaphor).
139. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1641, 1641-43 (1967).
140. Id. at 1643 (asserting that government "indifference becomes critical when a
comparatively few private hands are in a position to determine not only the content of
information but its very availability").
141. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (noting that
market intervention is a necessary means for counteracting "deficiencies in the real world of
commerce").
142. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 8, at 1149 (lamenting the fact that "those with
extensive institutional or financial resources" have greater access to "effective mass
communication").
143. See, e.g., id at 1157-64 (bemoaning the tendency of broadcasters to maintain the
status quo by programming content aimed at "reinforcing people's existing attitudes [rather
than] changing them"); Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First
Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 408-09 (2002) (arguing that the "risk of marketplace
approach is, therefore, to trivialize speech"); Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 90-97 (1965) ("Universal tolerance becomes questionable
when its rationale no longer prevails, when tolerance is administered to manipulated and
indoctrinated individuals who parrot, as their own, the opinion of their masters, for whom
heteronomy has become autonomy.").
144. C. EDwiN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 87-95 (2d ed. 2004).
145. For an excellent history of the marketplace metaphor, see SMOLLA, supra note 141,
at 6-17.
146. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627 (2003) (report, order, and
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As a unidirectional, publicly inaccessible, tightly controlled, and largely
commercial medium rooted in content-referential regulation, broadcasting
has never hosted a free marketplace of ideas. But what about the Internet?
Does it provide the platform for "free and open encounters" that
broadcasting ultimately failed to deliver? And what, so far, have been its
effects on democracy?
Although the notion is hard to believe, the Internet still is a very young
popular technology. The term Internet first appeared in the New York
Times only twenty-one years ago-four years before the Internet was
privatized-in a 1988 story about looming computer security threats in
which even the now-commonplace computer term virus appeared in
quotations. 47 Remarkably, in a Harris Poll conducted in 1994-just fifteen
years ago-two-thirds of respondents said that they had not heard of the
Internet. 148 In light of this youth, the Internet's full effects on our speech
culture and democracy are just starting to be analyzed. Preliminary
assessments, however, paint a mixed picture. Whereas the Internet has
catalyzed speech, democratic action, and democratic engagement in some
ways, it has undermined them in others. The following Sections discuss
how.
A. Autonomy and the Internet
The Internet attracted great popular attention in the early 1990s,
emerging from the obscurity of its origins as a little known tool of scientific
researchers. At that time, the demands of government noninterventioniststhose who insisted that the government allow the Internet to develop free of
regulation, in a private, nongovernmental arena-carried great currency.
They still do. Many industry advocates, scholars, and other commentators
argue not only that the Internet should not be regulated, but that it cannot
be regulated. 149 Nicholas Negroponte famously said that the Internet's
architecture renders "the nation-state ...not relevant." 150 Distinguishing it
from the tightly regulated and mediated broadcasting media, Internet

notice of proposed rulemaking).
147. John Markoff, Author of Computer 'Virus' Is Son of N.S.A. Expert on Data
Security, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1988, at 1.
148. DAVIS, supra note 5, at 168.
149. See, e.g., James B. Speta, FCCAuthority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and
Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 15 (2004) (citing PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER
4 (1997));
Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943,
995 (1998).
150. Andrew Higgins & Azeem Azhar, China Begins to Erect Second Great Wall in
Cyberspace, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 5, 1996. See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING
IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM

DIGITAL (1995).
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exceptionalists argued that the Internet was a creature of, and instrument
for, independence from government control and individual self-expression
and actualization. In his 1996 Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow touted cyberspace as "the new home of the
Mind" and issued the following warning to the "Governments of the
Industrial World": "You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather.... [L]eave us alone." 151
When a large segment of the academic community turned its attention to
the Internet as a fertile subject of study beginning in the mid-1990s, notable
scholars wrote about how the Internet's decentralized, international (crossborder), and open architecture made government regulation impracticable
Some scholars argued that even if modest
and unsustainable. 52
governmental interventions were possible, the government should forbear
from regulating the new Internet frontier, deferring instead to innovations53
in online self-governance emerging as new social norms and customs,
and forms of private contracting. 154 It was argued that because the Internet
gave anyone with access to the Web the power to be his or her own editor
and publisher for little or no cost-what Professor Eugene Volokh called
151. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8,
1996), availableat http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
152. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the Internet creates a new sphere of
human activity by cutting across territorial borders, thereby undermining the practicability
of laws based on geographic boundaries); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 447, 448 (2000) (book review) ("The first generation of cyberspace scholarship
shared the utopianism of the digital vanguard" by arguing that "[b]y its very rudderless,
decentralized, transnational structure, . . . the Internet must ultimately elude any attempt at
government regulation."); see also David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1366 (2002) ("Communication in cyberspace is not
'functionally identical' to communication in realspace; [therefore] the jurisdictional and
choice-of-law dilemmas posed by cyberspace activity cannot be adequately resolved by
applying the 'settled principles' and 'traditional legal tools' developed for analogous
problems in realspace.").
153. See, e.g., David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law3,
1995,
L.,
art.
ONLINE
J.
in
Cyberspace,
Making
(asserting that government
http://web.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/articles/post.shtml
regulation would interfere with the Internet's free market of privately developed rule sets);
1.Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993,
1025-41 (1994) (arguing that Internet rules of conduct should be self-developed and not
imposed by government); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall
Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419-26 (1997)
(arguing that a system of self-governance is best suited to devise specialized rules, promote
voluntary compliance, and produce efficient results).
154. See, e.g., Llewellyn J. Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 484 (1997) ("Cyberians must reject any attempt to shrinkwrap governance in cyberspace by imposing a standard form contract of adhesion as the
model for contracting in cyberspace .... [C]ontracting in cyberspace should be the
quintessential negotiatedcontract that represents a true meeting of the minds.").
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"cheap speech"' 5 5-there would be no valid grounds for the government to
regulate the Internet in favor of increased access, diversity of content
sources, or other public interest values. 156 The private marketplace would
deliver those democratic and speech benefits on its own.
Congress adopted this hands-off, anti-interventionist approach to the
Internet very clearly in the 1996 Telecom Act, in which it articulated as an
overarching policy the preservation of a "vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.' 157 The government has
stayed true to the 1996 Telecom Act's nonregulatory approach, and with
few exceptions has ceded the Internet's regulation almost entirely to the
commercial marketplace.' 5 8
Of course, the irony of the cyberlibertarianism prevalent in the 1990s
was that the Internet owes its existence to government subsidies and the
strict common-carrier regulation of telecommunications companies
carrying Internet traffic. 1 59 The Internet, in fact, is a creature of regulation.
The interconnected network that became the Internet originated in 1969 as

155. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1847
(1995); see also Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in
FirstAmendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the DemocraticDilemma 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1083, 1129-32 (1999) (describing the Internet as "'a decentralized, global medium of
communication that links people, institutions, corporations and governments around the
world,' and that enables communications to take place 'almost instantaneously' (quoting
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996))).
156. See Netanel, supra note 152, at 448 (noting that the Internet "is at once a distinct,
self-contained realm and a gauntlet to the inefficient, undemocratic, top-down
administration of the territorial state").
157. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (1996).
158. The government has, however, imposed regulations on Internet carriers in discrete
areas, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). See, e.g., Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Star. 4279 (1994) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)) (requiring telecommunications carriers to
cooperate with law enforcement electronic surveillance activities); Am. Council on Educ. v.
FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding FCC decision to apply CALEA wiretapping
requirements to broadband and VolP providers); see also Controlling the Assault of NonSolicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act), Pub. L. No. 108-187,
117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006)) (enacting standards
against unsolicited commercial e-mail and requiring the Federal Trade Commission to
promulgate rules against unsolicited messages on mobile networks); Telephone Number
Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers, 22 F.C.C.R. 19,531 (2007) (report, order,
and notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending local number portability to VolP services);
IP-Enabled Services, E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 20 F.C.C.R.
10,245 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) (imposing 911 obligations
on VolP providers).
159. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception and Deep-Packet Inspection:
Net Neutrality and the Role and Limits of Federal Trade Commission Act Restraints on
Internet Service Providers 12-14 (Jan. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(detailing the extensive federal regulation that facilitated the early proliferation of the
commercial Internet).
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part of a military research initiative in search of a resilient "packetswitched" communications system capable of instantly surviving the
destruction of entire sectors of the network. 60 Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed a
file transfer protocol (FTP), electronic mail, newsgroup, and other
information handling protocols. 161 It later funded the University of
California at Berkeley to incorporate what became the "transmission
control protocol" and "Internet protocol" (TCP/IP)-the language of the
Internet-into the UNIX operating system upon which the Internet was
built.' 62 These standards and norms operate on the Internet's logical layer,
which rests above its physical layer (i.e., the network of computing and
switching devices, servers, and transmission fiber), and below its
applications (e.g., software163and end-user devices) and content (e.g., text,
graphics, and audio) layers.
In the 1980s, the National Science Foundation devoted over
$200 million to expand the emerging Internet, interconnecting federal and
an increasing number of university and other research facilities (through a
system called NSFNet).164 Under contract with the Department of Defense,
the Stanford Research Institute managed the early domain name system,
policing
which enabled and registered dot-corn addresses, functionally
165
which servers and Internet websites had access to the Internet.
What most set the stage for the Internet's tipping point-from obscure
communications network connecting a relatively small realm of federalgovernment and educational servers to the main global communications
platform it is today-were two sets of relatively low-profile decisions. The
160.

JONATHAN

E.

NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS

129-30

(2005). Because the military long-distance communications network depended heavily on
the AT&T telephone network, an attack on the AT&T main switches could have prevented
the President or military brass in Washington from sending missile-launch messages to silo
locations in Arizona, Nebraska, or Montana. Id.
161. Id. at 130; see also Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and
Power Structures. Governing the Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REv. 1447, 1449-52
(2000) ("The origins of the Internet lie in efforts by the Defense Department to establish
communication linkages among the computers in its Advanced Projects Research Agency
(ARPA), which was set up in the wake of the Sputnik launch.").
162. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 160, at 130.
163. For a detailed description of the Internet's various layers, see id at 118-25. Some
Internet theorists envision the layers differently, assigning them different names and
conflating two of the four layers identified by most. For example, Professor Lawrence
Lessig writes of three layers: the physical layer, a middle "code" layer, and a top content
layer. See Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at
56, 59, availableat http://www.lessig.org/content/columns/foreignpolicyl.pdf.
164. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 160, at 130.
165.

JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A

BORDERLESS WORLD 33-34 (2006). In the first years of the Internet's existence, the dot-coin

naming system was comprised of only one text file named "hosts.txt," which was stored on
a Stanford University server. Id. at 33.
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federal government in 1992 privatized NSFNet and started registering
Internet addresses for commercial uses. 166 At the same time, the federal
government enforced an array of common carriage regulations, including
rate nondiscrimination and facilities interconnection requirements, against
telecommunications companies, affording new Internet Service Providers
167
(ISPs) access to the national telecommunications grid at affordable rates.
As a result, narrowband "dial-up" Internet service spread across the United
States. 161
The United States retains ultimate authority over the servers hosting the
Internet's root files, which control website naming and numbering and,
ultimately, access to the Internet itself.1 69 Nevertheless, as noted above, it
generally has stayed true to the "hands-off' nonregulatory disposition
established in the 1996 Telecom Act, imposing very few regulatory
requirements on Internet providers and doing very little to optimize the
Internet as a democratic instrument. As a communications platform, the
Internet hosts expression that is in most senses autonomous from
government coercion, censorship, or filtration.
B. Speech and Democracy Online
Independence from government authority does not alone set the stage for
a free marketplace of ideas and democratic exchange. The marketplace
itself must be conducive to an open and accessible competition in ideas, so
that truth, in the words of Mill, is "fully, frequently, and fearlessly
166. See Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 1862(g) (2000).
Two of the Internet's founders, Robert E. Kahn and Vinton G. Cerf, noted that the
government's decision to privatize the Internet was with the hope that "the enthusiasm of
private sector interests to build upon the government funded developments to expand the
Internet and make it available to the general public." Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf,
1999),
5 (Dec.
What Is the Internet (and What Makes It Work),
http://www.cnri.reston.va.us/what-is internet.html, quoted in NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER,
supra note 160, at 131.
167. See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. Rnv. 359, 372 (2007) (discussing how "[e]xponential growth in Internet use" was
spurred by the enforcement of common carrier regulations for the benefit of ISPs).
168. Id.
169. See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 165, at 30-31 (discussing the early battle
between the United States and private operators for "root authority" over the Internet);
Jonathan Bick, The Internet as Government Action, N.J. L.J., Oct. 3, 2005,
(arguing that
http://www.bicklaw.com/Publications/ThelnternetasGovernmentAction.htm
the U.S. government's authority stems in part from its control over the Domain Name
System (DNS)); Bradley S. Klapper, U.S. Insists on Keeping Control of Web,
USAToDAY.COM, Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-0929-us-web-control x.htm (explaining the reluctance of the United States to cede domain
management authority to the United Nations). Given the U.S. government's role in
launching the Internet, it is no wonder that law professor and former FCC Office of Plans
and Policy analyst Jonathan Weinberg observed that "the mindset in the U.S. government
was that this really was our Internet." GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 165, at 32.
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discussed" 170 and ultimately can gain currency in the marketplace. But
what really is meant by "democracy" and "democratic exchange" in
debates about the effects of media, and specifically the Internet, on our
democracy?
In theory, democracy-from the fifth-century B.C.E. Greek root
In practice, as political theorist
demokratia-is "rule by the people.''
72
and protean concept.'
contested
a
is
democracy
observes,
W.B. Gallie
73
Although there are many commonly accepted variations of democracy,
my analysis of the Internet's democratic effects will focus on four of the
principal interrelated democratic models recognized in American political
thought: direct democracy, representative democracy, liberal democracy,
and deliberative democracy.
Direct democracy, which involves unmediated decisionmaking through
mechanisms such as referenda and ballot initiatives, is popular with the
American people.' 74 Direct democratic governance, however, has long
been disfavored by theorists as the least accountable and self-actualizing
model of self-governance,17 5 vulnerable to what James Madison termed the
"confusion and intemperance of the multitude" that "can admit no cure for
the mischiefs of faction."' 76 Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose political
170. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 42 (Tichnor & Fields 2d ed. 1863) (1859).
171. Amy Gutmann, Democracy, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 411 (Robert E.Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993).
172. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167,
168-69 (1956); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

(1974).
173. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 171, at 411-18 (including brief descriptions of
Schumpeterian, populist, liberal, participatory, social, and deliberative democracy).

174. See Peter M. Shane, The Electronic Federalist: The Internet and the Eclectic
Institutionalizationof DemocraticLegitimacy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 33, at 69
(noting a recent survey that places public support for direct democratic mechanisms at
between 70% and 80% (citing DAVID McKAY ET AL., CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 91 (2002))).

175. Plato reveals himself as a strong critic of direct or classical democracy. In the
dialogue The Statesman, he arranges for the Stranger to tell Socrates that, among all of the
forms of government, "democracy is the worst of [them]" so far as law-abiding is
concerned, and the best for flouting the law. PLATO, The Statesman, in THE COLLECTED
DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE LETTERS 1074 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns

eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 1961). Aristotle took up Plato's antidemocratic mantel in
characterizing "extreme" Athenian (direct) democracy as the worst of all forms of
government since "all offices are open to all, and the will of the people overrides all law."
ARISTOTLE, The Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1119 (Richard McKeon ed.,
1941); see also Shane, supra note 174, at 69. Professor Shane writes that "It is difficult to
see ... how direct democracy promotes the equal consideration of the interests of all
persons." Id.
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43-44 (James Madison) (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003)
("A common passion or interest will ... be felt by a majority ... and there is nothing to

check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party .. "). Agreeing with Madison,
Alexander Hamilton said that "a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most
perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is more false than this." THE
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philosophy often is described as favoring direct democratic ideals,
acknowledged that "there never has been a real democracy, and there never
1 77
will be" since it is "against the natural order for the many to govern.

Although direct democracy has gained popularity at the state level, it plays
government given the Constitution's hostility to
virtually no role in federal 78
direct popular lawmaking. 1

Representative democracy is the form of governance most familiar to
Americans. This form of governance entails popular election of
representatives by means of majority or plurality support, and the exercise
by those elected representatives of decisionmaking power delegated to
them by the people.17 9 The presumption is that the elected representatives
will act in furtherance of the public good through their application of
expertise and calm consideration, qualities thought to be lacking in the
direct democratic model. But the representative model is criticized as
prone to corruption, to the overinfluence of political parties, and to
conflicts of interest, patronage, and expense, while offering little of the
transparency, immediacy, and accountability of the direct democratic
model. 18 °
Liberal democracy prioritizes individual autonomy and liberty over
majoritarian, collectivist notions of the "public interest."' 181 Attributed in

2,500

WISE AND WITTY QUOTATIONS FROM

THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO CREATED AMERICA 60

(Buckner F. Melton, Jr. ed., 2004)

QUOTABLE FOUNDING FATHERS: A TREASURY OF

(speaking at the New York Ratification Convention on June 21, 1788).

177. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 65 (G.D.H.
Cole trans., 1950).
178. See Shane, supra note 174, at 70 (observing the limited role accorded direct
democracy in the Constitution's framing, ratification, and content). By contrast, thirty-four
states have state-constitution-defined direct-democratic decisionmaking means. JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW ENGLAND TOwN MEETING: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION (1999); see also
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (upholding, through a refusal of
jurisdiction, Oregon's initiative and referendum mechanisms, reasoning that the controversy
was a political rather than a judicial question).
179. See Shane, supra note 174, at 68 (theorizing that such governance is premised on
the assumption that citizens, through exercise of self-determination, will warrant their
allegiance to the outcome and elected politicians will yield equal consideration for the
interests of all people).
180. See generally Gary Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in
Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT 92-93 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al.
eds., 1997) (arguing that continued public distrust of American politicians and the political
process is inextricably tied to the government itself, and not simply a byproduct of external
factors such as technological innovation, social transformation, or global economic trends);
JOHN HASKELL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT? DISPELLING THE

POPULIST MYTH 2-3 (2001) (positing that advocates of direct democracy argue that
"[r]epresentative institutions act to stymie the expression of the popular will and fail
accurately to consider the public interest when policy is made").
181. See Gutmann, supra note 171, at 413 (describing liberal democracies' insistence
that basic liberties, such as freedom of thought, speech, press, association, and religion must
be paramount to the will of popular rule).
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large part to the philosophies of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, 8 2 the

liberal democratic theory prioritizes constraints on the power of
representative governments and popular majorities from interference with
the rights and freedoms of individuals. 183 In prioritizing individual rights
over public good, liberal democratic theory is the source of much criticism.
In Democracy's Discontent, for example, Professor Michael Sandel argues

compellingly that the primacy of liberalism, individual rights, and
consumerism in American society, in place of more communitarian and
in the weakening of the nation's civic
deliberative activities, has resulted
184
whole.
a
as
democracy
and
life
The deliberative democratic model is valued in contemporary political
thinking as most in harmony with the multivalent principles of selfgovernance, including autonomy, dignity, equality, self-fulfillment, and
free expression in collective self-interest. 185 Deliberative democracy best
marries democracy with freedom of speech by transcending governance as
the aggregation of atomized preferences and interests, and by engaging
autonomous citizens with a diversity of interests and viewpoints in
substantive dialogue on issues of public importance. 18 6 As observed by
Professor Peter Shane, "[T]he fundamental accountability in deliberative
democracy does not run from the governor to the governed, but from each
citizen to every other."'' 87 This citizen-centered interdependence in
political decisionmaking, according to Professor Beth Noveck, is what
makes public deliberation "fundamental to participatory democratic life"

182.

See

DAVID R. HILEY, DOUBT AND THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 9

(2006) (identifying the "historic worry about disorder and the tyranny of the many" with
"liberal theories from John Locke and John Stuart Mill"); see also Rainey, supra note 12, at
317-20 (discussing individualistic theories of the First Amendment).
183. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (rev. ed. 1999).
184. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 4, 5, 27, 250-73, 318 (1996) (describing Americans' dual concern with fears of
community erosion and feelings of waning self-governance).
185. See ANDREW CHADWICK, INTERNET POLITICS 25 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1804 (1995) (arguing that the goals of the
First Amendment are linked with a deliberative democracy, and that the law must harness
new technologies for democratic ends); Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative
Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 5, 12
(2003) (asserting that deliberative speech, rather than free speech, makes true democracy
possible); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67-87 (James Bohman & William Rehg
eds., 1997).
186. See, e.g., James Bohman & William Rehg, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 185, at ix ("Deliberative democracy refers to the idea that
legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens."); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 134 (1993) (discussing the primacy of political

deliberation in the American conception of liberal republicanism).
187.

Shane, supra note 174, at 72.
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and "at the root of American democracy."'18 By merging autonomy with
community, deliberative democrats value the "freedom to think as you will
and speak as you think" as "means indispensible to the discovery and
spread of political truth."'8 9
Individual autonomy is important to the general notion of demokratia,
insofar as we take it as a given that, in order to govern ourselves and act as
effective civic agents, we must be able to think and speak for ourselves,
free from the constraints and distorting influences of governmental or
private forces. "Meaningful autonomy," according to Professor Baker, is
the ability "to lead a meaningfully self-authored life without unnecessary or
inappropriate frustration by others."' 90 But autonomy alone, uncoupled
with meaningful engagement in political discussion with fellow citizens, is
of limited worth to the individual as both a speaker and citizen.191 Because
thought and language are so inexorably linked, democratic self-governance
requires us to be able to express ourselves as well as hear the expression of
others. 92 Moreover, the benefits of individual autonomy-e.g., selfdiscovery, self-authorship, and moral and political agency-come partly as
a consequence of discourse with other autonomous individuals and the
concomitant exposure to a diversity of viewpoints and information.193
Deliberative democratic theories can be traced back far beyond the
founding of the American republic. Kant called for the "public use
of ... reason" as a route to enlightenment; 194 even Aristotle wrote that
"[w]hen there are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation],"
they "may surpass-collectively and as a body, although not individually188. Noveck, supra note 185, at 5, 12.
189. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
190. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central
Meaning of the FirstAmendment, 21 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 215, 220 (2004). Professor Baker
calls the other conceptualization of autonomy "formal autonomy" and describes it as a
recognition in law of "an agent's legal right to choose what to do with herself (and her
property)" and "dominion over [one's] own mind and body." Id. at 223.
191. Political philosopher Judith Lichtenberg makes an elegant variation of this point.
She writes that "[a] person cannot think freely if he cannot speak; and he cannot think freely
if others cannot speak, for it is in hearing the thoughts of others and being able to
communicate with them that we develop our thoughts." Judith Lichtenberg, Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of the Press, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 108 (Judith
Lichtenberg ed., 1990).
192. See Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the FirstAmendment, 34
CONN. L. REV. 405, 417-20 (2002) (theorizing that deliberation, not only is fundamental to
self-government, but also promotes reciprocity as cooperative behavior for mutual benefit
and ultimately enhancement of democracy).
193. See Baker, supra note 190, at 220-21; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses
ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 902-05 (1994) (providing convincing arguments for the
conceptualization of autonomy as a First Amendment value); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, andFreedomof Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
194. IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?', in
KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1971).
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the quality of the few best."' 195 Modem theorists, most notably Jtirgen
Habermas, posit that deliberative democracy can transform citizens whose
into more
political views start as undeveloped, inconsistent, and confused,
96
enlightened and informed participants in the public sphere.
Viewed through the lenses of these four general theories of democratic
governance-and especially the aspiration of deliberative democracy and
its related free speech ideals-the Internet reveals a mixed record of
effectiveness as a democracy- and speech-enhancing instrument. Contrary
to the utopian declarations of the early cyberlibertarians, the Internet has
evolved into a communications substrate that promotes democratic and free
speech ideals but also undermines them in very significant and troubling
ways.
1. Online Citizen Activism
a. The Democratizationof Information and the Demise of
UnidirectionalMonoculture
In contrast to unidirectional, homogenizing, and overly commercialized
broadcasting media, the Internet makes available countless opportunities
for citizens to speak, relate, and gather political, cultural, and social
information from a multiplicity of sources. The blogosphere, which started
as a collection of "web logs" or diary websites, has evolved into a source of
citizen journalism, political information and commentary, and creative
It has served as a powerful check on
expression of all sorts.' 97
governments and elected representatives, both by exposing government
abuses ignored or underreported by mainstream media and by providing
regimes a vehicle for dissenting, information
citizens of speech-repressing
98
sharing, and organizing.'
195.

ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 123 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ.

Press 1962).
196.

Tali Mendelberg, The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence, in POLITICAL

DECISION-MAKING, DELIBERATION AND PARTICIPATION 153 (Michael X. Delli Carpini et al.

eds., 2002).

Summarizing Habermas's vision as follows: "An informed and engaged

citizenry enriches the political process in at least two ways. It stimulates what we hope are
better decisions by contributing to the policy stew and by holding politician-cooks to
account. More fundamentally, participation legitimates the process by which we reach
decisions." Froomkin, supra note 33, at 3-4.
197. For an excellent overview of the importance of the blogosphere in the new media
ecology, see Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo
Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 690-94 (2007).

198.

See Leslie David Simon, Democracy and the Net: A Virtuous Circle?, in

DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNET: ALLIES OR ADVERSARIES? 9 (Leslie David Simon ed.,
2002) (noting that the Internet "dramatically increases citizens' ability to 'seek, receive and

impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'). Burmese
bloggers were the only reliable source of information for international observers of the
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The Internet-specifically bloggers and other citizen journalists-has
1 99
brought to light the significant failings of government officials in this
and other 200 countries, and wrongdoings of law enforcement 20' that would
have gone unexposed and unredressed in the pre-Internet media ecosystem.
As an especially recent example, the 2008 George Polk Award for legal
reporting was awarded for the first time to a blogger, Joshua Micah
Marshall, in recognition of his reporting on the firing of eight United States
Attorneys, which ultimately led to the resignation of Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales.20 2 Citizen journalists on the Internet also have exposed
the failings and oversights of the traditional media themselves. 203 In
addition, some broadcast and print news media have used their affiliated
blogs to run stories that have not yet satisfied journalistic standards (i.e.,
verification or confirmation) or are too scandalous to carry on the air or in
newsprint but are later substantiated.20 4
crackdown on dissidents in that country. Wayne Drash & Phil Black, Blogs Helping
Sept.
27,
2007,
Expose
Myanmar
Horrors,
CNN.COM,
Likewise,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/09/27/myanmar.dissidents/index.html.
Zimbabweans have turned to blogs to share stories about government atrocities that have
been altogether ignored by government-owned broadcast media and were out of the reach of
foreign journalists who were barred from entry. Zimbabweans Use Blogsfor Info: Since the
Silencing of Independent Media, People Turning Online for News, MSNBC.coM, July 20,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25772666/print/l/displaymode/1098/.
199. For example, blogger Matt Drudge broke the story concerning President William J.
Clinton's affair with intern Monica Lewinsky. An anonymous blogger brought attention to
the sexually explicit messages exchanged by Rep. Mark Foley (R-FL) and teenage
congressional pages. Moreover, bloggers, not the mainstream media, initially brought to
light racist remarks made by Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS) at a birthday celebration for former
segregationist Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC). See Lisa Napoli, The Post-Lewinsky Winner
Is the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at C7; Anne E. Kornblut & Katharine Q. Seelye,
Papers Knew of Foley E-Mail but Did Not Publish Articles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at
A20; Paul Janensch, Bloggers, Right and Left, Have Become Modern Vigilantes, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 17, 2005, at D2.
200. See, e.g., Loretta Chao, Gymnastics Question for the Ages... of the Ages, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 23-24, 2008, at A12 (reporting that an ordinary American citizen searching the
Internet from his home in Washington, DC, discovered Chinese documents online
apparently contradicting official Chinese statements regarding the age of Chinese Olympic
gold medalists); see also Levi, supra note 197.
201. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, When Official Truth Collides with Cheap Digital Technology,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1. A cyclist was jailed on charges of assaulting a police
officer with a bicycle on the basis of a sworn statement by Officer Patrick Pogan. A
passerby's video uploaded to YouTube, however, showed very clearly that the cyclist
swerved to avoid Officer Pogan, and the latter lunged toward the cyclist "as if he were a
halfback running along the sidelines, and sent him flying." Id
202. See Noam Cohen, Blogger, Sans Pajamas, Rakes Muck and a Prize, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2008, at Cl.
203. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Where Are Our Minds and What Are We
Thinking? Virtue Ethics for a 'Perfidious' Media, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 637, 667-71 (2005) (discussing the role of bloggers in revealing the journalistic flaws
in CBS News' reporting of President George W. Bush's National Guard service).
204. For example, mainstream broadcast and print journalists did not devote any airtime
or newsprint to the story broken by tabloid National Enquirerabout the infidelity of former
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The Internet and the political blogosphere have become especially good
sources for in-depth analysis and discussion of political candidates and
their campaigns, enabling voters to research the positions of the candidates
and engage in related discussions (sometimes with campaign staff members
themselves).2 °5 Mastery of the television medium became an imperative
for political candidates in high-profile elections from 1960 onward,
following the first-ever televised debate between then-Senator John
Kennedy (D-MA) and then-Vice President Richard Nixon, who appeared
wan, nervous, and generally uncomfortable compared to the much more
telegenic, and ultimately victorious, Kennedy.0 6 In the 2006 congressional
and 2008 presidential campaigns, mastery of the Internet proved pivotal in
many races, with online organizing and fundraising overtaking more
traditional campaigning practices in efficiency and effectiveness.20 7
The combination of the Internet with the wide availability of inexpensive
digital video recording devices has subverted old-world "insider" versus
"outsider" distinctions in political campaigning. Elected officials now have
difficulty saying in putatively private, small-audience settings what would
be politically and socially perilous if said to general audiences. YouTube
senator and vice-presidential candidate John Edwards, despite the story's having permeated
the blogosphere for several days. The L.A. Times covered the story prominently in its blog
despite having not mentioned it at all in its broadsheets. See National Enquirer Alleges
John Edwards Affair; Blogosphere Readies Salt Shaker, L.A. TIMES BLOG, July 23, 2008,
available at http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2008/07/jom-edwards-af.html. Only after
Mr. Edwards publicly acknowledged the affair did the mainstream news operations publish
information about the story. See, e.g., Scott Martelle & Seema Mehta, Edwards'Affair Puts
Him on the Sidelines, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at Al; Richard Prez-Pefia & Bill Carter,
Reticence of Mainstream Media Becomes a Story Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at A14.
Howard Wolfson, the communications director for Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential
campaign, later argued that the mainstream media's failure to cover the Edwards affair story
allowed Edwards to stay in the race longer than he should have, splitting the vote and
ultimately costing Clinton the nomination. Brian Ross & Jake Tapper, Wolfson: Edwards'
Aug. 11,
2008,
Cover-Up Cost Clinton the Nomination, ABCNEWS.coM,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=5553013&page=1.
205. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91
MINN. L. REV. 515, 523-26 (2007) (asserting that blogs drive national conversation and
detailing the benefits of blog communication, including access to original research and the
opportunity to hear directly from experts); see also Gracie Lawson-Borders & Rita Kirk,
Blogs in Campaign Communication, 49 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 548, 555-56 (2005)
(describing blogs as a "participatory outlet" and citing Howard Dean's Blogfor America as
stating that "people from all across the country.., are debating, organizing, arguing, joking,
and bringing innovative ideas to our organization").
206. See ALAN SCHROEDER, PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: FORTY YEARS OF HIGH-RISK
TV 3-6, 14, 99 (2000). On television, Kennedy appeared "calm and nerveless in
appearance" while Nixon looked "tense, almost frightened, at turns glowering and,
occasionally, haggard-looking to the point of sickness." Id. at 6.
207. See Jim VandeHei & Alexander Bums, Why the GOP Fell So Far, So Fast,
POLITICO.COM, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/13018.html
(reporting that the Democratic party's dominance in Internet campaigning has given it a
significant advantage in, inter alia, fundraising and getting out the vote).
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videos of Senator George Allen's "Macaca" moment and of Oklahoma
State Representative Sally Kern's statements about gay people posing a
bigger threat to the nation than "terrorism and Islam" by going after twoyear-olds are vivid illustrations.208 The Internet has infiltrated "insider
only" political spaces, often exposing politicians' true colors to the scrutiny
of the general public.
As Professor Susan Crawford notes, the Intemet-and especially the
new Web 2.0 social networking and personal webcasting websites such as
blogs, MySpace, YouTube, and others-have created a "substrate for new
forms of social relationships. '20 9 The Internet has allowed geographically
or socially isolated people to build online communities and engage in
meaningful interactions online. This is especially true for racial, religious,
sexual, and other minorities living in generally hostile communities, whose
interests and political and cultural concerns are not adequately reflected in
mainstream media.2 10
The Internet also has empowered individuals to undertake significant
social and political collective action without having to go through the highoverhead organizations-like political parties, labor unions, and grassroots
21
activist groups-that had cornered the market in the pre-Internet world. 1
208. See Tim Craig & Michael D. Shear, Allen Quip Provokes Outrage, Apology,
POST, Aug. 15, 2006, at Al (detailing Senator Allen's slip when he referred to his
opponent's campaign volunteer, S.R. Sidarth, as "Macaca"); Shannon Muchmore, Anti-Gay
Remarks Blasted, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 14, 2008, at Al (discussing Representative Kern's
statements). The Internet also has blurred the distinctions between "on-air" and behind-thescenes commentary of political pundits. For example, in September 2008, a video spread
widely on the Internet that showed conservative pundits Peggy Noonan and Mike Murphy
speaking very negatively about the naming of Governor Sarah Palin as the Republican vicepresidential nominee moments after the two had spoken in positive terms about the
nomination during a live televised interview. See Jim Rutenberg, Old Friends in the Media
See a New Side of McCain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at A20.
209. Crawford, supra note 167, at 369.
210. For example, the Internet is credited with playing a central role in the evolution of
the gay and lesbian community, both as a central gathering place for mutual support and as a
platform for political organizing. See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay
Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 (2003). in
addition, whereas atheism and religious skepticism are almost absent on mainstream media
due to advertiser sensitivities and other commercial pressures, the Internet has enabled these
individuals who adhere to these views to connect, share information, and organize political
action. See Jeff Gardner, Face of the New Atheism, NAT'L CATHOLIC REG., Aug. 10, 2008,
at Al, available at http://ncregister.com/site/article/15575 (profiling an influential, atheist
professor and blogger whose success is credited in part to the Internet). Communities with
multiple minority statuses-for example African-Americans who are deaf-also have
turned to the web to bridge physical distances by building online communities. See
National Black Deaf Advocates, http://www.nbda.org (employing the Internet as a tool to
unite, and advocate for, deaf African-Americans).
211. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (addressing the various ways in which "social tools" allow people to
do things together without requiring traditional organizational structures); JOHN HENRY
CLIPPINGER, A CROWD OF ONE: THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY (2007) (discussing the
WASH.
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online, saving charities
Much charitable giving, in fact, has migrated
212
millions in fundraising and overhead costs.

b. Direct Democracy 2.0?
The facility with which many citizens now can access political
information online and communicate with one another and their elected
officials promotes important aspects of representative and liberal
democracy. There is concern, however, that the Internet has exacerbated
direct democratic strains in ways that work against the values of
representative and deliberative democracy.
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalistthat, although republican,
representative government demands that elected officials remain
accountable to their constituents, accountability "does not require an
unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every
The benefits that come with the Internet's
transient impulse." 21 3
elimination of distance, time, and cost as barriers for communication
between elected officials and their constituents, therefore, may be
outweighed by the distorting effects this accelerated and magnified
constituent communication may have on the business of government-a
distortion aggravated by the demographic disparities between online and
offline communities. 214
Although it is true that the Internet can serve as a check on government,
it is also true that the Internet may replace the tyranny of unaccountable
government with the tyranny of an irrational but vocal public. In the words
of political scientist Arthur Isak Applbaum,
The claim that the greater participation of all entails the greater freedom of
all suffers from a fallacy of composition ....[I]t does not follow that if the

government were more responsive to the will of the majority2 15we would all be
more free, because we can-and do-tyrannize one another.
origins of identity and their influence on today's highly interconnected world of social
networking and virtual reality).
212.

Arianna Huffington, Charity May Begin at Home, but It's Moving Online,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna2008,
25,
July
POST,
HUFFINGTON
huffington/charity-may-begin-at-home b 115082.html (noting that "the Internet is
definitely energizing philanthropy and changing the way that we give" with online
donations rising from $250 million in 2000 to $7 billion in 2006).
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST: THE FAMOUS
PAPERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 459 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
2004).
214. Professor Cass Sunstein warns of the "serious risk that costless communication will
increase government's responsiveness to short-term or poorly considered public outcries, or
to sensationalistic anecdotes that are a poor basis for governance." CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 258 (1995).
215.

Arthur

Isak

Applbaum,

Failure in

the

Cybermarketplace of Ideas, in

GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

23 (Elaine Ciulla Kamarck &
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The framers, Madison as well as Hamilton, valued distance and delay in
communication separating Congress and its constituents as important
checks on the passions and power of the populace, and as safeguards for
the time, space, and peace required for elected officials in Washington to
do the work of government with quiet diligence. 1 6 Applbaum posits that
"precisely those aspects of interactive communication that thrill the direct
democrats make the identification and organization of factious majorities
more likely.,

217

I agree that by cheapening, accelerating, and amplifying the speech of
Internet-enabled and politically engaged constituents, the Internet can
disrupt and corrupt the federal government's important deliberative work
by presenting a distorted version of popular preferences. But this analysis
is incomplete insofar as it fails to account for the extent to which the ties
between members of Congress and their constituents have grown
attenuated and weak as the republic's population has increased with no
commensurate change in the size of Congress. Although Congress needs
insulation from the heat of popular passions, too much insulation breeds an
insularity at odds with the duty of Congress to remain accountable and
accessible to the citizens that elected it. The framers recognized the
importance of constituent consultation and communication in the work of
Congress.21 8 The Internet, in fact, may have succeeded at restoring some of
the necessary links between Congress members and constituents that time
and population growth have eroded.
The Constitution requires that each state send at least one representative
to the House of Representatives and that "[tihe Number of Representatives
shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand," 2' 9 but it provides no cap on
the total membership of the House. Both by means of the Constitution's
wording and statements in The Federalist, the framers made clear their
intention that the number of representatives was to increase periodically in
proportion to the growth in population. 220 Congress did, in fact, increase
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); see also id at 26 ("[M]en are not angels, one cannot judge

one's own cause without bias, passions and interests give rise to faction, and factions are
prone to tyrannize.").

216. Id. at 26-28.
217. Id. at 27.
218. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 56 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST WITH
LETTERS OF "BRuTus" 274 (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (noting the "sound and important
principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances
of his constituents").
219. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
220. See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or a House We've Outgrown?
An Argument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 25 COLuM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 157, 175-79 (1992) (citing numerous statements at the Constitutional
Convention and in The Federalist reflecting the intent that the House of Representatives'
size grow with population). In The FederalistNo. 58 ("The Future Size of the House"),
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the size of the House of Representatives occasionally, based on population
increases, until 1910. There were 65 representatives for 3.9 million
Americans in the first Congress (a 1-to-60,000 ratio). 22 1 The ratio was 1 to
every 39,000 citizens in 1810, 100,000 citizens in 1860, and 211,000
citizens in 1910.222 Then, in 1929, Congress froze the size of the House of
Representatives at 435 members. 223 With an estimated U.S. population of
303,824,640,224 today's representational ratio for the "People's House" is
one congressmember for every 698,447 Americans-a ratio 1,164% higher
than at the inception of the republic, and one described as "cramped"
225
compared to those of the much larger European national assemblies.
It reasonably can be argued, therefore, that the Internet's facility in
quickly and cheaply connecting citizens with their representatives in
Washington has had the positive effect of reversing the significant
alienation of Americans from their servants in the "People's House." An
early example of this rapid mobilization of popular opposition to the
actions of Congress was the quick formation of the now 3.2 millionmember website MoveOn.org to organize online opposition to the
impeachment proceedings against President Bill Clinton.226 MoveOn's
online organizing was credited not only with helping put an end to
congressional efforts to oust the President that were widely criticized as
wasteful and excessively partisan, but also with shifting control of
Congress from Republican to Democratic hands in 2006.227
James Madison explained that one of the purposes of the Decennial Census was "to augment
the number of representatives ... under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not
exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants." THE FEDERALIST No. 56 (James
Madison), in THE FEDERALIST WITH LETTERS OF "BRUTUS," supra note 218, at 282.
221. George F. Will, CongressJust Isn't Big Enough, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2001, at B7.
222. Id.; see also James K. Glassman, Let's Build a Bigger House, WASH. POST, June
17, 1990, at D2.
223. Yates, supra note 220, at 180.
224.

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY,

THE

WORLD

FACTBOOK,

(July
2008
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html
estimate).
225. See Matthew Cossolotto, Fightfor a Bigger House, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 7,
2001, at C4 (noting that the British House of Commons contains 659 members for a national
population of 60 million (a 1:91,000 ratio) and the French National Assembly contains 577
members representing a nation of 59 million (a 1:102,000 ratio)).
Organizations,
of
Family
MoveOn
the
About
226. See
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (describing the
http://www.moveon.org/about.html
organization's purpose and history); see also Brendan T. Holloway, McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission: The Supreme Court Rewrites the Book on Campaign FinanceLaw:
Will Political Speech Survive This Most Recent Onslaught?, 13 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS
107, 132-33 (2004) (describing MoveOn.org's portrayal of itself as a grassroots
organization); Scott Duke Harris, The Radical Centrists, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 29, 2004, at
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/29/magazine/tm-moveon09
1-22,
available
(describing MoveOn's rise from an online petition to an influential website with millions of
members).
227. See Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Urge Their Flush Candidates to Share the Wealth,
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But there is valid cause for concern. The Internet has increased the
accountability of elected officials by, inter alia, making more political
information available to constituents back home and empowering those
citizens, individually and in virtual groups, to pressure elected officials to
take certain actions. As discussed below, however, the composition of the
online constituency does not come close to reflecting that of the true
electorate, given the persistent and significant disparities in Internet, and
especially broadband, access. Direct democratic communication online,
therefore, may distort true constituent interests and preferences, leading to
government responses that favor the preferences of citizens who are online
and, therefore, are heard the loudest (or at all).
2. E Pluribus Pluribus-WhitherDeliberativeDemocracy Online?
Whereas direct democracy is disfavored, the ideal of deliberative
democracy has proved elusive. Although theorists have proposed varying
definitions, modern deliberative democrats generally seek at least five
qualities in successful citizen deliberation: (1) openness of deliberation to
all citizens; (2) equality among participants, including the universal ability
to raise questions and engage in debate; (3) rationality in discussion; (4) the
enforcement of reasonable ground rules to ensure productive discussion;
and (5) transparency and openness in the discussions and any
conclusions.228 Evaluated against these criteria, the current state of the
Internet cannot be said to be conducive to genuine democratic deliberation.
a. Access
The fundamental obstacle to inclusive and fully representative
deliberative democracy online is that the United States remains a country
divided between those with access to broadband Internet service and those
without. The federal government's generally hands-off, marketplacereliant approach to the proliferation of household-level broadband access
has led to the nation's precipitous decline in broadband Internet penetration
as compared to the rest of the industrialized world. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publishes the most
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A23 (describing MoveOn.org's personalized e-mail message

mobilization campaign to get members of Congress with at least $200,000 in their campaign
account and no competitive challenge in the upcoming 2006 election to donate 30% to other
Democratic candidates).
228. See Shane, supra note 174, at 71 (providing an excellent discussion of the general
requirements of deliberative democracy). Professor Beth Simone Noveck proposes that
deliberation should be accessible, free from censorship, autonomous, relevant, transparent,
reflecting

equality and responsiveness,

pluralistic,

facilitated. Noveck, supra note 185, at 12-18.

inclusive,

informed, public, and
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authoritative comparison of Internet broadband penetration among the
thirty most industrialized nations. In its most recent survey, the United
States had fallen to 15th place out of the 30 most developed nations for
broadband penetration, with 23.3 broadband subscribers per 100
inhabitants, 229 down from 12th place in 2006 and 4th place in the first of
such OECD surveys in 2001. 23 0 The OECD also reported that the United
States placed 14th internationally in average download speed for broadband
connections, while having the 8th highest average subscription price for
broadband service. 23' Other respected broadband rankings place the United
States even lower.

232

In July 2008, the Pew Internet & American Life Project reported that
55% of American adults have broadband access at home, up from 47% in
2007.233 Although this was a promising increase in overall broadband
penetration, Pew reported relatively flat growth in broadband adoption
among African-Americans (43%, compared with 57% for non-Hispanic
whites) and a reduction in the rate of broadband adoption by economically
disadvantaged households (25%, down from 28% in 2007).234 In addition,
229. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BROADBAND STATISTICS: OECD
(2007),
CAPITA
PER
GDP
AND
PENETRATION
BROADBAND
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband (follow "OECD broadband penetration and GDP per
capita"). In determining these rankings, the OECD defines broadband as "having download
speeds equal to or faster than 256 kbitls." ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD
BROADBAND SUBSCRIBER CRITERIA, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband (follow "OECD
Broadband Criteria").
230. Timothy Karr, The Cure for America's Internet, HUFFINGTON POST, June 3, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karrf/the-cure-for-americas-int b 104963.html.
231. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BROADBAND STATISTICS,
DOWNLOAD SPEED, BY COUNTRY (2007),
AVERAGE ADVERTISED BROADBAND
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband (follow "Average Advertised Broadband Download

Speed, by Country (October 2007)") (noting an average speed of 8.860 Mbps in the United
States, compared to 93.693 in Japan, 44.157 in France, and 43.301 in South Korea,
respectively ranked 1st, 2nd and 3rd); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD
BROADBAND STATISTICS, BROADBAND AVERAGE MONTHLY SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (2007),
[hereinafter OECD 2007 MONTHLY
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/44/39575002.xls
SUBSCRIPTIONS REPORT] (noting an average subscription rate in the United States of $53.06,

last measured in October 2007); see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Broadband Portal, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband (last visited
Feb. 15, 2009) [hereinafter OECD Portal] (listing other reports).
232. For example, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)
ranked the United States fifteenth in its 2008 broadband rankings. THE INFORMATION TECH.
RANKINGS,
BROADBAND
2008
FOUND.,
INNOVATION
&
http://www.itif.org/files/2008BBRankings.pdf. Similarly, the British telecommunications
research firm Point-Topic Ltd. placed the United States 17th among developed countries in
Peter Svensson, Is U.S. Stuck in Internet's Slow Lane?,
broadband deployment.
MSNBC.COM, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21549824/.
233. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2008, at i
REPORT],
BROADBAND
2008
PEW
[hereinafter
(2008)
http://www.pewintemet.org/ppf/r/257/report display.asp.
234. Id. at ii, 3 (classifying as economically disadvantaged or "poor" those households
with annual incomes of $20,000 or less).
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while 60% of survey respondents living in suburban communities reported
having household broadband access, only
38% of respondents in rural
235
access.
such
having
reported
communities
Recent data for American Internet penetration also show persistent
disparities across racial, ethnic, income, educational, generational, and
geographical strata. Given generational differences in familiarity and
comfort with computers generally, it may not be surprising that, whereas
90% of people between the ages of 18 and 29 report using the Internet
regularly, only 35% of people over 65 report regular use.236 More
surprising, however, is that whereas 76% of non-Hispanic whites report
regular Internet use, only 56% of non-Hispanic African-Americans do.237
A 2007 Pew Research Center comprehensive study of Internet access for
and use by Latinos/as revealed similarly troubling disparities. Although
Latinos/as already comprise 15% of the U.S. population and are the fastest

235. Id. at 3. Some commentators defend the American performance in the international
broadband penetration rankings by noting the size of the American land mass compared to
the more densely populated and compact nations with much more favorable broadband
statistics. For example, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin wrote, "Given the geographic and
demographic diversity of our nation, the U.S. is doing exceptionally well. Comparing some
of the leading countries with areas of the U.S. that have comparable population density, we
see similar penetration rates." Kevin Martin, Op-Ed., Why Every American Should Have
Broadband
Access,
FIN.
TIMES
(Asia
Ed.),
Apr.
2,
2006,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/837637ee-c269-1 lda-ac03-0000779e2340.html.
In reality,
however, Sweden and Canada have less population density than the United States (measured
by rurality) and are significantly higher in the rankings than the United States. See Mark
Lloyd, The Broadband Divide: Rural Access Lags Far Behind Cities, CENTER FOR AM.
PROGRESS, Oct. 23, 2007, at 2 (arguing that "the big difference" is that both Canada and
Sweden "have national policies aimed at promoting broadband deployment, with a
particular emphasis on service to rural areas"). Five of the fourteen nations ranked higher
than the United States in the OECD rankings-including sixth-ranked, Iceland-have
population densities lower than that of the United States. See Testimony of Benjamin Scott
on Behalf of Consumer FederationofAmerica, Free Press and the Consumers Union Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation Regarding Communications,
Broadband and Competitiveness: How Does the U.S. Measure Up? (Apr. 24, 2007), at 12,
available at http://www.freepress.net/files/42407bssentestimony.pdf [hereinafter Scott
Congressional Testimony] (citing December 2006 OECD penetration versus population
density comparisons). Nevertheless, the FCC continues to argue, most recently in a June
2008 report, that "in making international comparisons, it is important to account for
differences in geography and population distribution, given the economics of density in
supplying broadband."
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, 9647 (2008).
236, See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERNET USERS
(2008)
[hereinafter
PEW
2008
INTERNET
DEMOGRAPHICS
REPORT],
http://www.pewintemet.org/trends/User-Demo_7.22.08.htm.
The survey of 2,251 adults
(with a margin of error of +/-2%) was based on the following questions: "Do you use the
Internet, at least occasionally?" and "Do you send or receive e-mail, at least occasionally?"
Id.
237. Id.
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growing minority group,2 38 only 56% use the Internet regularly and only
29% have broadband Internet access at home. 239 Language and educational
attainment are two of the causes cited for the significant disparity in
Latino/a Internet use. 240 Educational attainment generally, across all races
and ethnicities, correlates with levels of Internet access and use. Whereas
93% of college-educated Americans are regular Internet users, only 38% of
those who lack a high school diploma claim regular use. 24' And whereas
57% of Americans residing in urban areas report subscribing to broadband
at home, only 38% of rural Americans do.242
i. Availability
The government estimates that approximately 10% of American
households cannot subscribe to terrestrial broadband service if they desired
243
But the
to do so because no carrier provides the service in their area.
to
access
has
FCC's statistics purporting to show that 90% of the country
true broadband service have been resoundingly criticized as inaccurate.
Until June 2008 the agency required broadband service providers to report
broadband service based only on zip codes, without distinguishing between
This overly broad-stroked data
commercial and residential users. 244
collection resulted in the government's classification of entire zip code
areas, which in rural territories can encompass many square miles, as being
served by broadband when in reality only one commercial customer on the
238.

See Sam Roberts, A Generation Away, Minorities May Become the Majority in

U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at Al (noting that by 2050, Latinos/as will account for

30% of the American population, tripling in number to 133 million).
239.

See PEW INTERNET

&

AM.

LIFE PROJECT,

LATINOS

ONLINE

i-ii

(2007),

www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/Latinos OnlineMarch 14 2007.pdf.
240. The Pew study found that among Latinos/as who only speak Spanish, only one in
three use the Internet. Id. at iii. Moreover, because 41% of Latinos/as do not have high
school diplomas (compared to 10% of non-Hispanic whites and 20% of non-Hispanic
African-Americans), Pew reasons that their average lower educational attainment
contributes to the Internet use and access disparity. Id. at i-ii.
241.

PEW 2008 INTERNET DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT, supra note 236. Of the cohort who

have a high school diploma but lack a college degree, 66% are regular Internet users, and
87% who have some college education but lack a degree are regular users. Id. In terms of
broadband access among these cohorts, 70% of Americans with a college degree have
broadband access at home, whereas only 21% of Americans without a high school diploma
and 34% of Americans with a high school diploma but no college degree have such home
broadband access. PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3.
PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3.
243. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-426, BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IS
EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT Is DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT
242.

OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 18 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 2006 BROADBAND
REPORT].

244. Id. at 14-16; see also infra note 498 and accompanying text (describing the FCC's
June 2008 decision to improve broadband data collection practices following widespread
and longstanding criticism).
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edge of the territory subscribed to broadband.245 Moreover, the FCC's
definition of broadband had encompassed any Internet service with
download speeds of above 200 Kbps (kilobits per second)-a speed that is
not much higher than dial-up and drastically below the speed required for
delivering many of broadband's innovative services. 246 This has caused
some commentators to dismiss the U.S. government's broadband
penetration figures as inflated and unreliable. 247 Telecommunications
industry analyst Mark Lloyd noted that "the truth of the matter is that over
10 years after the 1996 Telecom Act we don't really know
where advanced
248
telecommunications services are deployed in America.
ii. Cost

In addition to racial, ethnic, and geographic disparities, the related
differences in household income account for the persistence of the digital
divide. Among households with annual incomes above $75,000, 95%
report being regular Internet users, 249 and 00/h
82% have household broadband
access. 25 But among households with annual incomes below $30,000,
only 53% report using the Internet at all 251 and a mere 42% have household

broadband service. 252 This income-based access disparity is largely
explained by the fact that household broadband access remains expensive
throughout most of the United States. 253
Americans, in fact, pay
245. See GAO 2006 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 243, at 14. The GAO noted that
"[c]ompanies report service in a zip code even if they only serve businesses." Id. at 16. It
found "that in some zip codes more than one of the large established cable companies
reported service. Because such providers rarely have overlapping service territories, this
likely indicates that their deployment was not zip-code-wide and that the number of
providers reported in the zip code overstates the level of competition to individual
households." Id.
246. For example, anything less than 10 Mbps (50 times the speed of the FCC's
threshold) would be inadequate to accommodate high-quality video, real-time interactivity,
and many telemedicine applications. See Grant Gross, CaliforniaBroadbandReport Offers
Model
for
Other
States,
PC
WORLD,
Jan.
19,
2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id, 141536/printable.html.
247. See, e.g., Mark Lloyd, Raise the Bar on Broadband, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS,
July 18, 2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/07/broadband.html (referring
to the FCC's 200 Kbps benchmark as "slowband").
248. Lloyd, supra note 235.
249. PEW 2008 INTERNET DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT, supra note 236.
250. PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3.
251. PEW 2008 INTERNET DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT, supra note 236.
252. PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3.
253. The OECD October 2007 statistics for average monthly broadband subscription
prices place the United States among the most expensive member nations, with a monthly
average subscription price of $53.06, compared to Germany at $39.62 (USD), the United
Kingdom at $39.67 (USD), South Korea at $37.81 (USD), Turkey at $37.03 (USD), and
Poland at $39.04 (USD). OECD 2007 MONTHLY SUBSCRIPTIONS REPORT, supra note 231;
see also Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 CARDozo ARTS
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significantly higher monthly subscription rates for broadband Internet
service that is not as widely available as and significantly slower than
broadband services available in many other developed nations. For
example, compared to the average U.S. broadband monthly subscription
rate of $53.06 for an average download speed of 8.9 Mbps (megabits per
second), Japan has an average broadband subscription rate of $41.05
(USD) for broadband servicc at average download specds of 93.7
Mbps 254 -over ten times faster (and more capacious) than the average
broadband service in the United States. In other words, a video of a twohour legislative hearing that in Japan could take three minutes to download
could take well in excess of one hour to download in many American
broadband homes.
What is of even more concern is that the relative standing of the United
States in the OECD surveys is trending downward. As the OECD
penetration and subscription figures show, the United States continues to
fall behind the rest of the developed world in broadband penetration,
pricing, and quality of service. And the FCC's own data show that
broadband adoption in the United States has been slowing since 2004.55
iii. Why Is BroadbandImportant?
The focus of this Article is on broadband instead of Internet access in
the broader sense because the most vibrant democratic engagement online
is not as present in the e-mail and plain-text narrowband realm as much as
it is in broadband. In fact, in a 2008 study, the Pew Internet and American
Life Project revealed remarkable differences in the online experiences
between dial-up and broadband users, with "broadband" defined as access
delivered by cable modem, DSL, or similar high-speed connection. 256
Broadband users engage in significantly more activities involving
interactive expression, political engagement, and political information
gathering.
For example, on a "typical day," household broadband users were almost
three times as likely to use their connection to search for information about
the 2008 election and four times as likely to visit a state or local
government website, to watch a video on a video-sharing website like
& ENT. L.J. 135 (2002) (examining income disparities as a principal cause of the digital
divide).
254. See OECD 2007 MONTHLY SUBSCRIPTIONS REPORT, supra note 231; OECD Portal,
supra note 231. In France, the average monthly broadband subscription price is $44.77
(USD) for service that averages an advertised download speed of 44.2 Mbps. Id.
255. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., WIRELINE COMPETITION
BUREAU, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, at 1-3
(2007), availableat http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-270128A 1.pdf.
256. PEw 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 5, 19.
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YouTube, or to download a podcast. 257 Broadband users were five times as
likely to visit a blog, more than twice as likely to use a social networking
website like MySpace or Facebook, and twice as likely to create or work on
their own blog.258
In addition, home broadband users are significantly more likely than
dial-up users to access news websites, look for information related to a
personal hobby or interest, do employment-related research, use Wikipedia,
or peruse the blogosphere. 25 9 They also are significantly more likely to
create and post original content to the Internet, including blog and
discussion posts and graphical content. 260 Few would question, in fact, that
the increase in household broadband connectivity has driven much of the
rise of amateur, collaborative creativity and innovation-from Wikipedia
and YouTube to the creation of new open-access software models.2 6'
Today's online population-especially in the highly expressive fora
accessible primarily via broadband-is much wealthier, more highly
educated, younger, more suburban, and significantly less racially and
ethnically diverse than the general population. It cannot be said, therefore,
that today's Internet is conducive to open and inclusive deliberative
democratic discussion. Online political and other fora are open only to
those who can afford to subscribe and, if so, have broadband service
available in their communities. Because so many Americans are left
therefore no true
offline, there is no openness and equality of access, and
262
deliberative democracy, in the broadband public sphere.
257. Id. at 19.
258. Id.
259. Id. In 2007, Pew concluded that "a high-speed, 'always on' connection clearly
allows users to engage frequently in a wider range of online activities than dial-up users."
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,

HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2007, at

11,

http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPBroadband%202007.pdf.
260. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE BROADBAND DIFFERENCE: How
ONLINE AMERICANS' BEHAVIOR CHANGES WITH HIGH-SPEED INTERNET CONNECTIONS AT
HOME 3 (2002), http://www.pewintemet.org/PPF/r/63/report display.asp.
261. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 33 (2006) (noting that the wider accessibility of
personal computers and broadband connectivity has spurred the creation of Wikipedia and
innovative software); see also Terry Fisher, Professor & Dir., Berkman Ctr. for Internet &
Soc'y, Harvard Univ., The Future Digital Economy: Digital Content-Creation,
Distribution and Access, Dinner Speech at Meeting Organised Jointly by the Italian Minister
for Innovation and Technologies and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2-3 (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/44/36138608.pdf
(crediting broadband networks with the rise in amateurism in the creation of a new digital
culture).
262. Network theorist Albert-Ldszl6 Barabdsi, at the conclusion of a web-mapping
project, wrote, "The most intriguing result... was the complete absence of democracy,
fairness, and egalitarian values on the Web." ALBERT-LASZL6 BARABASI, LINKED: How
EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS,
SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 56-57 (2003).
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C. Private Censorship

Despite the cyberlibertarians' utopian vision of the Internet as an engine
2 64
263
and the Supreme Court's
of free speech-as well as both Congress's
own early characterizations of the Internet as a fertile substrate for
autonomous expression-in reality the Internet is a haven for private
censorship. News and blog websites can offer users a diverse and
substantively rich trove of information, but as is the case with broadcasting,
the ability of the viewer or reader to respond with his or her own
expression is not guaranteed online.265
In privatizing the Internet, Congress privatized control over online
expression as well, largely removing that expression from the First
Amendment's protective reach.266 In addition, the First Amendment
public-forum doctrine-through which the Supreme Court has
accommodated speech in public spaces-would not apply to the vast
majority of websites, since they do not constitute government spaces
2 67
analogous to sidewalks, streets, or other public areas open to free speech.
263. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 230(a)(3), 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(a)(3) (2000) (calling the Internet "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse").
264. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (characterizing the Internet as a
"vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience" and claiming
that "[a]ny person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 'publish'
information").
265. See Anick Jesdanun, Is It Censorshipor Protection?In Monitoring Online Content,
Internet Companies Are Judge and Jury, WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at A3 (discussing the
power of service providers to limit expression on their websites, such as the posting of
images on a photo-sharing service).
266. Professor Dawn C. Nunziato, one of the first scholars to examine the problem of
Internet censorship, argues in a pathbreaking article that "[w]hat follows from such
privatization is that today there are essentially no places on the Internet where free speech is
constitutionally protected." Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in
Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1130 (2005). Congress codified the
privatization of Internet content control by means of § 230 of the 1996 Communications
Decency Act, in which it absolved interactive computer service providers (including both
ISPs as well as website owners) from liability both for content posted by third parties and
for voluntary actions to remove "objectionable" material, "whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected." Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 230(c)(2), 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2) (2000).
267. See Varona, supra note 68, at 190-94 (2006) (providing an overview of the
Supreme Court's public forum analysis). In brief, the Supreme Court has identified three
First Amendment classifications for public property: "traditional" public fora, "designated"
public fora, and "nonpublic" fora. The Court considers traditional public fora as being those
government-owned spaces that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public ... for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and
discussing public questions." Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
In these traditional public fora, the "government may not prohibit all communicative
activity" and must show that any content-based restriction on speech satisfies strict scrutiny
and is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). "Designated" public fora are government-owned
spaces that are not traditional public fora, but that the government intentionally has opened
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Thus, despite the popular notion that the Internet is one big public forum, in
fact the Internet exists as a limitless agglomeration of websites and fora,
with the vast majority owned by private, nongovernmental entities that are
not at all subject to the anticensorship requirements imposed by the First
Amendment.268
1. Censorship on Social Networking and News Media Websites
Virtually all of the most popular websites, particularly those that host a
significant quantity of political discussion and public debate, are privately
controlled and regularly enforce Terms of Service (ToS) provisions
allowing for the removal of any user-posted content at the website owners'
sole discretion. For example, the popular social networking website
Facebook, which has played an unprecedented role as an organizing vehicle
in the 2008 presidential election,26 9 warns in its Terms of Use that the
website "may delete or remove (without notice) any Site Content or User
Content in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason. ' '270 Many highly
to some public expressive use (like municipal auditoriums and public meeting rooms).
Once opened to the public at large, any speech restrictions in designated public fora also are
subjected to First Amendment strict scrutiny. Id at 45-46. Some courts have used the terms
"designated" and "limited" interchangeably, although others have referred to limited public
fora to refer to fora designated for use by only a certain class of speakers or for only certain
types of speech. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 (10th Cir. 1997); Whiteland
Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999). Access and
speech restrictions in nonpublic fora, meaning public property that is both not traditionally
regarded as a platform for public expression and not intentionally opened for public
discourse, survive review "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
268. See Nunziato, supra note 266, at 1121 (noting that there is currently very little free
speech protection on the Internet); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From
Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998); Stacey D. Schesser, A New Domain
for Public Speech: Opening PublicSpaces Online, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1791 (2006) (discussing
the lack of public fora online); Noah D,Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for
Public Forums in the ElectronicEnvironment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 206-10 (1998)
(discussing the need for "cybersidewalks" on the largely privatized web).
269. See Brian Stelter, The Facebooker Who Friended Obama, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2008, at C1 (discussing how the presidential campaign of then-Senator Barack Obama relied
on the Internet to "raise more than two million donations of less than $200 each" and
cheaply and quickly mobilize supporters during the primaries).
According to the
Washington Post, Obama said, "One of my fundamental beliefs from my days as a
community organizer is that real change comes from the bottom up ....
And there's no
more powerful tool for grass-roots organizing than the Internet." Id.; see also Jose Antonio
Vargas, Grass Roots Planted in Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at CI (detailing
former Senator Edwards's enthusiastic adoption of social networking sites as a tool for
recruiting supporters during the presidential primaries).
270. Facebook.com, Terms of Use, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008). The other top social networking website, MySpace, has very similar ToS
policies and has a long record of censoring user-generated content, including deleting
content relating to competitor sites, deleting content critical of its owner, Rupert Murdoch,
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rated television network and newspaper websites with interactive fora
hosting lively discussions on political, cultural, and other matters-many
with particularly localized themes-are governed by similar ToS
policies. 27' For example, the "Rules of Engagement" for the discussion
fora on the CBS News website concedes that "what is not allowable is
subjective" and requires that comments be "polite and civil"-"no
2 72
bathroom humor, no comparing anyone to Hitler, Stalin, or Pol Pot.

Many newspapers' websites prohibit "insult[s]." One warns specifically
that it removes posts "calling someone a moron, idiot, etc." ;273 another
prohibits comments that are "hurtful," "vulgar, '' 2 74 or "inpoor taste" ;275 yet
another will delete comments "you wouldn't say in front of your mother at
the dinner table. 276
Popular websites hosting user-generated video and text, like YouTube,
MySpace, and LiveJournal, also have engaged directly in (or have allowed
users to commit) censorship that would violate the First Amendment if it
occurred in a public space.277 For example, in August 2008, MySpace
and deleting nonsexual content concerning homosexuality. See Kristen Nicole, MoveOn
Censorship, MASHABLE.COM,
May
18,
2007,
Openly Battling MySpace
http://mashable.com/2007/05/18/moveon-myspace/.
271. For example, the Los Angeles Times warns readers who post comments to the
company's website (www.latimes.com) that "[a]ny decisions as to whether User Content
violates any Posting Rule will be made by latimes.com in its sole discretion."
http://www.latimes.com/services/site/latLATimes.com,
Terms
of
Service,
terms,0,6713384.htmlstory (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). On the San Diego Union-Tribune
website (www.signonsandiego.com), the company warns posters that it "reserve[s] the right
to remove posting privileges of any user who violates [the Terms of Use] or for any other
Terms
of
Use,
reason."
SignOnSanDiego.com,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/about/privacy/termsof use.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008)
(emphasis added). The Walt Disney Internet Group websites, which include the interactive
site for ABC News and the ABC owned-and-operated television and radio stations, are
governed by ToS that reserve to Disney "the fight to screen, refuse to post, remove or edit
User-Generated Content at any time and for any or no reason in our absolute and sole
discretion without prior notice, although we have no duty to do so or to monitor any Public
Forum." Disney.com, Terms of Use, http://disney.go.com/corporate/legal/terms.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2008).
of
Engagement,
CBSNews.com,
272. Rules
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/20/utility/ main959709.shtml (last visited Oct. 21,
2008).
Back
Commenting
Policy,
273. BillingsGazette.net,
Talk
http://billingsgazette.net/info/?h/commentpolicy/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
274. SignOnSanDiego.com, supra note 271.
275. LATimes.com, supra note 271.
276. Editorial, Understanding the Surge, Pool Rules-Leave a Comment Interface,
July
25,
2008,
METROWESTDAILYNEWS.COM,
http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/opinions/editorials/x2109422824/Editorial-Understandingthe-surge (free registration required).
277. See, e.g., Benjamin Smith, Internet Vulnerable to Free Speech Issues, POLITICO,
May 10, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0507/3919.html
(detailing several instances where YouTube removed user videos that would have been
protected if the First Amendment applied, including the removal of a video featuring
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deleted pictures uploaded by parents of a fully clothed child who had
survived bum injuries as an infant but still showed significant facial
scarring, claiming that the pictures were "offensive" and a violation of the
website's ToS.278 The website threatened to delete the parents' entire
MySpace account if they reposted the pictures, which showed the boy
engaged in mundane activities such as eating.279
2. Censorship in the Blogosphere
Many observers tout the unique ability of bloggers to, in the words of
David Kline, "combine information with debate," leading "to a
strengthening of the civic mindedness of the citizenry" and to
"extraordinarily high levels of political participation., 280 For example, in
launching his blog with Professor Gary Becker, Judge Richard Posner
wrote that "the [I]ntemet enables the instantaneous pooling (and hence
correction, refinement, and amplification) of... ideas and opinions, facts
and images, reportage and scholarship., 281 Although the collective
blogosphere may be what Professor Cass Sunstein calls "a kind of gigantic

presidential candidate John McCain singing "Bomb, Bomb Iran"). YouTube administrators
can take down videos at their own initiative or in response to the "flagging" by users of
content that may be a violation of the company's ToS. Id.In addition, anyone uploading a
video to YouTube can opt to delete all of the comments posted in reaction to the video that
disagree with or otherwise have a negative reaction to its contents. YouTube Help Center,
Video
Comments:
Removing
Comments
on
My
Videos,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hlrm=en&answer=56112
(last
visited Aug. 8, 2008); see also Declan McCullagh, Mass Deletion Sparks LiveJournal

Revolt, CNETNEWS.COM, May 30, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Mass-deletion-sparksLiveJoumal-revolt/2100-1025 3-6187619.html (reporting on the outrage following
LiveJournal's deletion of 500 websites hosted on its service on the grounds that they
promoted sexual abuse of minors and "other illegal activities," but encompassing many
websites with no such content, including a website hosting Spanish-language discussions of
the Nabokov novel Lolita and a number of science fiction websites). Barak Berkowitz, the
chairman and chief executive of LiveJournal's parent company, defended the actions: "Our
decision here was not based on pure legal issues-it was based on what community we want
to build and what we think is appropriate within that community and what's not." Id.
278. Patrick Donovan, Pictures of Burned Indiana Child Banned from MySpace,
NBCNEwS.COM,
Aug.
28,
2008,

http://www.ksdk.com/news/world/story.aspx?storyid=153281.
279. The child's father, Billy McComb, said, "Regardless of what he looks like he's still
a child-he's not a monster." Id.
280. David Kline, Toward a More Participatory Democracy, in BLOG! HOW THE
NEWEST MEDIA REVOLUTION IS CHANGING POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND CULTURE 1,

11 (David

Kline & Dan Burstein eds., 2005).
281.

Richard

Posner, Introduction to the Becker-Posner Blog, Dec. 5, 2004,

http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2004/12/introductionto_ .html.
Judge Posner
writes that blogging is "a fresh and striking exemplification of Friedrich Hayek's thesis that
knowledge is widely distributed among people and that the challenge to society is to create
mechanisms for pooling that knowledge." Id.
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town meeting, ,,282 many individual bloggers, as nongovernmental, private
actors, can and often do censor visitor comments, thereby distorting the
tenor and flow of discussions.
Others disallow public participation
altogether.
For example, Arianna Huffington's metablog website, the Huffington
Post, which refers to itself as "the Internet newspaper," has been widely
accused of censoring posts in a politically slanted manner. 8 3 Huffington, a
self-avowed liberal, revealed that among the "certain obvious things" the
moderators do not allow to be posted are "conspiracy theories." "If you
thought Sept. 11 was caused by the Bush Administration, your comment is
not going to appear unless it is a mistake. 284 Conservative blogger
Michelle Malkin warns commentators on her website that she "reserve[s]
the right to delete your comments or revoke your registration for any
reason whatsoever. 285 In 2006, Malkin herself complained of having a
video "highlighting the victims of Islamic violence" inappropriately
removed from YouTube.2 86
3. Censorship by BroadbandProviders

Not only is there rampant censorship by individual website owners, but
there are increasing reports of censorship by broadband service providers
themselves. Many of these instances involve expression concerning
important political, legal, and social controversies. For example, in
September 2007, Verizon Wireless refused to carry text messages sent by
NARAL Pro-Choice America urging political action to its enrolled and
prospective members. 287 One month earlier, AT&T had temporarily
282.
(2006).

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MrNDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE

185

283. See, e.g., Huffington Post Censors Posts Favorableto Palin or McCain, Sept. 1,

2008, http://saywhatyoureallymean.blogspot.com/2008/09/huffington-post-censors-postsfavorable.html.
284. Daniel Libit, The Commentocracy Rises Online, POLITICO.COM, July 24, 2008,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0708/11890.html.
285. MichelleMalkin.com, Terms of Use, http://michellemalkin.com/terms-of-use/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2008).
286. Michelle
Malkin,
Banned
on
YouTube,
Oct.
4,
2006,
http://michellemalkin.com/archives/006048.htm?print=1 (questioning whether any criticism
ofjihad would qualify as inappropriate "hate" under YouTube's ToS); see also Tom Zeller,
Jr., A Slippery Slope of Censorship at YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at C5 (positing
that, as part of a "campaign to spit-shine its image and, perhaps, to look a little less ragtag to
potential buyers," YouTube removed especially incendiary political videos from the site,
including Michelle Malkin's "First They Came" video denouncing Islamic intolerance).
287.

See Adam Liptak, Verizon Rejects Text Messagesfrom an Abortion Rights Group,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at Al (noting that a sample message was "End Bush's global
gag rule against birth control for world's poorest women! Call Congress. (202) 224-3121.
Thnx! Naral Text4Choice"); Jeffrey Gold, Verizon Reverses Text-Messaging Decision,
STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 28, 2007, at 66 (following public outcry, senior Verizon Wireless
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censored a webcast of a concert by Pearl Jam during a Lollapalooza
celebration in which the band's lead singer replaced regular lyrics to their
hit "Daughter" with "George Bush, leave this world alone; George Bush
find yourself a home."288 In 2006, one of the largest cable modem-based
broadband providers in the nation, Comcast, was accused of blocking
access to AfterDowningStreet.com, the website run by a grassroots
organization known for activism against the Iraq war.289 The blocking
continued for one week,
hampering the group's efforts in organizing a
2 90
massive protest rally.

In addition, broadband providers have been found to censor
communications on their networks that disparage them or otherwise
undermine their commercial advantage.2 9 1 For example, Verizon and
AT&T disclose to new subscribers that they reserve the right to terminate
the accounts of users who use their networks to criticize the companies'
29
business practices. 292 And in 2006, America Online (AOL) was found to
be blocking e-mails from a coalition of 600 organizations-including the
AFL-CIO and the Gun Owners of America-that circulated an online
petition opposing AOL's proposal to charge a premium for bulk e-mail to
circumvent the company's filters.293
4. The New Scarcity: ScarceAudience, Abundant "Spectrum"
A popular response to the problem of legal censorship on the
predominantly private Internet is that editorial controls and moderation of
user-posted content are necessary to preserve civility and focus on
especially popular websites. Without these controls, the vitriolic, obscene,
or abusive speech of vandals and the uncivil would drive away other
executives determined that the decision not to allow the text messages was "an incorrect
interpretation of a dusty internal policy").
288. See Nate Anderson, Pearl Jam Censored by AT&T, Calls for a Neutral Net,
Aug. 9, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070809-pearljam-censored-by-att-calls-for-a-neutral-net.html; Lawrence Lessig, Jamming the Pearl,
LESSIG.ORG, Aug. 10, 2007, http://lessig.org/blog/2007/08/jammingthe-pearl.html ("This
censoring event, whether AT&T's 'mistake' or not, should be a rallying point for this [net
neutrality] movement.").
289. Greg Piper, No Harm Yet for Content, VoIP from Network Owners, Bells Say,
ARSTECHNICA.CoM,

COMM. DAILY, Mar. 24, 2006.

290. Id.
291. See DAWN
INTERNET

AGE

C. NUNZIATO, NET NEUTRALITY, FREE SPEECH, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE

16-19

(forthcoming

2009),

preface

available

at

=
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id
1266365.
292. Id. at 17 (citing AT&T Worldnet, AT&T DSL Service Subscriber Agreement,
http://worldnet.att.net/general-info/terms-dsl-data.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008)); see also
Verizon
Internet
Services,
Inc.,
Online
Terms
of
Service,
http://www.verizon.net/policies/popups/tospopup.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
293. Chris Gaither & Joseph Menn, AOL Blocks Critics' E-Mails, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2006, at C 1.
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These are important concerns. In
participants and destroy the forum.
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that in a democracy,
the government rarely needs to regulate speech since "public
disapprobation is enough" for the "multitude ...to coerce those who do
not think like themselves."' 295 On the Internet, however, the effect of public
disapproval is much weaker thanks to the medium's allowance of
anonymous or pseudonymous expression by speakers not physically
proximate to-and therefore not at risk of retribution from-those with
whom the speaker disagrees. As a result, some studies show that dissenters
are more willing to express their grievances online without fear of social
ostracism or disapprobation.296 On one hand, this bodes well for the
diversity and vibrancy of the ideas marketplace online. The expression of
dissenting ideas, free from fear of physical retribution, promotes individual
autonomy and self-identity, dissipates resentments that may fester into
dangerous anger if repressed, and enriches the marketplace. But on the
other hand, freedom from social constraints may render much online
expression too angry, too coarse, and so abusive that it denies human
dignity, silences opposition, and undermines democratic dialogue.2 97
As autonomous speakers protected by the First Amendment, private
website owners get to decide the tone and substance of their websites, even
if such decisions exclude worthy viewpoints and discriminate against valid
Editorial decisions can shape the thematic
modes of expression.
distinctiveness and identity of a website and, consequently, are themselves
an important form of protected expression. Moreover, if someone were
blocked from sharing her ideas on one website, then she is free to find
another website where the expression would be allowed to stand. Or she
294. For example, Professor Stephen L. Carter argues that the Internet poses a serious
challenge to civility as a result of the preponderance of autonomous, instantaneous
expression, and the paucity of thoughtful intermediation. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY:
MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY 193-202 (1998). Carter writes
that "President Clinton ...proclaimed that the Internet is becoming 'our new town square,'
but I am not sure that this is a town where the student of civility wants to live." Id.at 200.
295. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945)
(1840).
296. See Tamara Witschge, Online Deliberation: Possibilities of the Internet for
DeliberativeDemocracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 33, at 109, 115 (discussing a
number of empirical studies demonstrating that "anonymity and the absence of social
presence... can ... work against a genuine democratic exchange" online).
297. 1 agree with Professor Kent Greenawalt's assertion that "[e]xtremely harsh personal
insults and epithets directed against one's race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, or sexual
preference pose a problem for democratic theory and practice." Kent Greenawalt, Insults
and Epithets: Are They ProtectedSpeech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 288 (1990). Some
researchers have found that because of the relative anonymity of Internet interactions,
dissenters are subjected to much more "vigorous attack and humiliation" as a result of their
unpopular views and often flee the discussion forum as a result. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra
note 5, at 162, 163.
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could avoid having to comply with the quixotic standards of third-party
website owners and launch a website all her own, governed by standards
she devises.298
These defenses to the current state of affairs are not without validity, but
they too readily discount the harms of private Internet censorship. First,
whereas broadcast spectrum used for channels of programming is
exceedingly scarce and the broadcast audience is abundant, the reverse is
true on the Internet. As Professor Ellen P. Goodman has observed, "Today,
the scarce resource is attention, not programming., 299 Although there
virtually is no limit on the number of Internet "channels" or websites that
can be launched, audiences are hard to come by and the vast majority of
websites get little or no traffic. 300 Despite the Supreme Court's idealistic
declaration that "any person with [an Internet connection] can become a
town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox,30 1 the reality is that political expression "is less like crying oyez
from the central marketplace and more like whispering in a labyrinth. 30 2
Although a speaker whose content was blocked from a well-trafficked
website can simply start up her own blog or website, the likelihood is that
the uncensored website would receive considerably less traffic than the
censored one. 303 Only a tiny percentage of blogs have amassed large
audiences. The rest are read by very small numbers of readers or none at

298. Although this scenario would be less prone to censorship than that of postings to
websites controlled by others, it would still be susceptible to censorship and content controls
applied by the ISP or platform provider, such as a blog-hosting website like Blogspot.com
or LiveJoumal.com. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
299. Goodman, supra note 8, at 1392. Political scientist Herbert Simon, known for his
study of what he called the architecture of complexity, presaged the current condition of
attention scarcity when he posited in 1971 that "a wealth of information creates a poverty of
attention." Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World,
Speech at the Johns Hopkins University and Brookings Institute Symposium, in
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40 (Martin Greenberger ed.,

1971), cited in Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Interest
Intermediaries,and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 13, 16 (2006).
300. See BENKLER, supra note 261, at 245 ("Many Web pages and blogs will simply go
unread, and will not contribute to a more engaged polity.").
301. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
302. Noveck, supra note 185, at 26. Of course, the notion of the soapbox speaker in the
town center attracting an audience with the allure of his or her words and ideas is likely a
romantic conceit. As Steven G. Gey notes, "[Sipeakers on street comers have rarely been as
concerned with communicating Truth as they have been focused on winning converts or
motivating those who are already converted." Gey, supra note 268, at 1538-39. Although
the soapbox speaker as democratic symbol is "antiquated and somewhat inaccurate," Gey
notes that "it is a myth that is indispensible to democracy." Id.
303. "Many leading services, particularly online hangouts like Facebook,. . . MySpace
or... YouTube, have acquired a cachet that cannot be easily replicated. To evict a user
from an online community would be like banishing that person to the outskirts of town."
Jesdanun, supra note 265.
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all. 3 °4 In addition, although website owners have been known to reverse
their decisions to remove users' content following the protest of the content
authors or their supporters, removal of the material in today's very fastpaced media landscape for even a short amount of time can have a very
negative effect on the vibrancy and sophistication of online exchanges.30 5
Audience aside, because broadband providers themselves are engaging
in content discrimination and have the legal authority and incentive to
censor many more of the messages carried on their networks, subscribers
may not be as free as some may assume to express themselves on an
alternate website. Subscribers whose expression is censored by their
broadband carriers are entirely at the mercy of those carriers, since any
alternate websites would be transmitted through the same censoring
conduit.306

5. Valuable Dissent Can Be Impolite
Another problem caused by the rampant private censorship online relates
to the role of angry or disagreeable language in political discussion and
democratic deliberation. The United States was born of heated revolutionary
protest, and in light of those origins always has recognized "the essential
value of robust, abrasive, uninhibited dissent." 30 7 Valuable democratic
304. See Gregory M. Lamb, A One-Stop Shop for the 'Best' Blogs, CHRISTIAN SCI.
Nov. 30, 2005, at 14 ("Though many of the tens of millions of blogs have few
readers, a tiny percentage ... have won large audiences."); Blogging: Going Pro,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2006, at 67 (noting that most blogs are "personal diaries that happen
to be online" and "have tiny audiences").
305. See Smith, supra note 277, at 8 (observing that in two cases of YouTube
censorship, the removed material was restored after protests, "but in the new politics, a few
hours offline can make a huge difference").
306. See NUNZIATO, supra note 291, at 2 (discussing ability and incentives for
broadband providers to censor subscribers' content).
307. HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1N AMERICA 235
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). There are limits, of course. In 1942, the Supreme Court
articulated its "fighting words" doctrine, carving out from First Amendment protection
"insults" and other expressions "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942). The Court, however, has not upheld a conviction under the fighting words doctrine
since Chaplinsky was decided, and instead has struck down enforcement of prohibitions on
"offensive" language in public places. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26
(1971) (overturning conviction of Paul Robert Cohen for wearing a jacket bearing the words
MONITOR,

"Fuck the Draft" inside a courthouse); see also

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1013 (Kathleen M.

Sullivan & Gerald Gunther eds., 14th ed. 2001) (noting that the Court "has not sustained a
conviction on the basis of the fighting words doctrine"). Professor Stephen W. Gard
dismisses the fighting words doctrine as "nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier
morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free
expression." Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536
(1980). Yet many share the view of Chief Justice Burger in his Rosenfeld v. New Jersey
dissent, where the Court summarily vacated the conviction of a defendant who, speaking
before a school board meeting attended by at least forty children, referred to teachers and
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dialogue in fact can include speech that is angry, coarse, vulgar, and even
insulting, and not something one would want to say in front of one's mother
at the dinner table. Dissent can be impolite, or impolitic, and still be
worthwhile. Although Internet utopians may strive for especially rarified
dialogue in their neck of the online woods, the reality is that much online
discussion is like offline discussion. It is sometimes rude, crude, and angry.
The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that criticism of public officials
308
and public figures in particular "will not always be reasoned or moderate."
In light of the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open," the Supreme
Court has protected speech that "may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."30 9
And political speech described as "vulgar," "offensive," "shocking," or
"insulting" is nevertheless protected under the First Amendment in most
circumstances; indeed, the Supreme Court noted that ridicule of public
officials and figures has "played a prominent role in public and political
debate.

310°

Dissonance and disagreement, uncomfortable and impolite as

they may be, are important in public debate. "However pernicious an
opinion may seem," the Supreme
Court may find value in it as part of "the
311
competition of ... ideas.",
D. Online Exposure Diversity-The Diminishing
Returns of DigitalAutonomy
The ability of traditional broadcasting to serve as a point of common
focus has often enabled it to expose large numbers of citizens to some
democratically valuable material-like political news, public affairs, and
school board members, inter alia, as "motherfuckers."

See 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972)
f ------- ). Burger

(Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the uttered phrase as "in-----

wrote, "When we undermine the general belief that the law will give protection against
fighting words and profane and abusive language... we take steps to return to the law of
the jungle." Id. at 902 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

308. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 57 (1988) (rejecting Jerry
Falwell's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Hustler
after the latter published a parodic advertisement detailing "a drunken incestuous
rendezvous" between Falwell and his mother).
309. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
310. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54-55. When the New York Times opened its website postings
to public comment in late 2007, it also created a "comment desk" of four part-time staffers
assigned to screen all of the submissions before posting them. When one of the moderators
warned participants that vitriolic messages would not be posted, some users balked and
posted comments such as, "We need an open dialogue in this country, now more than ever,"
and "Mandating tepid civility in blog comments has an ideological component. 'Politeness'
bars sharply worded disagreement by dissenters against those who claim to be authority, but
doesn't usually bar dismissive or patronizing arguments by authority against the dissenters."
Clark Hoyt, Op-Ed., Civil Discourse,Meet the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at 14.
311. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
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local news and information-that they otherwise would not have
affirmatively sought. By contrast, the Internet's plethora of largely
unmediated and unedited content, and the ability of users to filter out
almost all material except that which they specifically seek, has raised
significant concerns about its effects on democracy, our sense of local and
As
national community, and political education and participation.
Professor Sunstein has warned, "Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are
central to democracy itself. 3 12 Democracy depends on diversity.
1. The Importance-andScarcity-ofHeterogeneousExchange Online
For truth to gain currency and prominence in a marketplace of ideas, it
must be allowed to compete in a vibrant, unbridled trade, with speakers and
listeners encouraged to explore widely, inviting serendipitous exchanges,
instead of settling for the same handful of familiar "stalls." Access to
diversity is not enough; there also must be a willingness to engage in it. In
theorizing that the seminal purpose of the First Amendment was selfgovernance, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the duty of
citizen-sovereigns was not only to speak, but to hear and consider ideas
different from their own.3 13 The great sociologist Robert Merton's work in
serendipity teaches us that unexpected, inadvertent research discoveries do
not happen entirely by accident, but by means of purposeful, planned
exposure to a diversity of information with weak or even no links to the
primary task at hand.3 14 A mindful openness to the new and unexpected
idea can provide an enlightened confirmation of an initial belief or reveal
its rooting in a false premise. Mill himself wrote that it was "hardly
possible to overrate the value... of placing human beings in contact with
persons dissimilar to themselves" and "with modes of thought and action
unlike those with which they are familiar" since315this social dissimilarity has
been "one of the primary sources of progress.
Broadcasters, like newspaper editors, offer their audiences a certain
amount of planned serendipity-giving viewers, listeners, and readers not

312.
313.

CASS R. SUNSTEFN, REPUBLIC.COM 8 (2001).
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOIIN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

65-66 (Lawbook Exchange 2004) (1948). Professor Meiklejohn wrote that "[w]e listen, not
because they desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are arguments against
our theory of government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must
hear and consider them for ourselves." Id. at 66.
314. ROBERT K. MERTON & ELINOR BARBER, THE TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES OF
SERENDIPITY: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGICAL SEMANTICS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 140-

46 (2004).
315.

JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

1909)
Co.
&
Green
Longmans,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP 1.html.

(1848),

581 (W.J. Ashley ed.,
at
available
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only what they seek, but also information that they did not set out to find
yet would be better off knowing. For example, the news of a World Series
upset may be followed by a much less prominent story on falling
graduation rates in urban high schools. Outside of certain news websites,
this planned serendipity is in scarce supply on the Internet.
In the largely private fora of today's Internet, there is not free
competition of ideas in central, open gathering spaces, but rather an
atomization of attention and a segregation of users by interests and
allegiances into a universe of noninteracting websites catering to the
likeminded.3 16 Although there is abundant debate and discussion online,
the exchanges often are internecine dialogues within self-selected affinity
groups. For example, DailyKos.com is the top-rated political discussion
website, averaging more than 1.4 million visits per day,317 hosting hundreds
of lively discussions at any one time. But its founder is clear about the
website's leanings: "This is a Democratic blog, a partisan blog. ''3 18 Given
its name, one would assume that another top-rated website, Townhall.com
and its thousands of blog discussions, would serve as a platform for a
diversity of opinions and ideas. But it too is unapologetically slanted,
calling itself "the first conservative web community ... designed to
316. Professor Sunstein has written extensively and eloquently about this problem. See
CASS R. SUNSTE1N, REPUBLIC.COM 3, 23 (2001) (noting that Internet users are able to create
their own "Neighborhood Me" or "Daily Me" in which they purposely only encounter and
interact with people just like them and ideas with which they agree); CASs R. SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 63-64 (2007) ("New technologies, emphatically including the
Internet, make it easier for people to surround themselves.., with the opinions of likeminded but otherwise isolated others, and to insulate themselves from competing views.
For this reason alone, they are a breeding ground for polarization, and potentially dangerous
for both democracy and social peace."). Professor Sunstein further wrote,
A system of individually designed communications options could.., result in a high
degree of balkanization, in which people are not presented with new or contrary
perspectives. Such a nation could not easily satisfy democratic and deliberative
goals. In such a nation, communication among people with different perspectives
might be far more difficult or even impossible. In such a nation, there may be little
commonality among people with diverse commitments, as one group caricatures
another or understands it by means of simple slogans that debase reality and eliminate
mutual understanding.
Sunstein, supra note 185, at 1786-87. Professor Stephen L. Carter also has written about
the Internet's facilitation of fragmentation. Comparing it to religion, he writes,
The online world seems to be the place to eliminate dissonance more thoroughly than
any religion ever did. You can spend your days and nights metaphorically
surrounded by anonymous people who will gleefully assure you that your most
unlikely fantasies are the reality-gleeful, because you are simultaneously assuring
them.
CARTER, supra note 294, at 201.
DailyKos.com,
Site
Summary,
317. See
SiteMeter
http://www.sitemeter.com/?a=stats&s=sm8dailykos (last visited Nov. 25, 2008) (showing a
daily average of 1.4 million unique visitors).
Daily
Kos,
of
kos
[sic]
to
318. Posting
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/15/212411/47 (Nov. 15, 2004) (18:23 PDT).
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amplify conservative voices in America's political debates.'
Blog directory Technorati currently tracks 112.8 million blogs, 320 but
one would be hard-pressed to find truly deliberative discussions reflecting a
diversity of major political and ideological viewpoints. Although there are
likely liberal visitors to conservative websites, or libertarian visitors to
socialist websites, it is unlikely that they will feel sufficiently at home to
contribute meaningfully to discussions and play any role but that of
interloping contrarian. Self-censorship on the part of these dissenting
"outsiders" would deprive the rest of the participants of valuable
information that may have corrected inaccuracies or misapprehensions in
the dominant discourse.321
An especially extreme example of the insularity of some public affairs
and discussion websites is that of OneNewsNow.com, which is owned by
the conservative American Family Association (AFA) and offers "[n]ews
from a Christian perspective. '' 322 As a service to its readers, the AFA news
feed automatically replaces certain words in Associated Press (AP) stories,
like the word "homosexual" for "gay," since the latter tenr, according to the
website's news director, puts homosexuality "in a positive light."3 23 This
practice resulted in an AP story about champion sprinter Tyson Gay's having
won his Olympic track semifinal being re-headlined for OneNewsNow.com
readers as "Homosexual eases into 100 final at Olympic trials" with
references to "Tyson Homosexual" throughout the story.324
The fragmentation of Internet communities is troubling, especially given
the increasing balkanization of the broadcast realm. In the wake of the
fairness doctrine's demise, broadcast media and their cable television
counterparts have compartmentalized into sectors that have very evidently
dispensed with journalistic neutrality in favor of advancing distinct political
and ideological agendas. For example, despite its "fair and balanced"
slogan, Fox Broadcasting and Fox News Channel advance self-avowedly

319.

About Townhall.com, http://www.townhall.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Nov.

28, 2008).
320.

Welcome to Technorati, http://www.technorati.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 28,

2008).
321.

Professor Sunstein warns that such self-censorship "is a serious social loss,"

positing that Communism survived throughout Eastern Europe partly because people
incorrectly believed that it was widely supported. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 81-82 (2003) ("The fall of Communism was made possible by the mounting

disclosure of privately held views, which turned pluralistic ignorance into something closer
to pluralistic knowledge.").
322. OneNewsNow.com,
http://www.onenewsnow.com/general.aspx?id= 1202
(last
visited Nov. 28, 2008).
323. Al Kamen, I Feel Pretty and Witty and... What?, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at

A13.
324. Id.
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325
By contrast,
conservative, Republican-slanted versions of the news.
MSNBC and Air America Radio are known to slant in favor of liberal
perspectives. 326 Public radio has been characterized as favoring liberal
ideologies, while commercial talk radio for the most part favors
327
Fulsome debate and dissension within these bulwarks
conservative ones. 32
are not especially welcome, as exemplified by the self-proclaimed
"dittoheads," the listeners who call in to the program of top-rated talk radio
host Rush Limbaugh and are put through the call screeners to (almost
always) agree with him.328 During the 2008 presidential campaign, a
Washington, DC broadcast group owner renamed its two area AM talk
stations "McCain 570" and "Obama 1260," with hosts and programming
3 29
dedicated exclusively to conservative and liberal slants, respectively.
Fragmentation online also should concern us in light of how the nation
as a whole is becoming increasingly segregated in terms of where we live,
in what journalist Bill Bishop and sociologist Robert G. Cushing have
called "the big sort. '330 According to Bishop and Cushing, the nation is

325. See Timothy Noah, Fox News Admits Bias!, SLATE, May 31, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2119864/ (asserting that despite the "fair and balanced" slogan,
"[n]o fair-minded person actually believes that Fox News is unbiased"). Fox News London
Bureau Chief Scott Norvell wrote in the May 20, 2005 version of Wall Street Journal
Europe, "Even we at Fox News manage to get some lefties on the air occasionally, and often
let them finish their sentences before we club them to death and feed the scraps to Karl
Rove and Bill O'Reilly .... Fox News is, after all, a private channel and our presenters are
quite open about where they stand on particular stories. That's our appeal." See Scott
Norvell, An Aunt with an Attitude, WALL ST. J.EUR., May 20, 2005, at A6.
326. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, MSNBC, Leaning Left and Getting Flakfrom Both Sides,
WASH. POST, May 28, 2008, at C1 (noting that MSNBC "has clearly gravitated to the left in
recent years and often seems to regard itself as the antithesis of Fox News"); William G.
Mayer, Why Talk Radio Is Conservative, 156 PuB. INT. 86, 86 (2004) (describing Air
America as "the creation of a group of wealthy entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
who ... are using their resources to promote a left-wing agenda").
327. See Mayer, supra note 326, at 88-91 (discussing the overwhelming dominance of
conservatives on commercial talk radio stations, and acknowledging critics' view that
noncommercial stations affiliated with National Public Radio (NPR) "already provide[] a
liberal voice on the airwaves").
328. See David Finkel, Dialingfor Dittos, WASH. POST MAG., June 12, 1994, at W9-10
(describing dittohead John Cavallo's repeated attempts to call in to Rush Limbaugh's talk
radio program and noting that "there's nothing he and Limbaugh disagree on").
329. See Michael Calderone, On the Dial. McCain 570 vs. Obama 1260, POLmCO.COM, Oct.
2, 2008, http://www.politico.com/blogs/michaelcalderone/1008/On the dial McCain_570 vs
Obama 1260 .html (noting that Obama 1260 featured noted liberal personalities Rachel
Maddow, Stephanie Miller, and Ed Schultz, while McCain 570's lineup included
conservatives Bill Bennett, Laura Ingraham, and Michael Savage).
330.

See generally BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE

CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED

AMERICA Is TEARING

US APART 45-49

(2008).

"As

Americans have moved over the past three decades, they have clustered in communities of
sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end, politics." Id. at
5. President Jimmy Carter won the White House in 1976 with 50.1% of the popular vote,
but with only 26.8% of voters residing in "landslide counties," defined as counties where
President Carter won or lost by 20% or more. In 2004, when President George W. Bush
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sorting itself into "balkanised communities whose inhabitants find other
Americans to be culturally incomprehensible., 331 Our self-segregation into
likeminded groups in both the online and brick-and-mortar worlds exposes
us to fewer contrary viewpoints and ultimately makes us more insular and
extreme in our views. 332 That, in turn, makes broader public discussions
much more polarized and angry at those moments when the fragments
333

reconvene.

2. Beyond Gatekeepers, Beyond Fences-FindingTruth in the Data Smog
Wired Editor in Chief Chris Anderson celebrates the "infinite choice" of
content online-what he calls the "long tail"-as providing users with the
ability to transition from an "or" culture, which restricts us to a sequence of
zero-sum choices from a menu of options compiled by media
conglomerates, to an "and" culture that affords us the luxury of having it all
(or at least thinking that we do).3 34 By transcending "the tyranny of
locality" and joining with others online in an appreciative, attentive, and
sometimes paying audience, we can satisfy our interests for relatively
uncommon or even exotic ideas, books, or music. And as a result, we also
make it possible for producers of that material to gamer enough attention
and income to continue making out-of-the-ordinary contributions to the
"paradise of choice" that has taken root online.335 After all, what may be
considered obscure today could, if given an opportunity to survive, earn
widespread acclaim in the future.
This is a persuasive perspective especially in light of how broadcasting
presents us with a homogenized, narrow, and commercially distorted vision
of ourselves and our society, and in so doing marginalizes expression
won reelection, 48.3% of voters lived in landslide counties. The Big Sort: Political
Segregation,
ECONOMIST.COM,
June
19,
2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&stor
y_id= 11581447.
331. The Big Sort: PoliticalSegregation, supra note 330.
332. Bishop warns that "[w]e now live in a giant feedback loop, hearing our own
thoughts about what's right and wrong bounced back to us by the television shows we
watch, the newspapers and books we read, the blogs we visit online, the sermons we hear
and the neighborhoods we live in." Id.; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at
60-64 (2007) (discussing experiments with homogenous, in-group deliberation, concluding
that after such discussions "people are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the
direction to which the group's members were originally inclined").
333. Professor Sunstein theorizes that the lack of diversity in subgroups of associates
generates a pressure to conform and an amplification of common ideologies, whereas
exposure to opposing or differing ideas has a dampening effect on ideological rigidity.
SuNsTEIN, supra note 321, at 4-5 (discussing how judges appointed to ideologically slanted
appellate courts tend eventually to conform to the dominant ideology).
334. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 180 (2006).
335. Id. at 17, 162, 168.
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outside of the monocultural broadcast norm. 336 The disintermediation of
cyberspace counters the agenda-setting power, often illegitimately
exercised, of commercial broadcasting. A "symbiosis," as Professor Glen
Reynolds calls it, has emerged between the Internet and mainstream media,
with the latter now looking to the former "to decide if something is worth
paying attention to. '337 Consequently, the diversity of online choice may
be forcing broadcasting to reflect a broader, more diverse, and more

complex society on its airwaves.338
Some observers, however, are understandably concerned that such
extreme diversity actually has undermined rather than promoted democratic
values by drowning democracy-elevating material in an ocean of content
that offers little or no political, cultural, or social worth. Whatever their
limitations, the editors and other "middlemen" of broadcast and print media
play an important journalistic qua democratic role in earning enough public
trust and accountability, through time, to direct large-scale attention to
important issues of governance and society that audience members would
ignore or miss altogether if left to their own devices in digital isolation.33 9
Whether bloggers can assume that important attention-focusing role online
is in dispute.340
Internet polemicist Andrew Keen warns that the "inanity and absurdity"
of much online content results in a general mediascape that provides us
with "less culture, less reliable news, . . a chaos of useless information,"
and "even disappearance of the truth., 341
He argues that the
"YouTubification of politics is a threat to civic culture" insofar as it
"infantilizes the political process, silencing public discourse and leaving

336.

See generally

JERRY MANDER,

FOUR ARGUMENTS

FOR THE ELIMINATION

OF

TELEVISION (1978).

337. Dan Schulman, Meet the New Bosses, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 2007, at 30.
338. Of course, broadcasters also are desperately looking for new ways to leverage the
Internet to shore up their declining business models. David Carr, Mourning Old Media's
Decline,

NYTIMES.COM,

Oct.

28,

2008,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/business/media/29carr.html
(noting that even as
mainstream media revenue is rapidly declining, overall media audiences are rising, with the
New York Times employing its website, RSS feeds, and hand-held devices to accommodate
the growing preference for alternative news conduits).
339. See ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS
PUTTING INDVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 187-96 (1999)

(arguing that delegating news-filtering duties to "trusted intermediaries" can make
consumers "more free" and "more connected to one another"); see also Netanel, supra note
152, at 456 ("Whatever their faults, for example, traditional news media have the resources
and professional commitment to check facts and verify sources, and we hold them
accountable if they do not.").
340. See Netanel, supra note 152, at 456 ("Matt Drudge and other individual online
publishers often have neither the financial wherewithal nor the institutional aspiration to
meet professional journalistic standards.").
341.

ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 5,16 (2007).
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the future of the government up to thirty-second video clips shot by
camcorder-wielding amateurs with political agendas. 342 With a paucity of
"experts and cultural gatekeepers" online, he quips that "[t]he monkeys
take over., 343 Habermas himself voiced some alarm at the effect the
Internet has had on the prominence of public intellectuals in the public
sphere: "The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the
medium,
Internet is the decentralized access to unedited stories. In this
3 44
contributions by intellectuals lose their power to create a focus.,
Not everyone agrees. Political philosopher Dennis Thompson, for
example, argues that the Internet's superabundance of information actually
generates more of a demand for experts and mediators to sort through the
chaff in search of the wheat. He writes that "[t]he greater the quantity and
more variable the quality of information, the greater the demand for
authorities who can assess its reliability and relevance." 345 In addition,
there is no shortage of evidence demonstrating how the Internet, and
especially the blogosphere, has allowed a diversity of experts to apply their
knowledge in a manner sometimes more effective than offline mechanisms
for quality control and peer review. For example, in the June 25, 2008
decision of Kennedy v. Louisiana, a closely divided Supreme Court banned
the death penalty for child rapists.346 Justice Anthony Kennedy based the
majority opinion in part on an assertion that, of the thirty-seven
jurisdictions with the death penalty (thirty-six states and the federal
government), "only six of those jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for
rape of a child," and the federal government is not among them.' 47 Merely
three days later, legal blogger Colonel Dwight H. Sullivan revealed in his
popular military justice blog that the Court had its facts wrong. The federal
government in fact had amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
2006 to allow for the death penalty for soldiers convicted of child rape. 348
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.'s
dissent (and apparently the State of Louisiana's brief) had mistakenly
overlooked this relatively new law, as had the mainstream media, including

342. Id. at 68.
343. Id. at 9.
344. Jiirgen Habermas, Acceptance Speech for the Bruno Kreisky Prize for the
Advancement of Human Rights (2007), quoted in KEEN, supra note 341, at 55.

345. Dennis Thompson, James Madison on Cyberdemocracy, in GOVERNANCE.COM,
supra note 215, at 36-37.
346. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
347. Id. at 2653.
348. See Dwight H. Sullivan, The Supremes Dis the Military Justice System,
CAAFLoG.COM, June 28, 2008, http://caaflog.blogspot.com/2008/06/supremes-dis-militaryjustice-system.html (noting that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 was "right on point").
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their vaunted legal commentators and experts.34 9
Stories similar to Colonel Sullivan's may have promoted Judge Richard
Posner to posit in 2005 that, viewed as a journalistic corpus, the
blogosphere does a better job than traditional media at surfacing and
vetting the truth:
The rapidity with which vast masses of information are pooled and sifted
leaves the conventional media in the dust. Not only are there millions of
blogs, and thousands of bloggers who specialize, but, what is more, readers
post comments that augment the blogs, and the information in those
comments, as in the blogs themselves, zips around blogland at the speed of
electronic transmission ....

[C]orrections in blogs are also disseminated

virtually instantaneously, whereas when a member of the mainstream media
catches350a mistake, it may take weeks to communicate a retraction to the

public.

Judge Posner's argument is a compelling one, and I do not dispute the
notion that the blogosphere has valuable self-correcting, truth-vetting
tendencies. I am more skeptical, however, of the premise that all or even
most visitors to the blogosphere spend enough time and enough focus
reading a sufficiently wide array of websites so as to obtain the full benefits
of the blogosphere as a "collective enterprise." It is true that many blogs
link to the same top stories in rapid succession, and that especially popular
blogs attract the attention of both the mainstream media and the rest of the
blogosphere. But it is unlikely that a reader of just a handful of websites
would get the full benefit of the blogosphere's checks and balances,
particularly if the websites on that reader's daily diet of blog reading are
especially inured to criticism and correction from bloggers elsewhere on
the web. In fact, recent studies have found that despite the Internet's
expansive breadth, most users visit a small number of favorite websites,
and not necessarily those with high readership and journalistic standards. 35'
Professor Matthew Hindman's recent research on the behavior of Internet
users notes that the number of websites an average Internet user visits is so

349. On the basis of Colonel Sullivan's post, the Washington Post editorialized in favor
of reopening the case in light of the Court's error. See Editorial, Supreme Slip-Up: A Recent
High Court Ruling Is Factually Flawed The Justices Should CorrectIt, WASH. POST, July 5,
2008, at A14.
350. Richard A. Posner, BadNews, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005 (book review), at 1, 10.
In effect, the blogosphere is a collective enterprise-not 12 million separate
enterprises, but one enterprise with 12 million reporters, feature writers and
editorialists, yet with almost no costs. It's as if The Associated Press or Reuters had
millions of reporters, many of them experts, all working with no salary for free
newspapers that carried no advertising.
Id. at 11.
351. See, e.g., Matthew Hindman, A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: Measuring Media
Diversity Online and Offline, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS
328 (2007) (discussing the paradoxical nature of online media diversity).
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small that "the diversity of media outlets that citizens use many be smaller
online than in traditional media., 352 He cautions that "[i]t may be true that
every web site has a voice-but most speak in a whisper and a powerful
few have a megaphone. 353
While it is widely accepted that the blogosphere has enriched political
dialogue and held government and mainstream media accountable, it is also
true that the Internet's destruction of the old twenty-four-hour news cycle
has had negative effects. The former daylong cycle afforded media an
opportunity to prioritize news items and lead with "headlines." It allowed
readers and viewers an opportunity to analyze and digest the news. And it
permitted newsmakers at least some time to craft thoughtful responses for
the next day's news. The "always on" blogosphere today has resulted in an
atmosphere of incessant news production in which, as described succinctly
by Professor Lili Levi, "blogs can goad mainstream media into sloppy,
responsive reporting and create partisan swarms that can distract media
coverage and lead to excessive defensiveness on the part of mainstream
outlets., 354 The round-the-clock, incessant oscillation between digital
reporting and official government response has left little time for digestion,
reflection, and the exercise of journalistic diligence.
The Internet has subverted the edit-then-publish norm of traditional
media with a new reliance on the "wisdom of the crowd" to serve as a post
hoc editorial check in the new publish-then-edit online culture. This instant
publication has allowed the Internet to respond quickly to events and
controversies, sometimes in positive ways. 355 But the prevalent lack of
editorial control brings new meaning to former British Prime Minister
James Callaghan's famous quip that "[a] lie can be halfway around the
world before truth has got its boots on."35 6 On the Internet, a mistruth can
circle the world several times and be featured in countless websites, with
convincing pictures, text, and discussion, before truth even awakes. Once
it does, it will need more than boots to counter online falsity.
The Internet has become a breeding ground for rumor-mongering,

352. Id. at 328; see also id. at 337 ("[A]udiences on the World Wide Web appear even
more tightly focused than those of more traditional media .... Online, a smaller number of
outlets have consistently garnered a larger share of the total audience.").
353. Id. at 345.
354. Levi, supra note 197, at 692. Professor Levi also observes that "the blogosphere
does seem to contain some strikingly partisan, extremist, and caustic rhetoric, which some
fear will enhance political polarization and undermine reasoned political debate." Id. at 693
(citing Kenneth Jost & Melissa J. Hipolit, Blog Explosion, CQ RESEARCHER, June 9, 2006,
at 511).
355. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
356. Jim Callaghan: A Life in Quotes, BBCNEwS.COM, Mar. 26, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/3288907.stm.
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defamation, and misinformation. 357 E-mail and websites were used to insist
during the 2008 presidential campaign that Barack Obama had radical
Muslim ties.358 Although the Obama campaign used its own website to
counter these rumors, as of July 2008, 12% of those surveyed continued to
say that they believed Obama to have such ties and 25% of those surveyed
said they did not know what Obama's religion is. 35 9 Similarly, for four
months a biographical entry on Wikipedia, the user-generated online
encyclopedia that has gained enormous popularity and even status as an
authoritative research tool, falsely reported that former Robert F. Kennedy
aide John Seigenthaler, Jr. had been involved in the assassinations of
both
3 60
Senator Robert Kennedy and his brother, President John F. Kennedy.
E. Localism and Community Building Online
Despite being available in almost all populated localities of the nation,
the Internet is not yet a source of distinctly local political and public affairs
content across the nation. In rejecting the "diversity index" the FCC
devised in 2003 to facilitate its liberalization of broadcast ownership
restrictions, the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC
concluded that the FCC was wrong to rely on what it called "the virtual
universe of information sources" available on the Internet as a source of
"local news" and "public affairs programming." 361 The court accurately
recognized that although there is much local information on the Internet,
the great majority is not the sort of political, democracy-elevating
information at the heart of the FCC's longstanding localism principle:
"Search-engine sponsored pages such as Yahoo! Local and
About.com... may be useful for finding restaurant reviews and concert
362
schedules, but this is not... 'news and public affairs programming.''
Although the Internet has proved to be useful to localities following natural
357.

See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR,

AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET

(2007) (exploring the tension between protecting privacy

and safeguarding free speech).
358. See James Barron, 9 Jewish Leaders Say E-mail Spread Lies About Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A20 (discussing the anonymous "hateful e-mails" which circulated
for months, spreading lies about President Obama's intentions).
359. See FightTheSmears.com, The Truth About Barack Obama's Faith,
http://my.barackobama.com/page/invite/Christian (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (dispelling
the myths behind President Obama's faith); Michael Dimock, Belief That Obama Is Muslim
Is Durable, Bipartisan-butMost Likely to Sway Democratic Votes, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
July 15, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/898/belief-that-obama-is-muslim-is-bipartisanbut-most-likely-to-sway-democrats (noting that the belief that then-Senator Obama was
Muslim did not affect the Republican voters, but did affect certain Democratic voters).
360. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 138
(2008) (detailing circumstances surrounding Wikipedia incident).
361. 373 F.3d 372, 406-07 (3d Cir. 2004).
362. Id.
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disasters and other emergencies, 363 the court was correct in observing that
there is a paucity of permanent, interactive websites devoted to primarily
local or municipal political or other public affairs.36 4
As noted in Part I, the FCC's policymaking in the area of broadcast
localism has been murky, but there is general scholarly agreement that
localism is an instrumentalist policy-not an end in itself, but a means to
the closely linked objectives of political and cultural enrichment.36
Governance in the United States is atomized and localized by constitutional
design. The decentralization of democracy enables citizens to "learn,"
personalize, and experiment with democracy at the neighborhood level.
Society can thereby respond to the specialized interests of individual
citizens while forming a strong foundation and substrate for democratic
information and innovation, all for the benefit of state and federal
government. 366 Policies promoting media provision of local political and
public affairs content support not only these local deliberative democratic
efforts, but also the closely related objectives of promoting a sense of local
community and culture and a spirit of neighborliness and shared
enterprise. 367 By valorizing coverage of local political, educational,
commercial, and even agricultural news on commercial broadcasting
stations, 368 the FCC endeavored to preserve what was distinct about local
363. See, e.g., Keith Axline, Craigslist Versus Katrina, WIRED.COM, Sept. 1, 2005,
http:/iwww.wired.com/medteclealth/news/2005/09/68720 (discussing how classified
advertising website Craigslist provided much-needed help to victims of Hurricane Katrina in
the New Orleans area, helping locate missing persons and matching survivors in need of
assistance with relief personnel).
364. See Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 372 (holding that the FCC inappropriately
weighted the Internet as a substitute for local television stations in diversity index); see also,
e.g., James E. Scott, "E" the People: Do Municipal Government Web Sites Support Public
available at
341,
349
(2006),
ADMIN.
REv.
66
PuB.
Involvement?,
(reporting results of survey
http://www.ppmm.net/images/resources/scott_2006.pdf
involving official government websites of 100 largest American cities, and concluding that
"[i]n general, our research found very little evidence that U.S. municipal Web sites support
significant public involvement").
365. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 205 (stating that localism has traditionally been
perceived as a way to achieve broader social objectives).
366. See id. (noting that localism has figured in the design and functioning of social
institutions and has played an important role in "the distribution of governmental control in
the United States"); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartII-Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 394 (1990) (paraphrasing Gerald Frug's argument that
transfer of power to local governments will enhance political participation of individuals);
Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1153-54 (1980)
(concluding that the concept of community is probably the most significant aspect of the
localism principle).
367. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 219 (concluding that concept of community is
probably the most significant aspect of the localism principle).
368. See Varona, supra note 7, at 19 (stating that the FRC required initial station
applicants to list weekly programming in entertainment, religious, commercial, educational,
agricultural, and fraternal areas).
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communities across the United States and prevent network broadcasting
369
from homogenizing the nation into one impersonal "mass society."
1. Are Online Communities UnderminingLocal Communities on Terra
Firma?
There is no disputing the Internet's ability to foster virtual communities.
Its wide availability and relatively open architecture enable geographically,
culturally, and socially distant people who share common interests or
problems to find one another and form relationships online. The Internet
allows users to transcend the limitations of physicality not only by bridging
distance but also by preempting prejudgments triggered by social and
visual cues and the physical manifestations of socioeconomic status. Its
egalitarianism can help bring about pure exchanges of ideas, unencumbered
by racist, sexist, ethnic, abilist, ageist, or other biases. 370 At times, perhaps,
it may even serve as a rooting medium for Aristotelian "perfect"
friendships formed on the basis of mutual admiration of mind rather than
extrinsic attributes. 371 A number of recent studies conclude that Internetand especially broadband-use can promote sociality by helping people
make connections online that evolve into3 72in-the-flesh friendships and
ultimately wider and deeper social networks.
369. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 207-08 (recognizing that "mass society" is viewed as
a threat to unique aspects of local communities and noting communications policymakers'
action to preserve local culture).
370. As the famous cartoon by Peter Steiner aptly put it, "On the Internet, nobody
knows you're a dog." Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. It bears noting,
however, that in a study of online deliberation, Professor Lincoln Dahlberg found that some
demographic distinctions and privileges offline can reemerge in online discussions:
"Participation is, in fact, both quantitatively and qualitatively dominated by those already
powerful offline (politically active, educated, white, males)." He particularly found that
gender distinctions offline replicated themselves online: "Not only are there many more men
than women posting. . . but also a masculine, agonistic style of discourse predominates
despite the high level of respect fostered." See Lincoln Dahlberg, The Internet and
Democratic Discourse, 4 INFO., COMM. & Soc'y 615, 626 (2001), available at
http://rcirib.ir/articles/pdfs/cdl%5CIngenta Sage Articles on 194 225_11 89/Ingenta9l8.pdf
(noting prevailing nature of masculine online activity to emphasize disproportionate amount
of Internet activity by different social groups).
371, ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142-44 (H.G. Apostle trans., Peripatetic Press
1984). "Perfect" friendship, according to Aristotle, is that which is based exclusively on
mutual admiration and appreciation of intrinsic qualities and character, instead of extrinsic
attributes such as wealth (as in the case of "utilitarian" friendships) or beauty (as with
friendships rooted in "pleasure"), which are much less apparent in online exchanges.
"Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish
well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves." Id. at 143. Aristotle
cautioned, however, that a perfect friendship "require[s] time and familiarity; for, as the
proverb says, it is impossible for men to know each other well until 'they have consumed
together much salt."' Id.at 144. So although cyberspace may birth them, perfect
friendships may need terra firma to mature.
372. See CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 104-05 (summarizing numerous studies finding
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The decentralized, geographically untethered communities forged online
in some ways may promote rather than undermine deliberative democracy.
Although the concerns raised convincingly by Professor Sunstein and
others about the harms of fragmentation and polarization of online
discourse are convincing, it is not hard to recognize the value that online
meeting spaces provide for geographically dispersed communities of
common interest.
Habermas himself recognized the benefits of
decentralized, subgroup deliberation as helping to hone the viewpoints of
subgroups, allowing them to be more legitimately and persuasively
presented later on in the broader public sphere. 373 In-group discussion also
can enable subgroup members to develop better deliberation skills, thereby
enriching the quality of 374
the discourse in the wider discussions both in
substance as well as form.

Of course, some communities of interest that have formed discussion
and mutual support groups online did so to fill the absence of communitybuilding opportunities in members' geographic localities.
A Muslim
African-American struggling with isolation and discrimination in a
predominantly white and Christian rural area can connect with a community
of geographically dispersed peers online and tap into resources-including
political training materials and religious fellowship-that otherwise would
have been out of reach. Similarly, an intellectually precocious teenager
living in an economically and culturally impoverished community with no
public museum and with a public library starved of resources can feed an
avid interest in modem art by connecting to arts communities online.
Yet despite the Internet's ability to conquer the happenstance of physical
proximity in fostering disembodied communities of interest, its power to
enhance political engagement in local terra firma communities is
underutilized. Some studies, in fact, demonstrate that engagement in online
social networking can increase isolation and social disconnection by
allowing attenuated interpersonal ties online to displace opportunities for
375
the initiation of deeper relationships with in-the-flesh neighbors nearby.
that the "Net's effects on actual social networks have tended to be quite positive," including
one study that found that "Internet users knew three times as many local people as nonusers
and were more likely to talk to their neighbors and to invite them round to their homes").
373. See Jirgen Habermas, FurtherReflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 422 (Craig Calhoun ed., Thomas Burger trans., 1993) (explaining that

the "contemporary scene has changed," shaping new perspectives in social-scientific
research); see also Froomkin, supra note 33, at 4.
374. See Habermas, supra note 373, at 422. Of course, it would be important to prevent
the in-group deliberation from venturing into extremism and polarization, by ensuring that
the subgroup indeed does engage regularly with the wider, more diverse public sphere.
375. See, e.g., Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, Is It Time to Disinvest in Social
Capital?, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y 141 (1999) (analyzing "social capital"); NORMAN H. NIE & LUTZ
ERBRING, STAN. U. INST. FOR THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF SOC'Y, INTERNET AND SOCIETY:
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Political scientist Richard Davis, for example, has written about how "[t]he
demise of geographical boundaries, so touted as a boon of the Internet, also
can reduce a sense of physical community to isolated individuals tied
virtually to other isolated individuals but unconnected to those who are
actually physically proximate." 376 By enabling us to satisfy our need for
community by relating online with distant digital "neighbors," the Internet
can thwart the democratic benefits inherent in learning how to understand
and accommodate the beliefs and needs of neighbors very different from
ourselves. Professor William A. Galston posits that "[i]n a diverse
democratic society, politics requires the ability to deliberate, and to
compromise, with individuals unlike oneself. When we find ourselves
living cheek by jowl with neighbors with whom we differ but from whose
propinquity we cannot easily escape, we have powerful incentives to
develop modes of accommodation."' 377 The Internet provides that "easy
escape" for citizens who wish to avoid the hard work of engaging with
local community by instead forging online communities with the
likeminded. Why engage in the shared enterprise of community-building
with proximate but different and even difficult neighbors when one can
build one's ideal community online, entering and exiting it at the click of a
mouse?
This propensity of the Internet to exacerbate civic disengagement and
the dilution of local community identity clearly works against the
communitarian, democratic objectives of the media localism principle. The
hyperindividualism of cyberspace may not only make it difficult to
engender deliberative democratic values online, but also render users so
autonomous from both government and their neighbors that it may
undermine democracy in the brick-and-mortar world. Professor Michael
Sandel has long bemoaned the unraveling of American civic life and our

A

PRELIMINARY

REPORT

(2000),

available

http://www.stanford.edu/group/siqss/PressRelease/PreliminaryReport.pdf

at

(reporting

survey results showing that respondents reporting regular Internet use "feel that it has
reduced their time with friends and family, or attending events outside the home"); see also
CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 84-88 (summarizing the results from numerous studies
showing the Internet's negative social effects).
376. DAVIS, supra note 5, at 146.
377. William A. Galston, The Impact of the Internet on Civic Life: An Early Assessment,
in GOVERNANCE.COM:

DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 215, at 47.

Galston concludes that "[o]nline groups can fulfill important emotional and utilitarian needs,
but they must not be taken as solutions for our current civic ills." ld. at 56. Andrew Shapiro
agrees that "[a]lthough choice is a benefit to the Internet, it's also a weakness" insofar as
"happenstance of location, climate, and natural resources ... creates dependencies between
individuals and groups, and thus creates deep long-lasting communal bonds." Andrew L.
Shapiro, The Internet DiscouragesSocial Interaction, in THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 64
(Laura K. Egendorf ed., 2004).
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sense of moral duty to the exercise of politically engaged citizenship. 8
Similarly, Professor Robert D. Putnam has argued that the general trend
away from civic and local community engagement and toward more
of
individualistic, consumerist endeavors has contributed to a weakening 379
democracy.
vibrant
and
strong
a
sustain
to
need
we
capital"
the "social
It is not difficult to see how the Internet has contributed to, and perhaps
even accelerated, these disturbing trends.
III. OPERATIONALIZING A BROADBAND PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
In light of the preceding analysis, it would be reasonable to conclude
that the Internet's evolution, left largely to the commercial marketplace,
has fallen far short of realizing the goals of universality: exposure to a
diversity of viewpoints and speakers, local political and public affairs
content, and a vibrant deliberative democracy in an online marketplace of
ideas. Despite the expectation of many cyberlibertarians that freedom from
government intervention would enable a vibrant democracy-enriching,
deliberative culture to flourish online, what is prevalent today on the
Internet is fragmentation, censorship, diffusion, very little use of the
Internet for local democratic engagement, and more anarchy and autocracy
The Internet not only may be failing to support
than democracy.
democracy online, it also may be subverting democracy on terra firma.
The question before us, however, should not be what the Internet is
doing to our democracy as much as what our democracy, and specifically
our government, should be doing on the Internet to help realize its fullest
potential as an instrument for deliberative democratic engagement and
political expression and education. 380 Toward that end, this Part discusses
a number of specific interventions the federal government can undertake in
adopting a more proactive role in cultivating the Internet as a democratic
instrument. Not all of these proposals are novel, and other scholars have
advanced many other good and worthy ideas in support of a more proactive
governmental role in promoting digital democracy. 381 These proposals are
378. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
379. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOwLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).

380. 1 borrow this idea from Professor Putnam, who eloquently wrote, "The most
important question is not what the Internet will do to us, but what we will do with it. How
can we use the enormous potential of computer-mediated communication to make our

investments in social capital more productive?" Id. at 180.
381. See generally DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 33 (presenting many innovative
ideas, theorized as well as realized, involving the use of the Internet for democratic
engagement and governance); SUNSTEIN, supra note 58, at 190-211 (proposing, inter alia,
deliberative domains online, self-regulation, and normative and government subsidies);
Patricia Aufderheide, The 1996 Telecommunications Act: Ten Years Later, 58 FED. COMM.
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not a panacea for all that ails democracy-online and on terra firma. Much
more can be done. The interventions below, however, would help realize
some of the goals of the broadcast public interest standard-a ubiquitous
electronic marketplace of ideas presenting a diversity of viewpoints, local
political information, and opportunities for deliberative engagement-in a
dynamic, interactive, and capacious digital environment much more
capable than broadcasting of achieving some of these objectives.
The proposals are arranged in two interrelated parts. The first discusses
opportunities for more affirmative, direct government support for universal
broadband access. The second discusses government interventions that,
presuming access, would help realize broadband's democratic promise
while mitigating some of its antidemocratic tendencies.
A. IntensifiedFederalEfforts in Support of BroadbandUniversality
1. Assessing the Challenge
Universal service has been a longtime goal at the core of American
communications policy. 382 Its roots can be traced to the establishment of
the American postal system, which achieved nearly ubiquitous access by
means of the use of subsidies from profitable, heavily-utilized routes to
build out post roads and post offices in more remote and underutilized parts
of the nation. 383 Universal service programs found enthusiastic support
from the academic community in the second half of the twentieth century,
with a new awareness of its positive network externalities-the democratic,
social, and economic benefits gleaned by society as the size of the
L.J. 407, 412-13 (2006) (describing ideas currently in circulation by organizations with
interests in nonprofits and suggesting approaches such as encouraging entry of new players,
government support for standards-setting, and privileging open access zones in spectrum
policy); Goodman, supra note 8, at 1465-68 (discussing importance of reform proposals
that, inter alia, "boost consumption of and critical engagement with" public service content);
SHAPIRO, supra note 339, at 203 (discussing detailed proposals for a "PublicNet" discussion
space online); Gey, supra note 268, at 1535 (proposing doctrinal modifications to public
forum doctrine to allow more public access to online spaces).
382. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 177 (discussing the centrality of universal service in
communications regulation); see also Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone
History, 17 TELECOMM. POL'Y 352, 352 (1993) (noting that "'universal service' is one of the
most commonly cited principles of telecommunications policy"). The universal service
ideal in telecommunications can be traced as far back as Alexander Graham Bell, the
telephone's inventor, who is quoted as declaring that the ubiquity of telephone service is so
important to the success of the technology that "a telephone in every house would be
considered indispensable." ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE 12 (1985).
383. See STARR, supra note 7, at 88 (describing the development of the postal service
network and noting the formation of 2,476 new routes between 1792 and 1828); see also
RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN

TO MORSE 49 (1995) (discussing Congress's involvement in the expansion of the postal
service system).
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communications network grows.
Congress articulated the universal service principle as "mak[ing]
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States... a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications
'
Although
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."385
386
this statutory language
criticized for lacking specific requirements,
served as the basis for numerous FCC interventions aimed at proliferating
low-cost telephone service across the nation.387 That focus has resulted in
telephone service penetration that has leveled off at approximately 94% in
384. One of the earliest and most influential pieces of scholarship detailing the dynamics
of positive network externalities in the expansion of communications networks was by Dr.
Jeffrey Rohlfs. Jeffery Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demandfor a Communications
Service, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974); see also Nicholas Economides, The
Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 673 (1996) (analyzing the major economic
features of networks); LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 9 (1994) (describing two types of demand externalities associated with the
telephone-the call externality and the network externality); Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424
(1985) (analyzing network externalities derived from the consumption of goods).
385. 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
386. See, e.g., Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, A Proposal for Universal
Telecommunications Service, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 351, 368 (1988) (noting that "[p]erhaps no
other regulatory goal has been so extensively discussed without an established definition as
universal service"); see also NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 177 (observing that "the universal
service principle has frequently been criticized for lacking a precise definition"); Patricia
Aufderheide, Universal Service: Telephone Policy in the Public Interest, 37 J. COMM. 81
(1987) (asserting that the phrase "universal service" is used at the FCC without an adequate
working definition).
387. See Angela J. Campbell, Universal Service Provisions: The 'Ugly Duckling' of the
1996 Act, 29 CONN. L. REv. 187, 189 (1996) (noting that the 1934 Communications Act's
universal service provision served as the legislative basis for regulations and policies
concerning the averaging of interstate toll rates, using long-distance proceeds to subsidize
local toll service, the provision of accessibility services to the hearing impaired, and deeply
discounted installation and continuing toll service to low-income households).
The first wave of universal service requirements was aimed at having the monopolist
AT&T build out the telephone network to rural and remote areas by means of proceeds
generated from surcharges on services to more profitable, densely populated areas. See
NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 178 (noting that universal service is typically associated "with
subsidization policies targeted at low-income and high-cost customers"). Later, the FCC's
universal service policies expanded to allow for the subsidization of telephone service to
low-income households by means of surcharges on more profitable business and longdistance services. Campbell, supra note 387, at 189; see also Allen S. Hammond IV, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 179,
194 (1997) (noting that telephone companies "were allowed to subsidize the cost of serving
poor, rural, and other less profitable customers with higher margin clients such as downtown
businesses"). The "Lifeline Assistance" and "Link-Up America" telephone access subsidy
programs, which provide significant discounts to low-income households for initial
telephone installation and continuing service, are funded by the Universal Service
Fund, which in turn is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company,
a quasi-governmental entity statutorily charged with coordinating the collection of
universal service subsidies from telecommunications providers and funding universal
service programs with the proceeds. See Christine M. Mason, Universal Service in the
Schools: One Step Too Far?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 237,239-40 (1997).
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the years since 1995.385 As noted above, Congress and the FCC also
applied universal service objectives to broadcasting.
a. Existing FederalEfforts to ProliferateInternet Access-Lack of
Prioritization
In contrast to its affirmative interventions toward universal service in
telephony and broadcasting, the federal government heretofore has not
targeted the proliferation of Internet access, and specifically broadband
access, with aggressive federal support. Federal resistance to a more
in
proactive approach to broadband proliferation has been rooted, not only 389
the market fiber alles mindset of the Reagan Revolution and its progeny,
but also in the misapprehension that the Internet is a luxury that the
government has no legitimate role in promoting. President George W.
Bush's first FCC Chairman, Michael Powell, memorably manifested this
perspective in discussing the relatively low penetration rate of computer
technologies in low income, rural, and of-color communities. He compared
such access to owning a luxury automobile: "You know, I think there's a
Mercedes divide. I'd like to have one; I can't afford one. 39 ° Recent
statements from the FCC leadership indicate an increased awareness of the
importance of universal access to broadband, but the pronouncements have
not been supported by a proactive and comprehensive federal effort to
catalyze broadband proliferation. 39' In addition, although details of the
proposed federal economic stimulus legislation were starting to be released
as this article went to press, its components addressing 392broadband
proliferation were criticized as much too modest to be effective.
388. See JOSEPH S. KRAEMER ET AL., THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION, THE
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE, REVISITING THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE

6 (2005) (indicating that nationwide telephone penetration had
stabilized at about 94% by the mid-1990s).
CURRENT STUDY STRUCTURE

389. See Hammond, supra note 253, at 136-38 (tracing the market-driven approach to
Internet and telecommunications proliferation).
390. Frank James, FCC's Powell Makes Clear Contrast with Predecessor,CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 7, 2001, at NI. Professor Cynthia Lanius, Executive Director of the Rice University
Center for Excellence and Equity in Education, responded to Chairman Powell by saying
that "the issue is not, 'I don't have a Mercedes.' The issue is, 'I don't have a car."' Robin
Apr.
27,
2001,
(Digital) Dream, WIRED.COM,
Clewley,
I
Have a
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/04/43349.
391. See Leslie Cavley, Martin Wants BroadbandAcross USA, USA TODAY, Aug. 19,
2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2008-08- 19-fcc-martinN.htm
(quoting Chairman Kevin Martin's statements that "[tjhere's a social obligation in making
sure everybody can participate in the next generation of broadband services" and that the
FCC should "find new ways to address" that obligation).
392. Spencer E. Ante & Arik Hessendahl, Broadband Bill Disappoints Nearly
17,
2009,
Jan.
Everyone,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2009/tc20090116_733609.htm?campa
ign id=rss topStories.
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In the years preceding the 1996 Telecom Act, Congress enacted a
number of modest legislative efforts to promote computer and Internet
access to the underprivileged. In 1994, Congress passed the Star Schools
Program Assistance Act, which required the Department of Education
(DOE) to award grants to schools and private-public partnership programs
supporting computer-aided instruction to needy children.39 3 A handful of
other legislative programs concerning public education have encompassed
the integration of technology in public school curricula as well as training
for teachers on the use of computers in the classroom.39 4
Then, in the 1996 Telecom Act, Congress recognized that "[u]niversal
service is an evolving level of telecommunications services' 395 and created
the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Joint Board).
Congress tasked the Joint Board with making recommendations to the FCC
on universal service standards for new services and on how to spend
universal service program funds most effectively.396 Citing the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity '397 standard, Congress also enumerated
the principles that should guide the work of the FCC and the Joint Board,
including "just, reasonable, and affordable rates," "access to advanced
telecommunications and information services ... in all regions of the
Nation," and "access in rural and high cost areas. 3 98 The Act also
contained a number of provisions collectively known as the "E-Rate"
program. Those provisions require the FCC to develop mechanisms to
subsidize discounted telecommunications and "advanced" information
services (including Internet access) to health care providers, educational
institutions, and libraries.399
In implementing Congress's directives, the Joint Board focused its
recommendations for expanded universal service mechanisms on
maximizing access to telephony-based telecommunications services. 400 It
concluded that household-level Internet access was not "essential to
393. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7255-7255f (2006).
394. For an excellent summary of such programs, see Patricia M. Worthy, Racial
Minorities and the Quest to Narrow the DigitalDivide: Redefining the Concept of Universal
Service, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 37-38 (2003).

395. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 254(c)(1), l10 Stat. 72
(1996).
396. Id. § 254(a)(1).
397. Id. § 254(b)(7).
398. Id. § 254(b)(1)-(6).
With respect to schools and libraries, the Act required
399. Id. § 254(h).
telecommunications carriers upon a request by a qualifying school or library for
telecommunications and advanced information services to provide such services "at rates
less than the amounts charged for similar services to other parties," with the amount of the
discount to be determined by the FCC as "appropriate and necessary to ensure affordable
access to and use of such services by such entities." Id. § 254(h)(1)(B).
400. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997).
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education, public health, or public safety," the guiding principle for
universal service set forth in § 254(c)(1) of the 1996 Telecom Act.40 1 The
FCC adopted the Joint Board's recommendations, and implemented the
1996 Telecom Act's E-Rate schools and libraries connectivity programs.40 2
Five years later, Congress returned to the technological needs of schools in
the No Child Left Behind Act, which in Part D--entitled "Enhancing
Education Through the Use of Technology"-provided funding for
computer equipment, Internet access, and increased technological training
for students and teachers.40 3
b. Mixed Results in EducationalConnectivity Initiatives-Many
ChildrenLeft Behind and Offline
In its latest report on Internet penetration into public educational
institutions, the DOE claims a progressive increase in the number of public
schools and libraries connected to the Internet attributed to the legislative
and regulatory connectivity efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s. 4 °4 The
DOE reported that by 2005 virtually all American public schools had some
sort of Internet access, compared to 3% in 1994.405 A closer look at the
DOE's statistics, however, paints a much less rosy picture. Although the
DOE figures purport to show that virtually all schools have Internet access,
the survey data show disparities in the availability of in-classroom Internet
access attributed to the predominant racial makeup of the school.40 6
Schools with minority enrollment of 21% and higher have 25% fewer

401. Id.at 8823; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 18 F.C.C.R.
2947-48 (2002) (declining to find that high-speed or advanced services satisfy the criterion
that supported services be essential to education, public health, or public safety).
Additionally, the FCC distinguished between the "telecommunications services" addressed
by the universal service provisions of the 1996 Telecom Act, and its provisions concerning
"information services," under which Internet services are classified. Id. at 2947. This
distinction garnered prompt and heated criticism. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 191 (noting
that the points of distinction have been hotly contested in policy circles); Sean M. Foley,
The Brewing Controversy over Internet Service Providers and the Universal Service Fund:
A Third Generation Interpretation of Section 254, 6 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 245, 250
(1998) (contending that the distinction is an unfortunate policy choice based on outdated
regulatory terminology).
402. FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776. For a
detailed description of the federal universal service funding programs and mechanisms, see
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 160, at 339-52.
403. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1445, 1623-31,
1646-47, 1671-75 (2001).
404.

See DEP'T OF EDUC., INTERNET ACCESS IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS:

1994-2005, at 1-10 (2006) (presenting key findings from a 2005 survey on Internet access
in public schools and selected comparisons with data from previous Fast Response Survey
System Internet surveys).
405. Id.at 4.
406. Id.at 16.
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Internet-connected computers for student use than schools with lower than
6% minority enrollment.4 °7 Access to laptop loans for teacher and student
projects also was significantly lower in schools with higher minority
enrollments.4 08
In addition, the E-Rate program has been criticized as falling far short of
what is necessary to address the lack of broadband connectivity and
computer-based instruction in poor urban and rural school districts. For
example, the Urban Institute documented that in many rural E-Rate-eligible
schools a lack of general technology skills and technical support staff was
40 9
impeding the incorporation of the Intemet-in-the-classroom environment.
The Urban Institute concluded that in poor urban schools factors such as
weak or nonexistent programs for technology training for teachers, the
absence of technical support staff, inadequate electrical connections, and
slow and unreliable Internet connections conspire to render E-Rate
ineffective in many cases.41
These conditions in poor schools are
especially troubling in light of how poor students living in households with
no Internet access often depend on school-based Internet connections for
access to online resources. 4tt
The conditions are also alarming in
democratic terms, in light of the Deweyan imperative of public education
as vital in the preparation of young people to be politically informed and
civically engaged citizens.412
407. Id. at 24. Whereas schools with minority enrollment of less than 6% have 3
students per Internet-enabled computer, schools with 21% to 49% minority enrollment have
4 students per such computer, and schools with majority minority enrollment have 4.1
students per computer. Id.
408. Id. at 16, 30. The Department of Education (DOE) reports that schools with less
than 6% minority enrollment were more than twice as likely as schools with 21% or more
minority enrollment to lend laptop computers to students for academic projects. Id. at 30.
409. See The Urban Institute, The Integrated Studies of Educational Technology: A
Formative
Evaluation
of
the
E-Rate
Program
viii
(2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410579_ERateFinalReport.pdf (draft).
410. Id. The Urban Institute observed that "the mere availability of computers
and the Internet does not mean that teachers are making use of what the new
technology has to offer." Id. at 5. It cites a number of studies concluding that "it is not
simply access to technology that is important for students, but rather how teachers
use technology as a tool to enhance learning."
Id.; see also E-Rate Funding
Casualties,
TECH.
&
LEARNING
(Apr.
15,
2001),
http://archives.techlearning.com/dbarea/archives/TL/200104/trendwatch.php
("Small
schools say the 20 to 30 hours of [E-Rate] application time aren't worth the few
thousand dollars they'd receive.").
411. The National Science Foundation's 2006 statistics demonstrate that students living
in high-income households were about three times as likely than those from poor families to
have household-level Internet access (90% versus 32%), and that the same low-income
students "were more than twice as likely to use a computer at school than at home ... while
high-income students used computers at only slightly different rates at the two locations."
NAT'L Sci. BD., NAT'L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2006, at 1-6
(2006), availableat www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06.
412. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY & EDUCATION 1-12 (Macmillan 1916) (arguing that
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c. What Else Is at Stake-Advantages of HouseholdInternet Access
Beyond DemocraticEngagement
Although the focus of this Article is on the value of the Internet and
particularly broadband access as a tool for expression and democratic
engagement, it is important to recognize that household-level access offers
very important benefits in closely related areas, including academic
achievement, employment, and overall national economic productivity.
Michigan State University recently published a two-year study on the
academic effects of household Internet access in poor and mostly minority,
single-parent families. It concluded that children with Internet at home
earned higher standardized reading test scores and higher overall grade
point averages than students without Internet access at home. 4 13 Students'
performance improved when they were able to access the Internet at home
rather than having to rely on school or library access. Moreover, although
the E-Rate program has allowed students whose families cannot afford or
otherwise do not have access to household broadband service to use
broadband connections at a neighborhood public library, in many cases
location, and crime make it difficult to depend on such
library hours,
14
access.

4

Not only is household Internet access important for especially lowincome jobseekers, but lack of household access may foreclose some

education is necessary to build communities and that education consists primarily of
communication); see also LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 247 (1995)
(quoting Moses Mather's 1775 declaration that "[t]he strength and spring of every free
government is the virtue of the people; virtue grows on knowledge, and knowledge on
education"); Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: Do Students Shed
Their ConstitutionalRights When Communicating to a Cyber-Audience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
587, 588 (2000) (stating that the Internet has replaced books and letters as the
communication device that connects students to the community).
413. Linda A. Jackson et al., Does Home Internet Use Influence the Academic
Performance of Low-Income Children?, 42 DEV. PSYCH. 3 (2006), available at
http://www.apa.org/releases/dev423-jackson.pdf. The study cohort was comprised of 140
children (average age of 13.8 years), 83% African American, 58% boys and 42% girls, 75%
of whom lived in single-parent homes with a median annual income of $15,000. Id. The
DOE itself acknowledges that students with home Internet access achieve higher test scores
than those who do not. Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Nations' [sic]
2000
(Nov.
20,
2001),
Report
Card:
Science
The DOE
http://nces.ed.gov/whatsnew/commissioner/remarks200l/ll 20 2001.asp.
studies also demonstrate a strong positive correlation between in-classroom instruction
aided by Internet-connected computers and performance in standardized testing. See
Worthy, supra note 394, at 42-43 (discussing numerous studies correlating instructional
computer use with higher academic achievement).
414. See Ian Urbina, Hopes for Wireless Cities Fade as Internet Providers Pull Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008, at A10 (quoting fifteen-year-old Cesar DeLaRosa's statement
that "[i]f we don't have Internet, that means I've got to take the bus to the public library
after dark, and around here, that's not always real safe").
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employment opportunities altogether. 415 The lack of household Internet
access also can significantly disadvantage already-employed individuals,
since many employers encourage and even expect employees to access the
workplace computer servers remotely to do work from home.416
In terms of the national competitive consequences, Brookings Institute
economist Charles Ferguson warns that the United States' lag in broadband
deployment may cause the country to lose $1 trillion in productivity
through 2014.417 Robert Crandall (also with Brookings) and Charles
Jackson estimate that affirmative government promotion of widespread
household broadband adoption could generate 1.2 million new jobs and a
$500 billion increase to the U.S. economy.4 18 In July 2007, Crandall and
several Brookings colleagues published the results of an empirical study on
the effects of increases in broadband penetration on economic output and
employment. 419 Among many notable findings, the study concluded that
with "every one percentage point increase in penetration in a state,
employment is projected to increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year," which
translates to 300,000 jobs at the national level.42 °
415. See Worthy, supra note 394, at 46 (discussing how "low-income jobseekers are
much more likely to rely on the Internet to search for employment than are high-income
jobseekers"); see also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL
INCLUSION 50 (2000) (finding that the percentage of Internet users searching for jobs on the
Internet declines as income increases).
416. New Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work at Home in 2004, at 1, 4 (Sept. 22,
2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/homey.pdf (reporting that as of May 2004, 20.7
million people did work at home at least once a week for their primary job and
approximately 70% of those people used the Internet).

417. Thomas Bleha, Down to the Wire, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2005, at 111, 121,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050501faessay84311/thomas-bleha/down-tothe-wire.html.
418. Id. ("The large broadband-user markets of Northeast Asia will attract the
innovation the United States once enjoyed. Asians will have the first crack at developing
the new commercial applications, products, services, and content of the high-speedbroadband era.").
419. ROBERT CRANDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE EFFECTS OF BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT ON OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. DATA
(2007), availableat http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2007/061abor crandall.aspx.
420. Id. at 2. The researchers also concluded that "state output of goods and services is
positively associated with broadband use." Id. In 2006, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology published the results of a study that found that between 1998 and 2002,
communities in which broadband service was available by 1999 saw rapid expansion in the
number of businesses (i.e., employers) and jobs, particularly in information-technologyspecific sectors of the economy. See WILLIAM H. LEHR ET AL., MEASURING BROADBAND'S
ECONOMIC

IMPACT

(2006),

available

at

Other
http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFP Papers/Measuringbbecon impact-final.pdf.
commentators have noted that the United States' falling behind other developed nations in
broadband penetration will have serious competitive consequences. See, e.g., Bleha, supra
note 417, at 112 ("By dislodging the United States from the lead it commanded not so long
ago, Japan and its neighbors have positioned themselves to be the first states to reap the
benefits of the broadband era: economic growth, increased productivity, technological
innovation, and an improved quality of life.").
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In addition, the nation's lag in broadband penetration and pricing
efficiency has inhibited the positive network externalities that come with
near-universal broadband availability, such as advances in telemedicine to
deliver quality healthcare to more patients (particularly the poor and
geographically remote), 4 2' improved public safety,422 higher education and
* 423anem o
and employee telecommuting. Telecommuting itself is
distance learning,
an important response to traffic congestion, high energy costs, and
increased pollution.424
President Bush referred to a number of these benefits of universal
broadband access in 2004 when he declared that "[w]e ought to have a
421.

See BroadbandEnables Better Health Care at Reduced Costfor More Americans,

Hosp. Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2007, at 220 ("The expansion of broadband internet service has
facilitated the development of telemedicine technologies improving healthcare to more
Americans at a reduced cost."). According to Neil Neuberger, President of Health Tech
Strategies, LLC, "[t]he critical prerequisite to success for growing small regional e-health
programs into a national healthcare agenda is to bring high-speed broadband to every comer
of America." Id.
422. CAL. BROADBAND TASK FORCE, THE STATE OF CONNECTIVITY: BUILDING
INNOVATION

THROUGH

BROADBAND,

FINAL

REPORT

15

(2008),

available at

http://www.calink.ca.gov/pdfICBTFFINAL Report.pdf (discussing the effect of ubiquitous
broadband on law enforcement and emergency response services in particular).
423. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Higher Education: Promisesfor Future Delivery, in
THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 269, 269-83 (Robert E.Litan &
Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001) (examining the past and future of the Internet education market).
424. See, e.g., Timothy Karr, America's Next Moon Shot: Internet for Everyone,

June 25, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/americasnext-moon-shot-i b 109217.html. Karr quotes Robin Chase, the founder of Zipcar, as
HUFFINGTON POST,

saying that the Interet "is required for full participation in society today" and is
"fundamental to maintaining a high quality of life and for addressing such pressing social
problems as America's energy dependency." Id.; see also ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
BROADBAND POLICY
8 (2007), available

FOUND.,

THE CASE FOR A NATIONAL

at http://www.itif.org/index.php?id=52
(discussing how widescale broadband deployment increases telecommuting, which is
shown to increase individual worker productivity and job satisfaction while reducing
traffic congestion, environmental contaminants, and energy use). Brookings Institution
economist Robert E. Litan argues that expanded broadband deployment to senior citizens
and persons with disabilities would result in cumulative savings and concordant output
increases of at least $927 billion by 2030. ROBERT E. LITAN, NEW MILLENNIUM
RESEARCH COUNCIL, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE
NATION FROM ACCELERATED BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT TO OLDER AMERICANS AND
available
at
WITH
DISABILITIES
3
(2005),
AMERICANS

http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/archive/Litan FINAL 120805.pdf. Litan posited
that increased broadband penetration in these groups would result in "lower medical costs
for both seniors and individuals with disabilities... ; lower costs from delayed or avoided
institutionalized living arrangements for senior citizens and individuals with disabilities; and
additional output made possible by increased labor force participation by individuals in both
groups." Id.at 2; see also KRISHNA JAYAKAR & HARMEET SAWHNEY, BENTON FOUND.,
UNIVERSAL

ACCESS IN THE INFORMATION

ECONOMY:

TRACKING POLICY INNOVATIONS

ABROAD 10 (2007), available at http://www.benton.org/benton-files/Jayakar Sawhney.doc
(concluding that universal broadband access "is not just a social ideal or a redistributive
tool, but an economic imperative with consequences for job creation, international
competitiveness and individual empowerment").
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universal, affordable access for broadband technology by the year 2007." 425
But his Administration persisted in relying almost exclusively on
marketplace competition to deliver that universality. That reliance was
misplaced, as demonstrated by the international household broadband
penetration, speed, and pricing comparisons discussed in Part II and the
persistent problems in school accessibility discussed in this Part. Professor
Lawrence Lessig observes that "[w]hat's bizarre about where we are in the
history of building infrastructure is that this is the first time we have tried
to undertake the building of fundamental social infrastructure against the
background of a Neanderthal philosophy, which is that you don't need
government to do anything." 426 As a threshold matter, therefore, the
federal government should recognize that broadband access is an essential
component of modem infrastructure that not only provides opportunities
for democratic engagement and expression, but when universalized, yields
significant spillover economic, educational, employment, and other
benefits.4 27
2. IncreasingDirectFederalSubsidiesfor BroadbandDeployment
The government's efforts at promoting broadband proliferation would
not be as modest as they have been if it regarded high-speed Internet as a
vital element of the nation's infrastructure.4 28 Faced with a nascent
electrical industry that would not extend its networks to less urban areas
because of the high costs and low returns associated with nonurban service,
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Administration created a new
kind of utility-an electric cooperative-designed to build out electric

Calls for Universal Broadband,
29,
2004,
Mar.
http://telephonyonline.com/broadband/web/telecompresident bush-calls/.
426. Karr, supra note 424. Professor Lessig continued:
That Neanderthal philosophy has governed for about the last eight years, and it has
allowed us to slide from a leader in this field to an abysmal position. And it's about
time when people recognize that of course the private sector has a role, a central role,
maybe the most important role, but it's never enough.
Id.
427. In arguing forcefully in favor of a greater awareness of positive network
externalities and the consequences of the far-reaching deleterious digital divide, Professor
Allen S. Hammond IV writes that "[t]he network is an evolving national asset critical to our
democracy, national defense, education, economic competitiveness, and physical wellbeing." Hammond, supra note 253, at 156.
428. The discussion in this Article concerning universal broadband service, like the
Sections that follow it, focuses on proposals for direct federal intervention. For excellent
proposals toward universal service involving regulatory interventions that would entail
contributions from telecommunications providers and other cross-subsidies, see Allen S.
Hammond IV, Universal Service: Problems, Solutions, and Responsive Policies, 57 FED.
COMM. L.J. 187, 193-97 (2005).
425.

Donny

TELEPHONY

Jackson,

President Bush

ONLINE,
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grids to rural and other underserved areas. 429 The electric cooperatives
received significant support from the federal government, including grants,
and low- or no-interest loans for the construction of generation plants and
distribution towers and lines. 430 Focused, comprehensive, and well-funded
federal intervention ensured that all populated areas of the nation were
connected to the electric grid. 431 Twenty-five years later, President Dwight
D. Eisenhower agreed with Congress to prioritize the construction of an
interstate highway system to bridge distances between population centers,
spur commerce, and serve the national defense. The federal government
allocated $27 billion in funding over a ten-year period.432 The economic
and social returns on this investment were evident as soon as construction
of the 41,000-mile Interstate Highway System commenced.4 33
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the federal government has not made
similar significant investments in helping build out a broadband
infrastructure. Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA)
Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has administered a loan program that has
helped fund some local utilities' attempts to build out broadband to
underserved areas, the program has been criticized for neglectful
management. 434 In addition, experts have criticized the RUS's exclusive
reliance on loans-with no agency funds devoted to grants-as
counterproductive and woefully inadequate for accelerating broadband
deployment in areas neglected by commercial carriers.435 Testifying before
429. As Amity Shlaes notes, President Roosevelt had four goals.
The first was to provide electricity to homes and farms-many farms were still
without. The second was to increase the use of electricity in all homes, providing
Americans with a better standard of living. The third was to reduce the cost of
electricity to the average consumer. And there was a fourth, more ephemeral goal:
that through the electricity industry the New Deal might create a new and more
prosperous form of society.
AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 175
(2007).
430. Jim Cooper, Electric Cooperatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 335, 335-45 (2008).
431. See id at 347 ("Electric co-ops eventually reached virtually all potential
customers.").
432. High-Cost Universal Service Support, 23 F.C.C.R. 1539, 1561 (2008) (Copps,
Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part). Commissioner Copps calculated that in
2005 dollars, the $27 billion allocated in the mid-1950s amounts to $196 billion. Id. at
1561.
433. See Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue,
84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 313-15 (2000) (noting that the federal government paid 90% of
highway construction and maintenance costs).
434. See Dan Morgan & Gilbert Gaul, Lawmakers May Refocus Rural Internet
Financing,WASH. POST, May 2, 2007, at A5 (noting that despite the program's mission to
help finance broadband deployment in rural areas, the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has
directed more than half of the available loan funds to projects in metropolitan areas).
435. See JOHN WINDHAUSEN, JR., A BLUEPRINT FOR BIG BROADBAND: AN EDUCAUSE
WHITE PAPER 31 (2008), available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EPO080l.pdf
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Congress in October 2007, Curtis Anderson, the USDA's deputy
administrator for the RUS, conceded that because companies find it very
difficult to craft business models that would ensure repayment of loans
used to build out broadband infrastructure in unserved areas, few
companies seek the loans, and the RUS often does not exhaust its annual
funding.436
In addition, the amount of direct subsidies allocated by the federal
government for broadband deployment under new funding programs has
been roundly criticized as inadequate in light of the enormity of the task,
one FCC Commissioner characterizing it as "like fighting a bear with a fly
swatter. ' '437 In November 2007, the Universal Service Joint Board issued a
Recommended Decision that addressed federal universal service support
for household-level broadband subsidization.43 8
The Joint Board
recommended that the FCC establish a Broadband Fund charged with
"disseminating broadband Internet services to unserved areas" by means of
grants for construction of new and upgrading of preexisting but
substandard facilities. The Joint Board also recommended that the
proposed Broadband Fund be funded by annual federal contributions of
$300 million per year. 439 FCC Commissioner and Joint Board member
Michael J. Copps argued that the amount of $300 million is evidence that
"the Joint Board has basically closed its eyes to the level of challenges we
(positing that this loans-only policy "does not address the needs of high-cost or low-income
communities that may desperately need broadband but where the returns may not satisfy
traditional commercial criteria"). It bears noting that in 2006 the FCC itself launched a
Rural Health Care Pilot Program to provide up to sixty-nine applicants with funding for up
to 85% of costs associated with the construction of state or regional broadband networks
designed to connect public and private nonprofit health care providers in underserved
locations. The pilot program also sought to provide 25% discounts for broadband service to
eligible health care providers. See Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 21 F.C.C.R.
11,111, 11,111-12 (2006) (order); Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 18 F.C.C.R.
24,546 (2003). None of these funds, however, can be used for residential broadband
service.
436. See David Hatch, Broadband: Rural Internet Program Is Flawed, Official
2007,
10
TECH.
DAILY
9,
Oct.
23,
Says,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/techdaily/tp_20071023_3.php?related=true&storyl=tp_200
71023_3&story2=null&story3=null.
437. High-Cost Universal Service Support, 23 F.C.C.R. 1539, 1561 (2008) (Copps,
Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part).
438. Id. at 1539 (majority opinion).
439. Id. at 1543. "Another secondary purpose would be to provide continuing operating
subsidies to broadband Internet providers serving areas where low customer density would
suggest that a plausible economic case cannot be made to operate broadband facilities, even
after receiving a substantial construction subsidy." Id. The Joint Board's Recommended
Decision also notably recommended that "the Commission revise the current definition of
supported services to include broadband Internet service" in order to "effectively declare an
explicit national goal of making broadband Internet service available to all Americans" and
"legitimize existing support mechanisms that already provide support for broadband-capable
facilities." Id. at 1553.
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face., 440 For the sake of comparison, the federal budget for Fiscal Year
2009 totals $3.1 trillion, 4 1 and Citizens Against Government Waste
identified $380 million in pork barrel spending appropriated to the State of
Alaska alone in the last fiscal year.442
The current federal financial commitment to broadband proliferation
seems especially meager in light of recent predictions that, absent major
upgrades to the nation's broadband infrastructure within the next several
years, the domestic broadband network will not be able to satisfy
443
bandwidth demand and Internet service will degrade for most users.
Such an outcome would be especially troubling to the nation's competitive
position vis-d-vis other developed countries where national governments'
massive subsidization of broadband deployment has achieved much higher
broadband penetration levels at significantly lower prices. For example,
the Japanese government subsidized one-third of the cost of building the
fiber-optic cable necessary for very-high-speed broadband service to
individual homes in Japan ("fiber to the curb"). 444 These direct subsidies
were accompanied by significant tax incentives and loans to private carriers
deploying fiber to difficult-to-serve locations.445 For example, the South
Korean government prioritized broadband deployment as an economic
development strategy and invested $9.2 billion in subsidies and other direct
financial support between 1999 and 2003 alone.446 Other nations that are
significantly ahead of the United States in international broadband
440. See id at 1561 (Copps, Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part) ("Bringing
broadband to the far corners of the nation is the central infrastructure challenge our country
confronts right now" and it is "no different than the challenges previous generations of
Americans faced to build the essential infrastructures of their times-the roads, turnpikes,
bridges, canals, railroads and highways of centuries past.").
441. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
Gov'T,
FISCAL
YEAR
2009,
at
142
(2008),
UNITED
STATES
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/budget.pdf.
442. CITIzENS AGAINST Gov'T WASTE, 2008 CONGRESSIONAL PIG BOOK SUMMARY 2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cagw.org/site/DocServer/CAGWPig Book 08.pdf?doclD=3001. Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) identified a
total of $17.2 billion in what it considered pork barrel spending in the FY2008 federal
budget. Id.at 1.
443. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 7 (discussing a November 2007 Nemertes
Research study concluding that, in the United States, $42 billion to $55 billion in network
upgrades would be needed in order to match demand for residential and commercial
bandwidth in 2010).
444. Id.at 60.
445. See Bleha, supra note 417, at 114 ("The (Japanese] government used tax breaks,
debt guaranties, and partial subsidies. It allowed companies willing to lay fiber to
depreciate about one-third of the cost on first-year taxes, and it guaranteed their debt
liabilities.").
446. See Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal BroadbandAccess as Antitrust
and Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1697, 1791 (2006) (citing Irene K.
Kunii & Moon Ihlwan, Where BroadbandIs Really Booming, BUS. WK., May 5, 2003, at
88).
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proliferation rankings have implemented similar significant government
subsidies, including loan and tax supports, far larger than the U.S. federal
commitment.4 47
3. Financial,Technical, and Legislative Supportfor MunicipalBroadband
and Public-PrivateInitiatives to Build Out Broadband
A number of developed nations with significantly wider broadband
availability at lower rates than the United States-including France, Japan,
and the United Kingdom-have achieved those outcomes as a result of
their imposition of common carrier requirements on broadband
providers. 448 By contrast, the United States' deregulatory approach to
broadband resulted in the elimination of all common-carrier regulations on
broadband services. 449 The classification of both cable modem broadband
service and DSL copper-wire-based broadband service as deregulated
"information services" under the 1934 Communications Act, as amended,
relieved providers of all unbundling, nondiscrimination, and other common
carrier requirements.45°
447. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 50-64 (detailing significant direct
government supports for broadband deployment in nations such as Canada, the
United Kingdom, and France); see also JAMES BALLER & CASEY LIDE, BIGGER
VISION, BOLDER
BROADBAND FOR

OF
CAPTURING
THE PROMISE
ACTION,
BRIGHTER FUTURE:
NORTH CAROLINA AND AMERICA 45-50 (2008), available at

http://www.e-nc.org/2008/pdf/Broadbandreport composite.pdf (detailing government
financial and other support in Japan, South Korea, China, Sweden, and France, including
low-interest or no-interest loans to both private entities and local governments, tax breaks,
and grants).
448. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 47-66 (discussing how many of the nations at
the top of the OECD broadband penetration rankings-like France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom-had required broadband providers to unbundle their networks and sell
component services to competitive resellers in a nondiscriminatory manner).
449. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2004) (classifying broadband
cable-modem services as an "information service" instead of a "telecommunications
service" under the 1934 Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Telecom Act,
thereby relieving cable broadband services of common-carrier regulations under Title II);
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,858 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking)
(relieving digital subscriber line (DSL) providers of common-carrier obligations);
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless
Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5914 (2007) (declaratory ruling) (relieving wireless Internet
providers of common-carrier regulation); United Power Line Council's Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet
Access Service as an Information Service, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281, 13,290 (2006) (opinion and
order) (relieving broadband over powerline (BPL) providers of common-carrier
obligations).
450. See 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (2000) (requiring common
carriers to provide "just and reasonable" rates and charges, and nondiscriminatory
practices).
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a. Cable Modem and DSL Duopoly
Although Congress and the FCC hoped that this deregulation of
broadband services would spur more investment in proprietary networks,
interplatform competition, and the proliferation of inexpensive broadband,
' ' 45
the result is still "a rigid duopoly that shows few signs of weakening. A
In excess of 95% of residential broadband subscribers buy their access
from telephone companies (36%) or cable operators (60%).452 Cable
modem and DSL broadband providers have competed minimally in the
marketplace, particularly since both cable and telephone companies have
profited from entering long-term contracts with upper-income subscribers
for "bundled" services that can include local and long-distance telephone
service, multichannel video programming., and other services in addition to
broadband. 453 And there has been little effective. competition from
non-wireline broadband providers, such as satellite broadband
companies.454
Initially, broadband over power line (BPL) systems
451. Scott CongressionalTestimony, supra note 235, at 7. Mr. Scott contended,
While much of the rest of the world has opened up vigorous competition within
platforms, we have staked our broadband future on competition between platforms.
So far, it has not worked out ....
The lack of price competition between DSL and cable modem is apparent in the
marketplace.
Id. at 7; see also Bleha, supra note 417, at 117 (noting that "vigorous multiplatform
competition is unlikely to emerge soon").
452. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., HIGH-SPEED
SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007, at 3 (2008) [hereinafter FCC
HIGH-SPEED

ACCESS

REPORT],

available

at

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-280906AI.pdf (providing data to
demonstrate that the majority of broadband subscribers purchase their Internet access from
telephone companies or cable operators).
453. See Scott Congressional Testimony, supra note 235, at 8 (stating that cable and
telephone duopolists "have slow rolled deployment, kept prices far above those in other
nations, and emphasized bundles of services targeted to upper income Americans built
around 'franchise' services"); see also Aaron Ricadela, US. Broadband Access Slips
at
25,
2007,
available
Bus.
WK.,
Apr.
Further,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2007/tc20070424_ 190579.htm
(reporting that the decision not to impose common-carrier obligations on broadband
providers "keeps broadband prices high by concentrating delivery in the hands of a few
phone and cable companies").
454. Although satellite Internet services are available in most parts of the country, these
services are not considered effective substitutes for terrestrial broadband provision because
residents without a clear view of the southern sky or without the ability to affix a receiver
dish on the exterior of a household would not be able to use satellite services. See GAO
2006 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 243, at 15 & n.15 (stating that although broadband
satellite service is deployed, it is not heavily regarded as a strong substitute for other highspeed technologies). Moreover, subscribers who can establish a strong satellite downlink
face higher monthly subscription rates than terrestrial broadband for service that is slower
than broadband speeds, less reliable, and incapable of accommodating some of the more
interactive and innovative bandwidth-intensive Internet services due to the signal delays and
interruptions inherent in satellite downlinks. The FCC itself acknowledges that "[w]ith a
few exceptions, none of the three most widely subscribed satellite-based Internet access
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appeared to be a means to use existing residential wiring to deliver a "third
pipe" for broadband service. But initial trials have been disappointing, and
obstacles related to interference with radio services, slow speeds, the
expense of repeating equipment, and general unreliability have kept BPL
from serving as a viable alternative, at least for now.4 55
b. Municipal BroadbandNetworks as an Emerging (but Underfunded)
Third Option
Assuming (quite safely) that the wireline broadband market will remain
deregulated and that the cable and telephone company duopoly will persist
for the foreseeable future, a more proactive governmental approach to
promoting broadband proliferation could come in the form of direct
financial and other assistance to municipal broadband initiatives. As cable
and telephone companies have written off large swaths of the country as
unprofitable for broadband deployment, state and local governments have
attempted to fill the void by launching low-cost and wide-scale municipal
broadband networks-popularly known as "municipal Wi-Fi.,, 456 Many of
services satisfies ... the Commission's definition of advanced services, which calls for a
minimum transmission speed of in excess of 200 Kbps downstream and upstream." Inquiry
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans, 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, 9628 (2008). Similarly, new wireless mobile Internet
services for personal communications devices, such as 3G mobile cellular broadband, are
not a substitute for high-speed household Internet access for fully functional computing
devices. Although these new wireless mobile personal communications devices represent
significant progress in Internet connectivity, their connections typically are much slower
than residential broadband and often slower than dial-up, carriers impose strict limits on
bandwidth use, and they do not enable their users to access many Internet broadband
functionalities and utilities (like VolP). See TIM WU, WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY:
CELLULAR CARTERFONE AND CUSTOMER CHOICE IN MOBILE BROADBAND 12-14 (2007),
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/wireless net neutrality (pointing out the
slow speeds and hidden limitations on bandwidth associated with Verizon and AT&T
mobile wireless broadband access); see also Scott CongressionalTestimony, supra note 235,
at 9 (describing the failure of mobile wireless connections as cable and DSL substitutes due
to their slow connections, strict bandwidth caps, and connection limitations).
455. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(granting American Radio Relay League's petition for review and remanding for a new
notice-and-comment proceeding of FCC's 2004 final rule concluding that existing
safeguards together with new protective measures would prevent harmful interference from
BPL facilities); see also David Coursey, Why Broadbandover Power Lines Is a Bad Idea,
ANCHORDESK, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Whybroadband-over-power-lines-is-a-bad-idea-39668 (observing that, because BPL relies on
radio waves to send signals through the electrical power grid, "[t]he problem with BPL is
simple physics: radio waves like to fly off into space" and "[w]hen they do, interference
results"); Joe Barr, Flawed BPL Is No Broadband Panacea, LINux.cOM, May 17, 2005,
http://www.linux.com/articles/44975 (noting that the major flaw with BPL is the
interference it causes with radio communications operating at or near the same frequencies).
456. See generally Craig Dingwall, Municipal Broadband: Challenges and
Perspectives, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 67 (2006) (lauding the beneficial aspects of broadband
deployment and noting the steps that municipalities can take toward providing accessible
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these initial attempts failed because of economic and technical glitches.457
For example, the City of Philadelphia's 2005 announcement that it would
partner with major ISP Earthlink to blanket 135 square miles of
metropolitan Philadelphia with free or low-cost broadband prompted many
to hope that universal broadband service could be achieved in short
order.458 But the business model for the Earthlink-Philly partnership
required the city only to provide free access to municipal rights of way and
utility poles while Earthlink bore all of the build-out and maintenance costs
with the expectation of realizing profits down the road. That model proved
unrealistic, and reception and speed problems discouraged new
subscribers. 459 Similar municipal Wi-Fi plans in Chicago, Houston, Miami,
and San Francisco find themselves in a predicament similar to
Philadelphia' S.460
The latest iteration of municipal broadband projects appears to be faring
better, but these projects require a significant amount of public funding. In
Minneapolis and Portland, for example, the ISP partner agreed to build out
broadband in their regions). Municipal "Wi-Fi," or wireless fidelity, operates by means of
wireless transponders located throughout a geographic area that wirelessly connect
computer and other digital equipment with compatible digital transceivers-devices that
both receive and transmit signals. WiMAX is an emerging technology, sometimes referred
to as "Wi-Fi on steroids," which allows a wireless network to be deployed over a large area,
such as a neighborhood or subdivision, with fewer transponders and repeater stations than
required by standard Wi-Fi deployments. Id. at 70-73.
457. See, e.g., Deborah Yao, Earthlink to Pull Plug on Philly's Wi-Fi, MSNBC.coM,
May
13,
2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24598616/printl/displaymode/1098/
(explaining the economic and technical failures that led to the abandonment of a nearuniversal Wi-Fi project in Philadelphia); Urbina, supra note 414, at AI0; Marguerite
Reardon, Facing Economic Realities of Muni Wi-Fi, CNETNEWS.COM, May 3, 2007,
http://news.cnet.com/Facing-economic-realities-of-muni-Wi-Fi/2100-73 51 3-6181058.html
(detailing EarthLink's failure to complete contracts that would have provided municipal
Wi-Fi in a number of major American cities).
458. See Yao, supra note 457 (reporting EarthLink's failure to adhere to a contract that
would have provided municipal Wi-Fi in Philadelphia).
459. See Urbina, supra note 414, at 2 (explaining that the failure of EarthLink to
continue the municipal Wi-Fi project was due to unforeseen equipment issues, such as
requiring more routers than predicted). Among other problems, effective deployment of the
network required significantly more equipment than expected, drastically raising the costs
for the project and ultimately rendering it unprofitable for Earthlink. Id. (explaining that
underestimating the amount of routers required for the project was a major flaw in
EarthLink's Wi-Fi plan).
460. See id. (describing how EarthLink's pullout also affected residents in San Francisco
who would have received free citywide wireless); see also Jose Antonio Vargas, Binary
America: Split in Two by a Digital Divide, WASH. POST, July 23, 2007, at Cl (noting that
municipal Wi-Fi projects in Charleston, South Carolina, and San Francisco, California, also
have struggled); Chicago Scraps Plans for Citywide Wi-Fi, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 28, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20482568/ (depicting the shelving of a municipal broadband
system in Chicago due to high costs and expected low demand); Reardon, supra note 457
(noting that some municipal broadband systems-such as those in Tempe, Arizona; Chaska,
Minnesota; and Lompoc, California-have had trouble signing up new subscribers because
of indoor coverage problems and other technical impediments).

2009]

TOWARD A BROADBAND PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

a citywide broadband Wi-Fi network but only if the city served as an
"anchor tenant," guaranteeing a significant amount of ongoing subscription
Whereas the initial failed
revenue from municipal departments.461
Earthlink projects with Philadelphia and other cities demanded no financial
commitment from the municipality, the new generation projects require the
city to subsidize construction of the network and ensure its ultimate
profitability by becoming its largest subscriber.462 Facing budget deficits
and public demands for more expenditures in traditional public safety and
education initiatives, many municipalities have not been able to afford
these investments in municipal broadband networks despite significant
citizen demand.463 The significantly wealthier suburban municipalities and
relatively small cities, like Burbank, California, and Tempe, Arizona, have
had more success in establishing their own tax-supported broadband
networks. 464 Less wealthy municipalities have not been as fortunate.
In the face of federal inaction, several states have launched initiatives to
promote statewide broadband proliferation. For example, in December
2007, the California Public Utilities Commission allocated $100 million
over two years to broadband companies to build out service to underserved
and unserved areas in the state.465 Massachusetts initiated a similar
program, committing $40 million raised through state-bond financing for
the direct subsidization of fiber networks, wireless towers, and other
broadband infrastructure in areas of the state bypassed by commercial
broadband carriers.466 Several other states, like Georgia, Kentucky, and

461.

See Urbina, supra note 414, at A10 (reporting that the ISP in Minneapolis required

the city to become an anchor tenant before agreeing to build a city network); see also
Reardon, supra note 457 (defining the anchor tenant requirement as forcing the city into a

contractual obligation to purchase an agreed-upon amount of service in exchange for the
city network).
462. Joanne Hovis, President of Columbia Telecommunication Corporation, said of the
Minneapolis municipal-broadband project, which involves a residential Wi-Fi network
overlay on a public safety network,
[T]he key thing there is that the city is paying a pretty substantial annual fee to the
provider for those two networks. I think the difference between that and the models
that were not successful is that ... [i]n the Minneapolis case, the city is financing
[buildout] as a tenant on the network.
The Kojo Nnamdi Show: The Future of Municipal Broadband(WAMU radio broadcast July
15, 2008) (transcript on file with author).
463. See Travis, supra note 446, at 1782-83 (discussing differing outcomes in larger
cities versus wealthier and smaller municipalities).
464. Id.
465. Press Release, California Public Utilities Commission, CPUC Promotes Broadband
Service in Unserved Areas of California to Bridge Digital Divide (Dec. 20, 2007),
California's initiative, partly
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/newsrelease/76879.htm.
the result of a study of broadband at 10 Mbps upstream and downstream speeds-the
minimum speed required for high-quality video, telemedicine, and other emerging
bandwidth-dependent technologies. CAL. BROADBAND TASK FORCE, supra note 422, at 32.
466. See Scott Stafford, Their Future Is Broadband, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 8, 2008

ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW

[61:1

Maine, have launched comparable, although less generously funded,
initiatives to encourage broadband deployment. 46' As is the case with
municipal Wi-Fi networks, most of the proactive state-level broadband
proliferation programs are relatively modest in their objectives and scope,
focusing on relatively low-speed broadband projects and not entailing the
large-scale broadband infrastructure buildout required for universal
access. 468 Some broadband is better than no broadband. But the local and
state programs have been financially and logistically unable to achieve the
deployment of very high-speed and low-cost broadband present in Canada
and many Asian and European nations. 469
c. Cable and Telephone Company Efforts to Thwart Public Networks
In at least fifteen states, telephone and cable companies have applied
their influence in state legislatures to pass laws that altogether prohibit or
hamper local and state governments' efforts in deploying public broadband
networks. 470 Take, for example, New Orleans, a city struggling to recover
(detailing state initiatives in Massachusetts that aim to make it more cost effective for ISP to
bring broadband to areas lacking coverage).
467. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 36-44 (describing, in detail, state initiatives
to boost broadband proliferation).
468. See id. at 66 ("Unfortunately, the majority of state programs do not address the
need to promote big broadband capability that will be necessary in the next few years."); see
at
OVERVIEW,
available
EMERGING
TECH.
FUND,
also
CALIFORNIA
http://www.cetfund.org/progress/overview/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (describing
relatively modest funding efforts by the state of California given the enormity of the
challenge of proliferating broadband in the state).
469. See Travis, supra note 446, at 1787-94 (detailing the results of massive national
investments in local broadband deployment in Canada, Sweden, South Korea, Japan, and
other nations).
470. See Christopher Rhoads, Cities Start Own Efforts to Speed Up Broadband,WALL
ST. J., May 19, 2008, at Al (describing telephone and cable company efforts to prevent
municipalities from entering the broadband business by claiming improper use of taxpayer
funds and unfair competition); see generally Dingwall, supra note 456, at 85-87 (providing
an excellent overview of state statutes barring municipalities from deploying broadband).
Individual state restrictions vary from a complete prohibition on the provision of
telecommunications services (including broadband) by political subunits to procedural and
See ARK. CODE ANN.
substantive requirements that are significant impediments.
§ 23-17-409 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting government entities from providing any basic
telecommunications services); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-27-103 (2008) (prohibiting local
governments from providing, directly or indirectly, telecommunications services (including
broadband) to subscribers of cable television service); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.047 (West
2000) (requiring that telecommunications companies controlled by local government entities
be subjected to the same local requirements applying to privately owned entities); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 388.10 (West 2007) (prohibiting local government entities that provide
telecommunications services from using general fund moneys or money generated from
public utilities services to support the services, requiring payment of reasonable costs for
use of city equipment, and imposing significant recordkeeping and certification
requirements); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:844.43, 45:844.47-.49 (2007) (prohibiting the
provision of telecommunications and advanced services by any local government unless the
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economically and socially from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, and
more recently Hurricane Gustav. Once the local state of emergency is
lifted, the city must reduce the already slow 512 Kbps download speed for
an under-construction Wi-Fi network to 144 Kbps in compliance with the
Louisiana law severely restricting the ability of municipalities to offer
broadband services. 471
Although § 253(a) of the 1996 Telecom Act proscribes state or local law
that "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity
telecommunications service,, 472 the FCC has refused to
to provide any ...
enforce that prohibition against anticompetitive state and local laws
advantaging cable and telephone companies.4 73 In 2004, the Supreme
government satisfies numerous conditions, including a comprehensive feasibility study);
Mo. ANN. REV. STAT. § 392.410 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting government entities from
providing telecommunications services for which a certificate of service authority is
required to the public or to telecommunications providers); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268.086
(2007) (prohibiting the governing body of an incorporated city that has a population of over
25,000 from selling telecommunications services to the public and providing strict
conditions for the purchase or construction of telecommunications facilities); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3014 (2005) (prohibiting political subdivisions of the state from providing
telecommunications services to the public for compensation unless the subdivision sends a
written request to the local exchange telecommunications company serving the area and it or
one of its affiliates has not agreed to provide the services requested within two months);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2620 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting the use of non-telecommunications
revenue sources to subsidize the cost of providing telecommunications services and
requiring the imputation of costs that nongovernmental entities incur in computing the cost
of providing services and the rates charged); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-52-401 to -407, -601 to
-611 (2005) (noting that any municipality that operates an electric plant can own and operate
it for the provision of telecommunications services but cannot provide subsidies for it;
however, the municipality cannot provide for telecommunications services within the
service area of an existing telephone cooperative with fewer than 100,000 lines, and
municipalities that operate electric plants as described in § 7-52-401 may offer cable and
Internet services if certain procedures, such as maintaining separate accounting and
recordkeeping for such services, are satisfied); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 54.201-02, 54.205
(Vernon 2007) (prohibiting municipalities from offering the public telecommunications
services by prohibiting issuance of the requisite certificate to a municipality); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 10-18-201 to -204 (2007) (requiring that the municipality hold a public hearing,
conduct a feasibility study, hold another public hearing, and adopt by resolution the
feasibility study before the municipality can provide to anyone cable television services or
public telecommunications services); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2160, 56-265.4:4 (2008)
(requiring that a locality obtain a certificate before it can provide telecommunications
services and outlining the factors considered by the municipality before such certificates are
granted); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.330 (2006) (allowing public utility districts to
own and operate telecommunications facilities for the district's internal needs but
prohibiting the sale of such services to public).
471. See Marguerite Reardon, New Orleans to Offer Free Wi-Fi, CNETNEwS.COM, Nov. 29,
2005,
http://news.cnet.com/New-Orleans-to-offer-free-Wi-Fi/2100-7351 3-5975845.html
(describing the need to reduce download and upload speeds in New Orleans to comply with
a state law that restricts Internet speeds on services provided by municipalities).
472. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). The 1996 Telecom Act authorized the FCC to preempt
enforcement of any state or local statute that contravened § 253(a). Id.§ 253(d).
473. See Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 3547 (1997) (concluding that
the definition of "entity" in § 253 does not encompass a state's political subdivisions,
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Court in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League474 upheld a Missouri statute,

enacted as a result of intensive lobbying by cable and telephone companies
that prohibits political subdivisions of the state from providing
telecommunications services.475 The Court ruled that § 253 does not
"affect the power of States and localities to restrict their own (or their
political inferiors') delivery of telecommunications services.' 47 6 This
decision emboldened cable and telephone broadband carriers to enforce
existing anticompetitive state statutes and pursue new enactments in states
without such statutes.477
Cable and telephone companies also have started filing lawsuits against
municipalities launching public Wi-Fi or wireline broadband networks.
Those suits claim that the broadband projects are an improper use of
revenue, constituting unfair competition and inappropriate local
governmental intervention in an inherently private, commercial
enterprise. 478 The companies also have argued that municipalities that own
or lease their own broadband networks would easily succumb to the
temptation of giving their networks preferential treatment, thereby putting
private carriers at a competitive disadvantage.479
These arguments are weak in several respects. First, most of the
municipalities that opted to build out their own networks did so because
thereby allowing states to restrict the ability of subordinate government entities to provide
telecommunications services).
474. 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
475. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 392.410(7) (prohibiting government entities from providing
telecommunications services for which a certificate of service authority is required to the
public or to telecommunications providers); Nixon, 541 U.S. 125 (upholding the statute).
For an excellent examination of the constitutional and political context of the Nixon case,
see Travis, supra note 446, at 1728-37.
476. See Nixon, 541 U.S. 125. The Court concluded, in part, that "any entity" in
§ 253(a) did not encompass a state's subdivisions and that a state therefore could prohibit
counties, cities, and other political subordinates from offering telecommunications services.
Id. at 135-37; see also Time Warner Telecom of Or., LLC v. City of Portland, 452
F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Or. 2006) (concluding that § 253(a) of the 1996 Telecom Act
did not preempt the city of Portland from selling telecommunications services, including
broadband, to public schools and other municipalities).
477. See Travis, supra note 446, at 1765-72 (discussing state law restraints on universal
broadband).
478. See Rhoads, supra note 470 (describing Comcast Cable suit against Chattanooga,
Tennessee, alleging improper tax expenditures and unfair competition).
479. Id.; Eric Bangeman, Community Broadband Act Would Overturn Bans on
Municipal
Broadband,
ARS
TECHNICA,
Aug.
3,
2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070803-community-broadband-act-would-overturnbans-on-municipal-broadband.html; see, e.g., Comcast v. Elec. Power Bd., No. 08-0291,
slip op. at 1-3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. July 11, 2008) (notice of appeal), available at
http://media.timesfreepress.com/docs/2008/07/memorandum opinion%20andorder.pdf, appeal
filed sub nom. Notice of Appeal, Tenn. Cable Telecomms. Ass'n v. Elec. Power Bd. of
Chattanooga,
No.
07-2145
(Tenn.
Ch.
Ct.
July
28,
2008),
http://media.timesfreepress.com/docs/2008/07/Stamped Notice of Appeal.pdf.
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for-profit carriers had refused to offer broadband service to their residents
due to concerns about profitability. 4 0 Additionally, even where a
municipal Wi-Fi system would run parallel to a private broadband network
(i.e., fiber-optic or coaxial cable), it is most likely that the two services
would cater to different segments of the market by delivering materially
different products-fiber or cable providing more expensive and higher
speed broadband, and Wi-Fi providing very inexpensive or even free
Internet access at relatively low speeds. Moreover, there is nothing new
with local governments offering services in competition with private
providers. If it were inappropriate for government to compete with forprofit enterprises, then the government would need to cease its provision of
public variants of healthcare, education, library services, transportation,
parking, housing, police, and power generation.i 8 In addition, in offering
these services, it is well within the public interest to pass along to citizens
any cost savings resulting from public ownership of the resource at hand.
It is ironic that the telephone and cable companies have been so forcefully
pursuing regulatory and judicial restraints on municipal broadband
deployment when, in all other contexts, they are vehement opponents of
412
regulatory constraints.
In sum, in addition to significantly increasing its direct financial support
for broadband deployment, the federal government should enact legislation
lifting all protectionist, anticompetitive state and local legal restrictions on

480. See Rhoads, supra note 470 (discussing experience in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and
noting that cable and telecom companies focus most their efforts on larger U.S. cities); see also
Arik Hesseldahl, Bringing Broadband to Rural America, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Sept. 18, 2008,

http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/sep2008/tc20080917_797892.htm
(discussing how lack of profitability has deterred broadband providers from deploying
broadband in low-density areas).
481. For expanded versions of these and other arguments against cable and telephone
company efforts to thwart municipal broadband projects, see Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Remarks to the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and
at
available
22,
2005),
(Sept.
Advisors
Memorably,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/050922municipalbroadband.pdf.
Commissioner Leibowitz said, "To put this in context, imagine if Borders and Barnes &
Noble, claiming it was killing their book sales, asked lawmakers to ban cities from building
libraries. The legislators would laugh them out of the State House." Id.
482. Nevertheless, should neutralizing any competitive advantages of municipalities
providing broadband service be necessary, states can adopt legislation designed to ensure
fair competition between private and public providers of broadband services instead of
implementing statutory bans or severe restrictions on municipal broadband. For example,
regulations could be promulgated requiring municipal broadband projects to abide by
certain rules preventing below-cost pricing funded by cross-subsidies with other municipal
projects, financial reporting and transparency, fair cost imputation for use of public rights of
way, and other rules designed to mitigate competitive advantages. For a detailed analysis of
options for neutralizing any competitive advantages on municipal broadband projects, see
Dingwall, supra note 456, at 98-100 (providing a detailed analysis of options for
neutralizing any competitive advantages on municipal broadband projects).
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and other

4. Supporting Demand-Side DigitalLiteracy Programs
Not everyone with access to residential broadband service and enough
money to afford it subscribes. In the July 2008 Pew Internet & American
Life Project survey of residential broadband adoption, 33% of non-Internet
users-with a median age of 61 and more than twice as likely to live in
low-income households than Internet users-responded that they are not
interested in using the Internet. 483 Among users of low-speed, dial-up
Internet access, 19% said that nothing, including residential availability at
low subscription rates, would persuade them to migrate from dial-up to
broadband service.484 Vint Cerf, known popularly as the "father of the
Internet," responded to the survey results by theorizing that "[s]ome
residential users may not see a need for higher speeds because they don't
know about or don't have ability to use high speeds. 48 5 In other words,
some offline Americans do not know what they are missing.
To address the lack of awareness or even fear of new technology in
certain population sectors, a number of nations at the top of the OECD
broadband rankings have successfully incorporated demand-side promotion
of broadband and digital literacy as a key component of proactive national
strategies to promote broadband universality. Fourth-ranked South Korea,
for example, passed national legislation creating the Korea Agency for
Digital Opportunity and Promotion, which in turn devised and
implemented a national program to educate South Koreans on the use of
broadband Internet service.4 86 South Korea's digital literacy programs
aggressively deployed training resources as well as equipment across the
nation's schools to train children from all socioeconomic strata on
intelligent broadband use as early in their academic careers as possible.48 7
The nation's programs also deployed training and equipment resources to
reach individuals who may be especially prone to isolation and reticence to
483. PEw2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at iii.
484. Id. According to the Pew Report, 62% of dial-up users replied that they are not
interested now in switching to broadband, but 35% of those respondents explained that high
broadband prices prevent their migration to broadband, and 14% explained that broadband
service is not available to their household. Id.
485. Anick Jesdanun, Many Dial-Up Users Don't Want Broadband,TIME.COM, July 3,
2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1819972,00.html. Cerf explained,
"My enthusiasm for video conferencing improved dramatically when all family members
had MacBook Pros with built-in video cameras, for example." Id.
486. See JAYAKAR & SAWHNEY, supra note 424, at 5.
487. Id.(noting that South Korea's demand-side initiatives are so extensive that "as
many as 10 million South Koreans may fall into the disadvantaged categories targeted by
the digital literacy programs").
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adopt new technologies, including stay-at-home mothers, older citizens,
military personnel and veterans, and the disabled.488 Japan and the United
Kingdom also have funded national digital literacy programs to spur
broadband proliferation by cultivating awareness and demand.4 89
Other nations' demand-side broadband awareness programs are
reminiscent of the United States' own efforts in the 1930s to catalyze
demand for electricity. Although much of rural America was left unserved
by private electric utilities that viewed service in those areas as
many of these communities remained
economically infeasible,
unconvinced that they needed electric service at all. 490 Regarding electric
service as not only a convenience but an imperative for innovation and
economic and social growth, President Franklin Roosevelt signed into law
That Act created the Rural
the 1936 Rural Electrification Act.
Electrification Administration, tasked in part with increasing the demand
heavily subsidized
for electricity in unserved areas and administering a 49
'
cooperatives.
electric
rural
new
for
program
loan
federal
Although a few state-level broadband initiatives in the United States
have incorporated modest digital literacy programs to promote more
interest in broadband in low-adoption communities, there are no
comprehensive digital literacy programs supported by the federal
government. 492 Federal demand-side support could be in the form of grants
to nonprofit organizations, public schools and libraries, and similar entities,
for the creation of localized broadband awareness and digital literacy
programs. It also could take the form of a centralized federal effort to
educate children and adults on broadband use, especially the resources
488. Id.
489. See

ROBERT D. ATKINSON ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
37-40
(2008),
BROADBAND
LEADERSHIP
INTERNATIONAL

EXPLAINING

http://www.itif.org/files/ExplainingBBleadership.pdf.
490. See Joel A. Youngblood, Note, Alive and Well, The Rural Electrification Act
Preempts State Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South Louisiana Electric Coop.
Ass'n, 16 ENERGY L.J. 489, 491-92 (1995) (discussing history and demand-side objectives
of federal electrification initiatives during the 1930s).
491. See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-918 (2006); see also
SHLAES, supra note 429, at 175 (noting that among Roosevelt's goals was "to increase the
use of electricity in all homes, providing Americans with a better standard of living"
(emphasis added)).
492. For example, the "e-NC Authority" broadband initiatives in North Carolina
and the "ConnectKentucky" program in Kentucky encompass plans to educate lowadoption communities in broadband resources and use. See North Carolina e-NC
Authority, Who We Are, http://www.e-nc.org/whoweare.asp; About ConnectKentucky,
http://www.connectkentucky.org/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). ConnectKentucky,
and its new national umbrella organization ConnectedNation, have "employees [who] fan
out to small towns and rural areas and hold meetings where they demonstrate the benefits of

broadband ....

For instance, they'll show parents better ways to communicate with

teachers and brainstorm ways to use broadband in local institutions."

note 480, at 2.

Hesseldahl, supra
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available through broadband related to political information and democratic
involvement. Such efforts can be part of, or run parallel to, information
literacy programs already implemented by the National Institute for
Literacy. That federal agency-in partnership with the Departments of
Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services-promotes the
improvement of reading skills of children and adults, with the intention of
cultivating a more informed and engaged citizenry. 4 3
5. More FederalResearch Support, Better Data Collection, andBetter
Spectrum Management
A more aggressive federal role in broadband proliferation also should
attend to improvements in the interrelated areas of technological research,
data collection, and efficient spectrum utilization. Although the United
States for many decades was the international leader in public and private
telecommunications-oriented research and development, it has fallen
behind. For example, the European Union spends upward of $13.5 billion
per year in public and private telecommunications-oriented research and
development, whereas the United States now spends between $250 million
and $350 million.49 4 The National Research Council recently issued a
report tracking the steep decline in American telecommunications research
investment in
and development, concluding that "[w]ithout an expanded
495
research,

. . .

the nation's position as a leader is at risk."

As noted above, the failure of the FCC to collect comprehensive and
reliable data on broadband penetration throughout the nation has hampered
efforts to catalyze the government's response to delays in broadband
proliferation. The FCC's practice was to treat an entire zip code as
broadband-deployed even if it contained only one Internet connection at a
speed as slow as 200 Kbps (which is too slow for many current
applications). That allowed the FCC to claim that 99% of the nation had
broadband availability 496 -a claim that FCC Commissioner Deborah Tate
conceded was "something of a running joke. 4 97 The FCC in June 2008

493. National Institute for Literacy, http://www.nifl.gov.
494. WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 33.
495.

COMM.

ON TELECOMMS.

RESEARCH AND

DEV.,

NAT'L

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

W. Lucky & Jon Eisenberg
eds., 2006), http://www.citi.columbia.edu/conferences/telecomRD/luckyreport.pdf. The
National Research Council advises that "[a] strong, effective telecommunications R&D
program for the United States will require a greater role for government-sponsored and
university research." Id at 2.
RENEWING U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 1 (Robert

496. See FCC HIGH-SPEED ACCESS REPORT, supra note 452.
497. See Matthew Lasar, Joke's Over: FCC Adopts New Broadband Penetration
Metrics, ARS TECHNICA, June 15, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080615jokes-over-fcc-establishes-new-broadband-measurement-system.html.
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promulgated a new data collection system that will require ISPs to report

broadband service on the basis of census tracts, which are typically much
smaller than zip code, and to report the speed of broadband service offered
according to tiers, with basic broadband defined as between 768 Kbps and
1.5 Mbps. 49' Although these modifications were positive steps and
overdue, the data collected under the new system remains thin. For
example, the FCC will not collect any pricing data from ISPs. Such data
could be compared with census household income figures, as well as the
more granular penetration and speed data for detailed examinations of
broadband affordability and the tipping points at which specific kinds of
households opt to subscribe to broadband.4 99
Finally, a more aggressive federal approach to broadband proliferation
should include a comprehensive effort to improve the efficiency of federal
spectrum allocations. The FCC currently is exploring the use of unused or
"white spaces" between broadcast television channels for unlicensed
wireless services, including wireless broadband devices.5 00 It also launched
an auction in January 2008 for spectrum in the 700 MHz band vacated by
broadcasters as part of the transition to digital transmission.5 0 1 Despite
these initiatives to render more spectrum for broadband use, the new
spectrum locations may still be inadequate to meet the demands of next498. See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and
Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, 23 F.C.C.R. 9691 (2008).
Among other reforms, the FCC revised Form 477, through which broadband Internet service
providers report the services they make available to the public, to require reporting of
broadband service at a much more granular level-census tract instead of zip code-and to
report download and upload speeds available in those areas. Id. at 9692-93.
499. FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein criticized the exclusion of pricing data in
the new data collection scheme in a separate statement: "Particularly given the growing
evidence that citizens of other countries are getting a much greater broadband value, in
terms of price per megabit, it is regrettable that the Commission misses an opportunity to
collect useful information about the actual prices available to American consumers." Id. at
9767 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring in part).
500. Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 19 F.C.C.R. 10,018 (2004).
This still-open proceeding has been delayed by broadcaster-led disputes concerning the
potential of interference and broadcast signal degradation as a result of the use of wireless
See SASCHA D. MEINRATH & MICHAEL
devices in broadcast-adjacent frequencies.
CALABRESE, NEW AM. FOUND., UNLICENSED "WHITE SPACE DEVICE" OPERATIONS ON THE

(2008),
AND
THE
MYTH
OF
HARMFUL
INTERFERENCE
3-4
TV
BAND
http://www.newamerica.net/files/WSDBackgrounder.pdf; see also Ted Hearn, Out of the
Blue: Vacant Channels Could Fuzz Up Free TV; Broadcasters See Red over White Spaces,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 5, 2007, at 20 ("The NAB insists that sharing the broadcast
band would imperil over-the-air television because signal interference would be rampant
and unstoppable, as unlicensed users wouldn't have to answer to anyone-including the
FCC.").
501. See Chloe Albanesius, Verizon, AT&T Win Spectrum; Google Bluffs, PCMAG.COM,
Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2277767,00.asp (noting that the 700
MHz auction "raised a record $19.59 billion," with Verizon and AT&T winning most of the
auctioned licenses).
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generation broadband, both in their scope and the speed at which devices
used on those frequencies could access the Internet. °2
B. Content: CultivatingDigitalDemocracy
The government's assumption of a much more proactive role in
proliferating broadband to communities that lack it should be the
centerpiece of a new federal public interest broadband initiative. As
discussed in Part II, access is only part of the challenge. Once online,
citizens should be presented with more opportunities for localized
democratic discussion and political engagement in public spaces, where the
full complement of First Amendment protections applies. Such efforts
should be focused on optimizing the democratic and expressive potential of
broadband while helping to mitigate some of the civic disengagement,
fragmentation, social diffusion, and other harms described in Part II.
1. Building Online Town Squares-Supportfor Public Foraon Local and
State Government Websites
As noted above, although a small minority of Internet websites are
government-controlled, there is a paucity of public discussion fora on those
websites. Many municipal, county, and state governments have launched
websites that provide important and detailed information about governance,
proposed legislation, and community initiatives, but very few public
websites in the United States host interactive discussion of issues of public
importance by means of discussion fora or community e-mail discussion
Moreover, government-controlled websites that do not
lists.5" 3
affirmatively provide public discussion boards or other opportunities for
online public discussion are not deemed traditional or designated public
fora.5 °4 In 2003's United States v. American Library Association, a
502. See, e.g., WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 29 ("Making more spectrum available
for broadband services is certainly worthwhile. The question is whether there is enough
spectrum available to provide adequate capacity for big broadband.").
503. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 364, at 348 (reporting that a study of municipal websites
from the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas found "no applications designed to facilitate
networking or offline meetings of interest groups, and only two sites facilitated online
policy forums or discussion lists").
504. See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000). In
Putnam Pit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Cookeville's denial of plaintiff Davidian's demand
for a hyperlink on the city's website to Davidian's website, which focused on alleged
corruption and incompetence in municipal government and area businesses. Id. Davidian
argued that by hosting a number of hyperlinks to several nonprofit and for-profit
organizations in the area, the city had created a designated public forum on its website and
violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to include a hyperlink to his website on the
city's website. Id. at 841. The court reasoned that because the Internet is such a recent
innovation, it could not be classified-like public streets, sidewalks, and parks-as a
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plurality of the Supreme Court held that the application of traditional public
forum status would not apply to fora that have not "immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public ...for purposes of assembly,
communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public

questions.,

50 5

That status prohibits the government from restricting public

expression absent a compelling state interest and less restrictive means of

restricting such expression.

To qualify as a designated public forum in

which any government restriction of public expression must satisfy the
strictest scrutiny, a space must have been affirmatively opened up by the
government for use by the public for expressive purposes.5 0 6 Thus,
citizens' First Amendment right-of-access claims for expressive activity on
websites controlled by government entities not expressly willing to provide
such a platform are weak at best.50 7
The few jurisdictions that have launched highly interactive municipal
websites with discussion boards, and other deliberative features, have done
For example, Seattle, Washington, launched a
so to good effect.
"Democracy Portal" online through which citizens may view city council
meetings, comment on proposed legislation, and access archived publicaffairs video aired on the city-programmed cable channel.50 8 Seattle also
encourages citizens to arrange and participate in a variety of e-mail
discussion lists (listservs) administered by the city itself through its

traditional public forum. Id.at 842-43. It then asserted that the city's website also could
not be classified as a designated public forum because the city had intended the site "to
convey information to the reader" and not to serve as a platform for free public discourse.
Id. at 844. The court concluded that the city's website was a nonpublic forum and that its
efforts to limit the number of hyperlinks on its site in order to "avoid a cacophony of
speakers" was reasonable, but it remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether
the city's requirement that hyperlinks on its website "promote the economic welfare,
industry, or tourism of the city" constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a
nonpublic government forum. Id.at 845-46; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n,
539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that Internet access provided by public libraries is neither a
traditional nor designated public forum).
505. 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nunziato, supra
note 266, at 1150-59 (discussing the significance of the case).
506. Nunziato, supra note 266, at 1149-50; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985) ("The government does not create a public
forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.").
507. For a thorough discussion of the futility of using First Amendment public forum
right-of-access claims against unwilling government websites, see Schesser, supra note 268,
at 1813-14 (noting that even cases that would succeed in advancing such arguments would
yield less-than-ideal outcomes: "Weak right-to-access claims do not foster the ideal type of
public online space because they potentially yield highly restrictive forums").
Portal,
Democracy
Seattle's
508. Seattle.gov,
http://www.seattle.gov/pan/SeattleDemocracyPortal_0405.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2009).

[61:1

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW

website. 50 9 In addition, a handful of small communities have launched
online initiatives encouraging citizens to interact with other citizens and
elected officials online. 51 0 Although these local government initiatives to
create localized, democratic public discussion initiatives online are
laudable, they are the exception. The great majority of local and state
public web spaces are minimally interactive and
opportunities for public discussion and engagement.

do

not

provide

a. Causes of the Shortage of Public DeliberationSpaces Online
Although the reasons for the paucity of public discussion websites on
local- and state-government-controlled websites vary by jurisdiction, some
of the principal problems identified have been (1) a lack of available

funding for computer services, software, and staff; (2) a lack of expertise in
best practices for building and monitoring discussion websites and online
interaction with elected officials; and (3) a general lack of leadership and

assistance by the federal government in promoting online democratic
engagement. 51'

In contrast to the absence of federal support in the United

States, the governments of Australia, Canada, the European Union, South
Korea, and Singapore provide significant funding and technical expertise

for online public discussion and e-democracy at the local and regional
levels.51 2 In the United Kingdom, the government's "UK Online" website
provides visitors with proposed laws and regulatory materials and hosts
public discussions concerning those proposals and other issues concerning

Lists,
Discussion
509. Seattle.gov
http://www.seattle.gov/tech/get involved/discussions.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
510. See, e.g., CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 93-96 (describing government-supported
online communities in Blacksburg, Virginia (hometown of Virginia Tech), and Roxbury,
Massachusetts (funded in part by Massachusetts Institute of Technology)); Schesser, supra
note 268, at 1819 (describing the Federal Heights, Colorado, practice of facilitating online
chats between citizens and the city's mayor). The city of Winona, Minnesota, is known for
an especially successful resident-run website designed "to empower, inform, and engage the
citizenry by creating an ongoing community-wide discussion of local public issues."
Winona Online Democracy, http://forums.e-democracy.org/groups/winona/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2009). The state of Minnesota itself has encouraged the development of the Minnesota
E-Democracy project, which, although not on a government website but instead one
controlled by a nonprofit organization, hosts online discussions and debates about state
politics and regional public affairs. CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 98-99.
511. Scott, supra note 364, at 349; see also CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 102
(attributing lack of public deliberative sites to "a combination of poor funding, unrealistic
expectations, inappropriate technology, internal disputes, and lack of clear objectives");
Dahlberg, supra note 370, at 629 (noting that nonprofit, nongovernmental online democratic
deliberation projects, such as Minnesota E-Democracy, are severely limited in their
effectiveness because of the lack of funding, particularly from government: "funding is
required to enable deliberative initiatives to resist incorporation by commercial and
non-deliberative interests and to expand, multiply and improve").
512. Scott, supra note 364, at 349.
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51 3
governance and public affairs.
In his 2006 study of the resources for public involvement made available
on the websites of the 100 largest cities, Professor James K. Scott notes that
in addition to lack of funding, expertise, and federal leadership, another
reason state and local governments have opted against opening public
discussion fora online is that they may "want to avoid the political-and
possibly legal-risks of opening up such communication channels" and
may "lack the capacity to monitor, manage, mediate, or otherwise respond
to such public discussions. 51 4 These are reasonable concerns, of course,
especially because of the very little experience local governments have had
in opening spaces online for public discussion. Nevertheless, all levels of
government already have extensive experience in opening government
spaces for public discussion and debate.
Government-sponsored outdoor protest zones, town hall meetings,
public meetings of lawmaking bodies, regulatory agency comment
proceedings, school board hearings, and an array of other public brick-andmortar fora provide helpful analogues for how governments could open
space online for the exchange of public views while exercising reasonable
controls to preserve the purpose of the space and mitigate disruption. The
same First Amendment principles and doctrines that apply to public expression
in government-controlled spaces on terra firma would apply to governmentprovided public spaces online. In addition, it is worth noting that for several
years the federal government itself has been hosting a form of detailed public
discussion online by way of its electronic administrative rulemaking
proceedings. 1 5 In these proceedings, any member of the general public with
an Internet connection is able to read initial regulatory proposals, file electronic
comments, and then respond to other commentators in subsequent rounds.

513. Froomkin, supra note 33, at 15-17. Both England and Scotland also permit
citizens to propose new laws by means of government websites. Id.
514. Scott, supra note 364, at 349.
515. The federal government launched its Regulations.gov website in 2003 to provide
centralized online access to every rulemaking proceeding open for comment at more than
160 federal agencies, enabling users to view open proceedings, including already-filed
comments, and file comments and replies electronically.
General Information on
Regulations.gov, http://www.regulations.gov/search/footer/faq.jsp#27 (last visited Nov. 30,
2008). These new online tools for accessing rulemaking proceedings are an important step
toward more public awareness and participation in governance, but the rulemaking
proceedings themselves are quite formal with very limited opportunity for dynamic
discussions. See Shane, supra note 174, at 73 ("The structure of [federal] rule making... in
at least a modest way, positions the agency in deliberative dialogue with citizens that links
direct citizen input to official government decisionmaking."). In addition, some individual
federal agencies have experimented with electronic alternatives to physical public hearings,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency's National Dialogue on Public Involvement
project, which entailed online threaded discussions, electronic briefing books, and other
innovations. See Thomas C. Beierle, Digital Deliberation:Engaging the Public Through
Online Policy Dialogues, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 33, at 155, 156-59.

ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W REVIEW

[61:1

b. Parametersfor Online Public Fora
As with the opening of any government-provided public meeting and
discussion space, state and local governments would be wise to proceed
carefully in opening public discussion spaces online to avoid running afoul
of the First Amendment. At minimum, a local or state government opening
an online public forum should (1) make clear through widely accessible
announcements and the website's ToS that the discussion area is one where
First Amendment protections apply with no content- or viewpoint-based
restrictions; (2) announce that the website is open to, and welcomes the
participation of, the general public, similar to an open-air public gathering
space or public hearing (e.g., city council or school board meeting); and
(3) adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions designed to keep
individual discussions flowing without disruptive activities, such as
repeated identical postings, obscene postings, or other material that would
not be consistent with the purpose of individual discussions. 516
Government websites also could implement innovations that have worked
well in private online discussion fora for keeping discussions on track while
mitigating vandalism, such as the use of automated obscenity filtration and
user-based "flagging" and reporting systems, like those used on YouTube
and other websites, which depend on users to report individual members'
violations of the ToS. The few existing public discussion websites hosted by
or with the support of state and local governments have developed guidelines
and practices to support productive discussions while mitigating nuisances.51 7
One potential point of contention may arise from attempts by
government hosts of online public fora to limit the ability of forum
participants to express themselves anonymously or pseudonymously in the
hopes of discouraging incivility, vandalism, and disruptive personal
attacks. Although such restrictions are permissible on privately controlled
websites, on government websites they may run afoul of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the view that
anonymous speech is constitutionally protected.51 8 Nevertheless, as noted
516. See Schesser, supra note 268, at 1818-21 (providing excellent, detailed
recommendations (much more extensive than what I can provide here) for the creation of
government-hosted public fora for online public discussion).
517. For example, Minnesota's E-Democracy project enforces a set of complex rules
See E-Democracy Forum Rules,
developed in part by users themselves.
http://e-democracy.org/rules/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (displaying the rules for
E-Democracy citizen-to-citizen discussion fora).
518. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
("Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.... The right to remain
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its
nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
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above, some studies show that anonymous discussions online have a
disinhibiting effect on discussants, at times making it more likely that
discussions will disintegrate into "shouting" matches or exchanges of
abusive personal attacks, causing other participants to stay silent or flee the
space altogether. 519 These negative effects can be- mitigated by the
implementation of practices refined on private websites that have proved
effective at promoting civility in fora permitting anonymous and
For example, websites may require
pseudonymous contributions.
registration (with e-mail address known only to a website moderator) and
discussion moderation (which can be done by volunteer discussion
leaders). In addition, there now is research indicating that, as a normative
development, discussion participants increasingly are opting to identify
themselves in posts as a means of making their contributions more credible
and persuasive.52 °
Some of the benefits of public deliberative fora on government-owned
websites have been achieved on a small number of websites controlled by
nonprofit organizations interested in promoting public deliberation and
If operated with the objectives of
democratic discussion online.52'
promoting true, censorship-free democratic deliberation, a privately
controlled website can provide many of the advantages of a governmentcontrolled forum, with two advantages of private control. First, complete
independence from the government would ensure the autonomy of the
discussions and freedom from any potential interference or manipulation by
the government. Second, private website operators could implement
website moderation practices designed to preserve civility and the

books have played an important role in the progress of mankind."). There is a limit to the
protection of anonymity, however. For example, courts have been willing to unmask
anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers accused of misappropriation of trade
secrets and defamation. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005
WL 578641, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (ordering an ISP to disclose identities of
Internet users accused of misappropriating Apple trade secrets); In re Richard L. Baxter, No.
01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *1, *52-53 (W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2001)
(holding that "a reasonable probability of a finding of defamation" justified compelling an
ISP to disclose the identity of an anonymous website contributor accused of making
defamatory statements).
519. See Witschge, supra note 296, at 115 (summarizing research findings on negative
effects of online anonymity).
520. See id at 117 (noting that "[u]sers are sometimes not even interested in exploiting
the potential for anonymous interaction" because "[t]he use of one's real name can give
more weight to a posting").
521. For example, the Minnesota E-Democracy project, whose original aims were "to
strengthen, expand, and diversify citizen engagement through effective and meaningful
online discussions and two-way information exchange on public issues," was not a
government-hosted website, but an online discussion service originating as an e-mail
discussion listserv controlled by a nonprofit corporation with the endorsement of
government entities. CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 98.
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seriousness of purpose of the discussions, such as barring anonymous
postings, which likely would be challenged under the First Amendment if
the website were hosted by the government.
The disadvantages of private website control, however, are significant.
A number of experiments in nongovernmental online deliberative fora have
suffered from the inability to raise enough funds to sustain operation
without having to resort to advertising and the pressures of
In addition, public discussion fora hosted on
commercialization. 522
municipal or state websites are believed to generate higher levels of traffic,
and therefore much more vibrant discussions, due to their proximity to
public information and materials relating to governance (e.g., proposed
legislation, archived hearing materials, and regulatory proposals).52 3 To
drive traffic to government-controlled public websites, elected officials
could affirmatively request community discussion on a particular proposal
(e.g., a new recycling policy) or challenge (e.g., juvenile crime). Citizens
should be empowered to open their own discussions on topics important to
them but neglected by elected officials. For example, a citizen concerned
about pollution from a neighborhood industrial facility who has an
especially friendly relationship with the municipality's elected officials
could open a discussion thread to engage neighbors in how to address the
problem.
In sum, a broadband public interest standard should encompass proactive
federal support for public discussion spaces on local municipal and state
websites. These fora would be censorship-free areas that would engage a
diversity of citizens in discussion of issues of local public importance and
that would foster locally oriented community identity and shared
experience online in ways that would buttress community-building and
democratic engagement efforts on terra firma. Support can come in the
form of federal grants to help fund the efforts of local and state initiatives
to provide public fora online, and fund technical assistance in the form of
proven templates and best practices models for the establishment and
maintenance of such websites.
2. Linking Public Broadcastingwith Public Broadband-A New
Corporationfor Public Broadband?
The proactive role for government sketched out so far in the creation of
public, noncommercial, localized spaces in electronic media has a strong

522. See Dahlberg, supra note 370, at 627-29 (noting that "Minnesota E-Democracy
itself has not completely sidestepped the Web's commercialization," having had to accept

advertising on each post in order to stay afloat).
523. Id.
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and relatively successful precedent in the American public broadcasting
system. In fact, perhaps a new Corporation for Public Broadband, modeled
after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), could serve as a
centralized government entity responsible for coordinating and funding
some of these efforts as a sister agency to the CPB.
The American system of public broadcasting was created largely in
response to concerns that-like the almost entirely privatized, commercial
Internet today-commercial, private broadcasting was failing to live up to
the expectation that it would "realize the vast potentialities ' '524 of the
medium. It was the brainchild of the Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television, which in a 1967 report urged the government to assume a much
more aggressive role in bringing about "a well-financed and well-directed
educational television system" in order to serve the commercially
unsatisfied needs of the American public for diverse, locally oriented
Quoting E.B. White, the
educational and cultural programming. 525
Carnegie Commission concluded that noncommercial broadcasting would
526
serve as "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, and our Camelot.,
At the Carnegie Commission's behest, Congress enacted the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967 and, in so doing, created the CPB.527 The CPB
was designed to act as a fiscal agent through which significant federal
budget appropriations would flow to the public broadcasting licensees
themselves, as well as a "heat shield" to absorb political fallout from
528
In creating the CPB, Congress
specific programming choices.
emphasized the importance of federal support for noncommercial media
"for instructional, educational, and cultural purposes" that is "responsive to
the interests of people both in particular localities and the United States,"
that will "constitute an expression of diversity and excellence," and that
"addresses the needs of unserved and underserved audiences, particularly
children and minorities. 529
The American noncommercial broadcasting system has had its
controversies and dysfunctions, and it suffers from the same insoluble
structural impediments as commercial broadcasting in serving as an
524. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
525. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUC.TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION:

A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

SUMMARY (1967), availableat http://www.current.org/pbpb/camegie/CarnegielSummary.html.
526. Letter from E.B. White to the Carnegie Comm'n (Sept. 26, 1966), available at
http://www.current.org/pbpb/camegie/EBWhiteLetter.html; see also Weinberg, supra note
8, at 1200 n.458 (discussing the origins of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)).
527. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2000)).
528. JEROLD M. STARR, AIR WARS 25-26 (2000). The CPB's ten-member governing
board, which is appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, must be bipartisan,
with no more than five members belonging to the same party. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1).
529. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1), (5)-(6).
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electronic marketplace of ideas. 530 In light of their dependence on tax
dollars, public broadcasters at times have had to avoid politically
controversial subject matter in favor of more bland material.5 3 '
Nevertheless, public broadcasting has succeeded at delivering some of the
locally oriented political and public affairs, children's educational, and
cultural programming that is virtually absent from the commercial
airwaves. As Professor Patricia Aufderheide notes, public broadcasters'
service to their local communities earns them "the highest trust ratings of
any media in the [United States]. 532 The value of public educational
television for minority immigrant communities is especially underreported.
For many immigrant children in non-English-speaking households, free
educational broadcasting is the only reliable source of English language
instruction
and acculturation outside of school.533 This was certainly true
53 4
for me.
In addition to serving as a fiscal agent for funds and technical expertise
to support the creation of locally oriented online public fora, a Corporation
for Public Broadband, like its broadcast counterpart, could serve as a
source of grants to promote innovative noncommercial uses of the

530. Professor Aufderheide posits that although public broadcasting "provides some
opportunities for people to learn about each other and their problems, and to share a
common cultural experience," it is limited by its nature "as a mass medium." She writes
that "[t]he [commercial] broadcasters, at one point, speak to the many, who then talk to each
other. The [public] broadcasters have to stand in the place of the public, and act on their
behalf, and hope they guessed right." Pat Aufderheide, Vlogs, iPods and Beyond: Public
Media's Terrifying Opportunities, AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 3-4 (Nov. 2006),
availableat http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/vlogsipods beyond.pdf.
531.

See, e.g., John Briggs, Same-Sex ParentsAngry at PBS, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS,

Jan. 27, 2005, at IA (discussing the PBS decision not to distribute an episode of "Postcards
from Buster," the educational children's program, after Secretary of Education Margaret
Spellings denounced the episode as inappropriate for children because it featured,
incidentally, the children of two families headed by same-sex parents); see also
Aufderheide, supra note 530, at 2 (noting that public broadcasters "need to maintain their
relatively bland reputation for uncontroversial quality, to maintain the broad support they
have won"); ROGER P. SMITH, THE OTHER FACE OF PUBLIC TV: CENSORING THE AMERICAN

DREAM (2002) (detailing numerous problems associated with encroaching commercial and
governmental interests in public broadcasting content).
532. Aufderheide, supra note 530, at 2.
533. Milton Chen, Myths About Instructional Television: A Riposte, EDUC. WK., May
24, 1989, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1989/05/24/08310012.hO8.html
(discussing how instructional children's television, including programs like "The Electric
Company," has been shown by the Educational Testing Service to be effective at teaching
beginning reading skills, and how "instructional television can play an especially important
role in providing new immigrant children with the cultural and linguistic background for
interpreting lessons in the humanities and sciences").
534. Born in Cuba, I was brought to the United States at the age of three by my parents,
who did not speak English. Not being able to learn English from my family, I was
administered a steady diet of Sesame Street, Mister Rogers' Neighborhood,and The Electric
Company, as prescribed by my first-grade teacher.
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technology for locally oriented political and democratic engagement. 35 A
more proactive government orientation to broadband also could encompass
significantly more funding for local public broadcasting stations' ventures
online. Although public radio stations have had some success in streaming
and podcasting select programming by means of their websites, for the
most part, public broadcasters have been unable to establish much of a
dynamic, locally oriented presence online due to funding shortages.536
Helping local public broadcasting stations establish a more substantively
rich and interactive presence online would help to create more locally and
community oriented points of common focus online, in harmony with the
goal of providing local, public online deliberation websites described
above. In fact, because the transition to digital television has made the
programming of public television broadcasters fully compatible with the
digital Internet, public television station programming concerning local
public affairs can be linked to local public online discussion fora, thereby
forming the basis for discussions on local issues of democratic importance
and driving participation to the fora. Because many public broadcasting
stations are licensed to state and local government entities, 537 such crossutilization may be viewed as mutually beneficial by both the station
licensees and the hosts of the local discussion websites.
Finally, although the federal government provides significant financial
support for children's educational programming on public television, 538 it
has made no comparable investment in noncommercial educational
broadband content for children despite their high levels of Internet use. In
fact, PBS has resorted to selling advertising on its PBSKids.org and related
websites--commercialization of the sort prohibited on public broadcasting
stations-to raise revenue to support its online endeavors. 539 A more
535. See, e.g., Press Release, Corp. for Pub. Broad., CPB Announces Recipients of the
2008),
8,
(Aug.
Initiative
Programming
Election
Station-Based
http://www.cpb.org/pressroom/release.php?pm=675.
536. See CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD., CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING 2007
ANNUAL

REPORT

14-15

(2007),

http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/reports/annual/cpb_2007_annualreport.pdf (describing modest
forays into funding online initiatives beyond the archiving and podcasting of select
broadcast material). Professor Aufderheide observes that "[i]t's been hard for most public
broadcasters even to recognize the power of this new [digital] environment," but documents
a number of very modest projects initiated by public broadcasters themselves featuring
original, interactive online media. Aufderheide, supra note 530, at 11-12.
537. See Barnstone v. Univ. of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (noting
that, of 285 public television stations in the United States, 132 are licensed to government
entities and an additional 77 are licensed to colleges and universities, many of which are
public).
538. See CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD., supra note 536, at 36-38, 42 (detailing 2007 CPB
expenditures for children's educational programming).
539. Dinesh Kumar, PBS to Resume Online Ads to Exploit Market Demand, COMM.
DAILY, Aug. 24, 2006, availableat http://www.commercialalert.org/issues/culture/pbs/pbs-

ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW

[61:1

proactive federal commitment to public interest broadband should
encompass efforts to support children's educational and informational
services on the Internet.
3. Network Neutrality
A broadband public interest standard calling for affirmative government
interventions to promote locally oriented, noncommercial, diverse
democratic expression and discussion online also could inform and elevate
the unfolding debate on network neutrality (net neutrality). The net
neutrality controversy has focused almost entirely on the logical- and
application-layer implications of net neutrality on innovation, competition,
and market power. Not enough attention has been devoted to how the
absence of net neutrality would ramify across the content layer in ways that
would undermine the Internet's emergence as a platform for political,
social, and cultural engagement. A full discussion of the legal and
technical complexities of net neutrality is far beyond the scope of this
Article, but a brief foray into the controversy will help show how the
Internet's value as a democratic and expressive instrument is due to, and
dependent upon, the neutrality of the network.
At the heart of network neutrality is the norm that Internet carriers must
transport data packets using "best efforts," from one end of their network to
the other, without discriminating against any particular classes of
packets. 540 Advocates of net neutrality regulation have argued that the
neutrality norm has been the innovation most responsible for the Internet's
success. 54 1 Congress, however, has resisted codifying network neutrality
principles partly because major ISPs and their supporters, and some

to-resume-online-ads-to-exploit-market-demand.
540. See Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The New Network Neutrality:
Criteriafor Internet Freedom, 12 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 226 (2008) (defining
network neutrality as the "nondiscriminatory interconnectedness among data
communication networks that allows users to access the content, and run the services,
applications, and devices of their choices"); see also Crawford, supra note 167, at 395
(explaining that a nonneutral network would allow Internet connection and transport
providers to "monetize these connections by discriminating against particular packets"). See
generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (comparing network neutrality to open access for all users).
541. See Lessig, supra note 163, at 2 (noting that the neutral network, end-to-end
"philosophy ranked humility above omniscience and anticipated that network designers
would have no clear idea about all the ways the network could be used" and thus "counseled
a design that built little into the network itself, leaving the network free to develop as the
ends (the applications) wanted"); see also Meinrath & Pickard, supra note 540, at 227
("This best effort entails packets being delivered in a 'first-in first-out' method at the
maximum speed possible given network constraints. Under network neutrality, network
operators do not decide what content users can access and cannot impede the flow or give
preferential treatment to particular kinds of content.").
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respected scholars, have insisted that prohibitions on "network
management" would, inter alia, slow innovation and hinder carriers' efforts
to respond nimbly to competitive pressures and consumer demand 42
Public demands for network neutrality regulation have grown louder in
recent years, especially in the wake of reports revealing that Internet
carriers were degrading or blocking packets associated with certain
applications or expressive content. 543 As discussed in Part II.2.B, there
have been numerous verified reports in recent years of broadband providers
censoring political content, or messages critical of the providers
themselves, over their networks.
There also have been high profile incidents of violations of the net
neutrality principle associated with carriers' discrimination against data
packets associated with certain software applications. For example, in
2005, Madison River Communications, LLC, a broadband service provider
in North Carolina that also offers telephone services, entered a consent
decree with the FCC assessing a $15,000 "voluntary payment" for having
blocked packets associated with VolP telephony applications offered by
competitors. 44 More recently, in August 2008, the FCC found that
Comcast Corporation-a major cable television provider-had "broadly
and arbitrarily" blocked packets associated with certain file-sharing
542. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 7 (2005); see also Net Neutrality, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Kyle McSlorrow, President & CEO, National
Cable
&
Telecommunications
Association),
available
at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/mcslarrow-020706.pdf ("Congress should... allow the
marketplace to continue to grow and change so network and applications providers can offer
consumers the fullest range of innovative service options.").
Broadband providers have argued that originators of bandwidth-intensive content
and applications, like Google and MSN, should pay a premium for the transport of their
packets. For example, SBC Communications, Inc. Chairman Edward E. Whitacre, Jr.
expounded in an interview that "what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't
going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on
it." Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at
Dl. Mr. Whitacre apparently failed to account for the fact that broadband carriers in fact are
compensated for carrying bandwidth-intensive traffic by means of large access fees paid by
originators as well as end-users, who pay a premium for high-speed access. Professor Phillip
Weiser called Mr. Whitacre's comment "bizarre on many levels" and noted that "Google
does not use much bandwidth for its search application" and "has added enormous value
to-and demand for" broadband service. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontierfor Network
Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 283 (2008).
543. For numerous examples of net neutrality violations in North America, see JOHN
WINDHAUSEN, JR., GOOD FENCES MAKE BAD BROADBAND: PRESERVING AN OPEN INTERNET
THROUGH
NET NEUTRALITY,
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE WHITE PAPER
16-23 (2006),

http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf.
544. Madison River Commc'ns, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005) (consent decree);
see Jonathan Krim, Phone Company Settles in Blocking of Internet Calls, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 2005, at E2 (reporting that the company's blocking of calls resulted in a complete
inability for some consumers to use their VolP services).
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applications, such as BitTorrent, thereby denying subscribers online video,
music, and other content of their choice.5 45 The FCC rejected Comcast's
argument that the blocked traffic merely was the result of "reasonable
network management," noting that the record showed that Comcast was
blocking these packets even at times when there was no network
congestion, and that its actions had an anticompetitive motive since peerto-peer file-sharing applications "including those relying on BitTorrent,
provide Internet users with the opportunity to view high-quality video that
they might otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television. 54 6
Comcast's appeal of the FCC's order is pending.
547
While proponents of net neutrality praised the FCC's Comcast Order,
the action was not a model of administrative clarity and coherence. In his
statement supporting it, then-FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin said that by
"tell[ing] Comcast to stop" blocking and delaying certain traffic, the FCC
had taken "another important step to ensure that all consumers have
unfettered access to the Internet. 548 But in the same statement, Martin
declared that "[o]ur action today is not about regulating the Internet" and
that he has "consistently opposed calls for legislation or rules to impose
network neutrality., 549 This contradiction caused some observers to
question the FCC Comcast Order's validity and longevity. 5 0
The lack of clarity in the FCC Comcast Order may be attributable, in
part, to uncertainty surrounding the FCC's authority to hold carriers
accountable for violations of net neutrality. As noted in Part III, the FCC
deregulated cable-modem broadband service in 2002 and DSL broadband
service in 2005 by removing them from the scope of Title II's commoncarrier requirements and reclassifying them as unregulated "information

545. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (2008)
[hereinafter Formal Complaint Against Comcast] (opinion and order).
546. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Orders Comcast to End
Discriminatory
Network
Management
Practices
(Aug.
1,
2008),
http:/ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-284286AI.pdf. The Commission
concluded that "[s]uch video distribution poses a potential competitive threat to Comcast's
video-on-demand ('VOD') service." Id.
547. For example, Commissioner Michael J. Copps called it "a landmark decision" and
"a meaningful stride forward on the road to guaranteed openness of the Internet." Formal
Complaint Against Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13,078.
548. Id. at 13,065.
549. Id. at 13,067.
550. See, e.g., Charles Cooper, The FCC on Comcast: Confusion in Spades, Coop's Comer,
CNETNEWs.COM,

http://news.cnet.com/8301-10787_3-10005350-60.html

(Aug. 2,

2008);

Posting of Olga Kharif to BusinessWeek.com, FCC's Comcast Ruling Opens a Can of Worms,
http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/techbeat/archives/2008/08/fccs comcast ru.html?
campaign id=rss blogtechbeat (Aug. 1, 2008) (suggesting the FCC Comcast Order will
"likely open a whole new can of worms" in regard to the "net neutrality debate").
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services" under Title I of the Communications Act. 55 1 Although the
Supreme Court in Brand X noted that the FCC could still "impose special
regulatory duties" on cable-modem broadband providers "under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction, ' 552 the FCC has promulgated no regulations
addressing net neutrality in cable broadband or any other Internet service.
In addition, scholars disagree about whether Title I ancillary authority
would, in fact, support FCC regulation of broadband providers of the sort

that

net

neutrality

proponents

demand,

absent

new

authorizing

legislation.553 Even if the FCC were to promulgate regulations mandating
network neutrality, those regulations likely would be challenged promptly
as inconsistent with the overarching policy objective Congress articulated
in § 230 of the 1996 Telecom Act, namely to preserve "the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
554
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."
551. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
552. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996
(2005).
553. Professor James B. Speta, for example, has written that "the FCC's authority under
Title I is, at best, uncertain" and that with broadband services under Title I of the Act it is
"unlikely that the courts would permit the FCC to regulate the Internet in any significant
fashion." James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: CreatingIt and Limiting
It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 22 (2003); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV.
467, 517-19 (2002). Professors Merrill and Watts argue that the legislative intent of Title I,
§ 4(i) of the Communications Act, as amended-which states that "the Commission may
perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions"--is not a
grant of legislative rulemaking authority but merely the grant of authority to make
procedural rules and undertake other internal "housekeeping" functions. Id They posit that
Congress expressly conferred legislative rulemaking authority to the FCC only in the areas
of common carriers (Title II), broadcasting (Title III), and cablecasting (Title VI). Thus the
Communications Act's rulemaking language in Title I, if interpreted as conferring blanket
legislative rulemaking authority to the FCC, would render superfluous the latter substantive
grants of rulemaking authority. Id. Professor Weiser disagrees, arguing that the FCC does
have adequate authority under Title I to promulgate regulations imposing substantive duties
on broadband providers. See Weiser, supra note 542, at 289; see also Philip J. Weiser,
Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 48-67 (2003)
(conceding that the FCC "will face serious questions as to whether Title I authorizes the
FCC to regulate broadband platforms" but concluding that the FCC could promulgate
legislative regulations using its Title I ancillary authority if, inter alia, it were to articulate "a
limiting standard to contain the reach of its authority over the Internet").
554. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000); see also Editorial,
FCC.politics.gov,WALL ST. J., July 30, 2008, at A14 ("It's also not clear that the FCC even
has the authority to enforce net neutrality, because Congress has never passed a law
establishing such a policy."). The FCC responded to this argument in the Comcast Order,
arguing in part that "the policy embodied in this provision cannot reasonably be read to
prevent any governmental oversight" of broadband providers since, when the provision was
enacted, Internet providers were subjected to "extensive common carrier regulation."
Formal Complaint Against Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,042 (2008) (opinion and
order). Although this characterization of the regulatory status of Internet services at the
time of the 1996 Telecom Act's enactment is accurate, it does not go far in resolving the
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Given the FCC's uncertain legislative authority, it is not surprising that
the agency assessed no fine and merely required Comcast to comply with
its 2005 Internet Policy Statement. In that nonbinding statement, the FCC
declared that it "has a duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and open
character of the Internet as the telecommunications marketplace enters the
broadband age. 555 It also adopted a number of principles central to the net
neutrality norm, including consumers' right to access the "lawful Internet
content of their choice," "to run applications and use [legal] services of
their choice," 556
and "to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm
the network.,

a. Net Neutrality andDemocracy Online
The focus of many of the arguments in favor of legislation mandating
net neutrality has been on application-layer competition and innovation.
Professor Lessig, for example, convincingly argues that instead of
hindering innovation, a neutral Internet respecting the nondiscriminatory
end-to-end principle has been "an engine of innovation" by decentralizing
"[t]he power, and hence the right, to innovate." 557 Similarly, Professor Tim
Wu has posited that a neutral Internet has engendered a much more
for Internet applications than would have resulted
competitive marketplace
5 58
from a non-neutral net.

Telephone and cable companies, intent on exploiting their duopoly
control by churning more profit out of their broadband networks, can
attempt to do so by further commoditizing the Internet to the detriment of
end users and third-party content providers. This threat reasonably has
generated legislative proposals and scholarly theorizing focused on the
economic, commercial marketplace threats posed by violations of the net
neutrality norm. For example, in introducing a bill seeking to codify net
neutrality, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) argued that allowing broadband
intermediaries to create and charge premium rates for prioritized carriage
uncertainty concerning whether the FCC currently has the statutory authority to enforce net
neutrality, especially given the deregulatory impetus of the statute.
555. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (2005).
556. Id.
557. Lessig, supra note 162, at 61.
558. See Wu, supra note 540, at 151; see also Tim Wu, Why Have a
Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) (arguing that network neutrality encourages
competitors to enter the market and compete for business); WINDHAUSEN, supra note 543,
at 39 (explaining that net neutrality has spurred, instead of hindered, broadband deployment
by "provid[ing] certainty to innovators and entrepreneurs who will be more willing to invest
to develop new services if they have confidence that, once developed, access to the network
will be available").
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of traffic "could have a chilling effect on small mom-and-pop businesses
that can't afford the priority lane, leaving these smaller businesses no hope
of competing against the Wal-Marts of the world., 559 Other proponents
similarly speak in terms of "design[ing] rules that explicitly forbid network
operators and ISPs to use their power over the transmission technology to
and thereby harm consumers in the
negatively affect competition"
560
broadband marketplace.

Allowing broadband carriers such as Comcast to commoditize the
transport of data packets, charging a premium for faster transport, or to
degrade surreptitiously or block competitors' traffic, triggers serious
concerns involving unfair competition and antitrust generally. With the
prospect of optimizing profit from prioritized "extra charge" traffic,
broadband providers would have an incentive to sell as much of that ultrahigh-speed transport to providers that can pay the premiums. They also
would have the incentive to reserve much of that prioritized "fast lane" for
their own affiliated applications and services.
This antitrust lens, however important, does not encompass the totality
of the harm a nonneutral Internet would cause to diverse political
expression, noncommercial content, and democratic engagement generally
on the Internet. Although the conditions for political engagement and
discussion online are less than ideal, the significant value that the Internet
delivers today as an instrument of democratic expression is attributable
largely to the ability of citizens to use free applications, such as YouTube,
blogging and social networking websites, or low-cost website-hosting
services, to engage other citizens online. The absence of net neutrality in
favor of tiered, premium pricing for packet transport could threaten the
viability of these free websites, as well as that of the noncommercial, local
public discussion websites proposed above. A non-neutral Internet also
would threaten the economic viability of print journalism (i.e.,
newspapers), as it continues to make the already precarious transition from
broadsheets to broadband.56'
Absent net neutrality, the Internet would become a variation of a private
shopping mall or, perhaps more analogously, a homogenized cable
559. Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), Wyden Moves to Ensure Fairness of
(Mar.
2,
2006),
Net
Neutrality
Bill
Usage
with
New
Internet

http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=266467.
560. See Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common
Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 483, 486-87
(2006) (providing helpful summary of policy and academic arguments advanced in support
of net neutrality, almost all focusing on antitrust and marketplace concerns).
561. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEDIA 145-46 (2008)
(noting that the successful transition of print journalism "from ink and paper to bits" is
dependent on net neutrality, inter alia, and the inability of broadband carriers to "demand a
ransom for the newspaper to have access to the public").
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television service with a preponderance of subscription and other pay
channels and a paucity of noncommercial, public space (e.g., public,
educational, and governmental "channels") for diverse, localized
community dialogue and expression. 62 Much of the generative agency on
the Internet would shift from the masses of users to the carriers themselves
and to those corporate customers that can afford premium transport pricing.
Moreover, these carriers' senior executives have made clear in public
statements that they are interested in the ability to prioritize packets not
only as a way to gain competitive advantage, but also as a way to control
content. For example, IDT Corp. founder and CEO Howard Jonas
proclaimed that he not only "want[s] to be the biggest telecom company in
"[b]y
the world" but also wants "to be able to form opinion," noting that
563
content.,
the
of
control
get
eventually
can
you
pipe,
the
controlling
Professor Susan Crawford correctly recognizes that, to date, the
application-layer focus of regulatory, industrial, and scholarly thinking
around the Internet, and particularly net neutrality, has "see[n] the
Internet as a content-delivery supply chain-much like a railroad" and
thus "does not capture what is valuable about the Internet to people. 564
I very much agree with her assessment that "[o]nline communications
are not just like any other form of economic activity. Ideas are not like
goods; they are potentially far more valuable., 565 Accordingly, calls for
net neutrality should be broadened to encompass not only competitive
and antitrust considerations but also the effects commoditization of bit
transport would have on opportunities for noncommercial, local
political and democratic engagement online.5 66 The Internet is not

562. See Susan P. Crawford, CulturalEnvironmentalism @ 10: Network Rules, 70 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 59 (2007) (noting that cable and telephone company efforts against
the codification of net neutrality requirements are "part of a global attempt by many
broadband providers to turn their networks into something much more like what cable
companies and mobile phone carriers already have-wholly monetized 'services,' with
vertically integrated networks built to allow deep packet inspection and the possibility of
blocking or degrading undesirable services").
563. Ann Wozencraft, For IDT, the Bid Flameouts Light Its Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2002, at C4.
564. Crawford, supra note 167, at 361, 381.
565. Id. at 391. Professor Crawford further argues that "communications law can no
longer afford to ignore" how the Internet is "creating opportunities for the development of
new ideas and new ways of making a living" that are key "to our future economic growth."
Id. at 391.
566. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Vice President Mark Lloyd has
characterized net neutrality as a civil rights issue because, "[f]or communities of color, the
Internet offers a critical opportunity to build a more equitable media system [by] provid[ing]
all Americans with the potential to speak for themselves without having to convince large
media conglomerates that their voices are worthy of being heard." Mark Lloyd & Joseph
Torres, Net Neutrality Is a Civil Rights Issue, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Feb. 21, 2008,
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/02/21/7210/.
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merely a platform for commerce.
and economic imperative.

Net neutrality is both a democratic

IV. OLD WINE IN A NEW (DIGITAL) BOTTLE? HOW A BROADBAND
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE
THAN ITS BROADCAST PROGENITOR

The broadband public interest standard components discussed in Part III
would assign the federal government a much more proactive role in
promoting important democratic and expressive principles on the Internet.
These principles have been at the heart of the broadcast public interest
standard for seven decades but have not been fully achieved as a
consequence of the broadcast medium's inherent limitations. These
proposals, however, may beg a number of important questions. First, how
would a broadband public interest standard, comprised of the interrelated
interventions detailed above, avoid some of the same shortcomings that
compromised the effectiveness of the broadcast standard and failed to
engender a diverse, deliberative, locally oriented, and democracy-enriching
free marketplace of ideas on the nation's airwaves? Would these proposals
encounter the same First Amendment frustrations as the broadcast
standard? How might a broadband public interest standard actually be
more effective than the broadcast standard in delivering the long-promised
electronic marketplace of ideas? Finally, why should it be up to the federal
government in particular to assume a more interventionist posture in the
broadband sphere?
A. Avoiding Content Regulation Quagmires
As discussed in Part I, the tension inherent in the government's having
to walk the line between avoiding excessive interference with broadcasters'
free speech on the one hand and championing the public interest in scarce
spectrum on the other has undermined the broadcast public interest
standard since its inception. Congress's failure to provide a durable and
coherent definition of public interest broadcasting further frustrated the
success of the broadcast standard. Although significant content-related
programming requirements are in place today, the broadcast public interest
standard's components have varied so extensively throughout the history of
broadcast regulation-in sometimes conflicting ways-that the standard
has been described as "the epitome of analytical emptiness. 5 67 Moreover,
with the transition to digital broadcasting delivering innovative ways to

567. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to
the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 256 (2003).
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share spectrum efficiently, the scarcity rationale that served as a premise
for broadcast content regulation for most of the twentieth century is now on
its weakest footing ever.
I agree with Professor Levi's assessment that we need "to find a
practical middle ground" in what has become a polarized media policy
debate with, at one end, those who are overconfident about the ability of
commercial marketplace competition and content abundance to best realize
the democratic benefits of new technology and, at the other end, those who
discount the manifold disadvantages and inefficiencies of content-based
command-and-control regulation.5 68 The middle ground charted in Part III
attempts to reconcile those two competing visions by cabining the
orientation of government toward the Internet to that of facilitator and
convener, much like how the government proactively supports civil society
on terra firma. The proposals do not harken back to troubling broadcaststandard-like content regulation, which would be inapposite in the private,
post-scarcity digital sphere. They also move away from the Internet
exceptionalism that, especially since the 1996 Telecom Act, has kept the
government from assuming a more affirmative role in realizing the
Internet's democratic potential. They depend principally on subsidies and
the provision of access, leaving the content of the resulting online
communications up to the individual beneficiaries. Many of the First
Amendment conflicts inherent in command-and-control broadcast
regulation are thus avoided by this more modest yet still proactive approach
to public-interest-minded, governmental intervention into the online
marketplace of ideas. All of the affirmative interventions above can be
implemented by means of comprehensive legislation, which would avoid
the impediments awaiting broad and ill-defined delegations of regulatory
authority at the captured and excessively politicized FCC.
In addition, it is unlikely that net neutrality regulation would constitute
content regulation or other interference with speech that may run afoul of
the First Amendment, despite the arguments that have begun to be made by
a small number of neutrality opponents. For example, Randolph J. May
claims that a net neutrality regulation would "implicate[] ISPs' free speech
rights" since "it is as much a free speech infringement to compel a speaker
to convey messages against the speaker's
wishes as it is to prevent a
569
speaker from conveying messages.

568.

Lili Levi, In Search of Regulatory Equilibrium, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1321, 1366

(2007).
569. Randolph J.May, CommunicationsPolicy Pirouettes,WASH. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007,
at B4; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1905-07 (2006) (arguing that network neutrality mandates would
interfere with Internet carriers' editorial discretion).

2009]

TOWARD A BROADBAND PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

But such reliance on the First Amendment by net neutrality opponents is
misplaced, even assuming the far-fetched proposition that broadband
providers are First Amendment speakers as a function of their carriage of
Internet data packets. The Supreme Court's validation of the cable
television must-carry regulatory regime in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC provides a fitting analogy. The Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 generally required cable television
operators to carry signals of local broadcast stations on their cable
systems. 57 Rejecting the cable operators' First Amendment claims, the
Court conceded that cable operators "engage in and transmit speech" and
thus "are entitled to the protection ... of the First Amendment' 57 1 as a
result of their legitimate editorial role in composing channel lineups and in
h
572 Nvrh
Nevertheless, the
producing and transmitting original programming.
Court concluded that any burden on the cable operators' speech was
justified in light of the important government interests in "prevent[ing]
cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of
broadcasters." The Court emphasized the importance of"ensur[ing] that all
Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to
free television programming-whatever its content." 573 Because a cable
operator's network is connected directly to subscribers' television sets, it
can "prevent... subscribers from obtaining access to programming it
chooses to exclude" and "can thus silence the voice of competing speakers
with a mere flick of the switch. 5 74 Relying on Associated Press v. United
States,575 the Court reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment's command that
government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the
government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict,
pathway of communication, the free
through physical control of a critical
576
flow of information and ideas."
Like cable television operators, the telephone company and cable
modem duopolists in the broadband marketplace in almost all cases provide
the sole interactive "data pipe" into subscribers' homes. They thus have
the incentive, given their integration with broadband content providers, to
act as "gatekeepers" who can "flick the switch" on competitors or any other

570.
571.

47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2000).
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).

572. Id. at 643. The Court also concluded that the must-carry rules were content-neutral
because they "are unrelated to the content of the speech." Id. at 647.
573. Id. at 649.
574. Id. at 656.
575. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
576. Turner, 512 U.S. at 657. See Baker, supra note 8, at 59 (claiming that the Supreme
Court relied on Associated Press in order to "assert the legitimacy of broad governmental
power over cable").
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online speakers whom they disfavor.577 With online content rivaling and
perhaps soon exceeding the importance and centrality of broadcasting in
the public sphere, it would not be inconceivable that an assertion by
broadband carriers that net neutrality regulations violate their free speech
rights would meet the same fate as the similar argument cable operators
578
advanced in Turner.
Moreover, broadband providers may find it difficult to overcome the
inconsistency in arguing that they-as carriers-are First Amendment
speakers whose free speech rights are infringed by net neutrality mandates,
while continuing to insist that they deserve the broad immunity granted
them under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act from liability for
privacy, reputational, and other torts committed over their systems.579
Courts have upheld such immunity for broadband providers because, to
borrow the words of the New York Court of Appeals, the provider "is
merely a conduit., 580 It is unlikely that broadband providers will succeed at
having it both ways, forestalling net neutrality mandates by insisting that
their carriage of data packets renders them First Amendment speakers,
while at the same time continuing to disclaim tort liability as mere
conduits.
B. Subsidies as a ConstitutionalAlternative to Regulation
Most of the proposals discussed in Part III rely on subsidies in contrast
to the broadcast public interest standard's mandates, which largely have
entailed content regulation justified by the increasingly unstable scarcity
and public ownership rationales. Whereas the regulation of even contentneutral speech is presumptively unconstitutional, the government's
subsidization of speech is presumptively valid even where it poses an
incidental burden on the facilitated speech. 8'
577. See Crawford, supra note 167, at 403 (arguing that, in the absence of net neutrality,
broadband providers would "cease to be commodity-transport providers, and will instead
become gatekeepers," causing the "diversity of online experiences, and thus the range of
freedom of human connection, human relationships, and the diverse generation of new ideas
[to] diminish").
578. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 360, at 181-82 (drawing a parallel between broadband net
neutrality norms and the cable television must-carry regulations); see also Sunstein, supra
note 185, at 1774 (positing that Turner supported government regulation of "new speech
sources" by "invoking such democratic goals as the need to ensure 'an outlet for exchange
on matters of local concern' and 'access to a multiplicity of information sources' (citing
Turner, 512 U.S. at 663)).
579. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000); see also supra note 266 (describing the liabilitylimiting effect of § 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act).
580. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. 1999).
581. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 680 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (recognizing that "the government may subsidize speakers that it thinks provide novel
points of view"); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The
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Contrary to the widely held misconception that the government has
prioritized an autonomy-based, noninterventionist approach to the First
Amendment, the government has in fact historically exercised its
prerogative to use public monies to promote civic engagement and enhance
political communication among the people.582 As Professor Richard C.
Levin has argued, the federal government has intervened especially when
private commercial forces have caused inequality of access to democratic
and political mechanisms or distortions in the speech marketplace.58 3 John
Rawls warned that "[t]he liberties protected by the principle of
participation lose much of their value whenever those who have greater
private means are permitted to use their advantage to control the course of
public debate. 5 84 Government, and especially the federal government, has
long intervened to level the playing field and preserve the free speech and
other democratic rights and liberties of the less powerful.
For example, Professor Baker has noted that the framers themselves
advocated government subsidization of journalism and the democratization
of "political intelligence and information. 5 85 One of the first tasks of the
first Congress was to devise a system for richly subsidizing newspapers by
means of deep discounts on postal rates, free postal delivery of newspapers
to members of the press, and the building of a network of post roads, both
for the distribution of news and political information and for
Use of Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, I J.ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
217, 219-20 (2002) (positing that "[s]peech regulations, even if they are content neutral, are
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment" whereas "burdens on speech that are part
of a discretionary speech benefit may be treated as presumptively valid exercises of
government largesse" (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991))); see also Rust, 500
U.S. at 202-03 (upholding ability of government to deny Public Health Service Act funds to
recipients who engage in any activities advocating abortion as "a method of family
planning").
582. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234
(2000) (holding that a public university, like other government entities, has an interest in
encouraging engagement and participation in civic, social, and community affairs); see also
Netanel, supra note 152, at 472 (affirming that the government has the privilege of utilizing
public funds, not only to promote civic goals, but to advance its own policies).
583. See Richard C. Levin, President, Yale Univ., Democracy and the Market, Speech
for Democratic Vistas: The William Clyde DeVane Lecture Series 15 (Feb. 6, 2001),
transcript available at http://www.yale.edu/terc/democracy/media/feb6text.pdf ("Our
American democracy appears willing to tolerate a substantial degree of inequality, but we
nonetheless used political means, acts of government, to temper the tendency to inequality
that market forces produce."). Professor Owen M. Fiss has made a similar argument,
reasoning that "[tlhe state should be allowed to intervene, and [is] sometimes even required
to do so,... to correct for the market." Fiss, supra note 19, at 791.

584. RAWLS, supra note 183, at 225.
585. Baker, supra note 8, at 99 (quoting President George Washington). Madison also
argued that in a democracy like the United States "easy and prompt circulation of public
proceedings is peculiarly essential." Id.; see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 696-99 (Archon Books 1965) (1947) (discussing government

subsidies as valid and useful media reform measure).
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communication among the citizenry. 586 The U.S. Postal Service, whose
creation required a massive commitment of federal revenue soon after the
birth of the Republic, was founded in part to facilitate the exchange of
political communication among and between citizens and their
representatives in Washington.58 7 In addition, Professor Jack Balkin refers
to the government's creation of a free public education system and a
network of free public libraries as components in the federal government's
proactive promotion of speech and democratic values.58 8 The CPB itself is
a contemporary example of the federal government's direct subsidization of
speech on electronic media for civic elevation and democratic engagement.
Commercial broadcasters themselves enjoy an implicit subsidy by virtue of
their free use of public spectrum. The proposals discussed in Part III are
wholly in harmony with this long tradition of government-and
specifically federal government-subsidization of public spaces, speech
opportunities, and democratically and socially valuable content.
Although government speech subsidies are not presumptively invalid, as
speech restrictions would be, the government must exercise care in opening
and subsidizing online speech fora in order not to violate the First
Amendment rights of participants. The Supreme Court in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia underscored the importance
of the government's not engaging in viewpoint discrimination when it
designates limited public fora. 589 There, the Court concluded that the
University of Virginia's student activities fund constituted a limited public
forum, and that the University-a state institution-violated the First
Amendment by discriminating against the viewpoints of religious student
groups who were denied funds. 590 The Court reasoned that "when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its
own," as in the case of Rust v. Sullivan, "it is entitled to say what it
wishes.",591 Viewpoint-based restrictions are not valid, however, when the
state "expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers"-as would be the case with government-hosted or governmentsubsidized online fora.5 92 Nevertheless, in designating public fora online,
the government would be free to articulate a purpose for a particular
586. See Netanel, supra note 152, at 472.
587. See LLOYD, supra note 6, at 15-16 ("Madison helped to enable all Americans to

communicate... by supporting legislation that simultaneously subsidized the spread of
popular information and advanced what would become the largest part of our early federal
government-the Post Office.").
588. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expressionfor the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (2004).
589. 515 U.S. 819, 828, 845-46 (1995).

590. Id.at 834-37.
591. Id.at 833.
592. Id.at 834.
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discussion website and exercise editorial control in excluding and limiting
individual speakers when "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum."

593

For example, as in the case of already successful local public

discussion websites, a public website facilitator may set up an online
community discussion on a particular topic-for example, a proposal to
new library-and limit discussion to what
merge two schools or build a 594
would be germane to that topic.

Attention also must be paid to ensuring that in subsidizing online public
spaces and speech, officials implementing these interventions are not
permitted to manipulate the content of the speech for partisan political
advantage or other illegitimate ends. Of course, this is a risk inherent in the
government's subsidization of any speech or public fora, both online and
on terra firma. Nevertheless, as in the context of federal subsidization of
public broadcasting, there must be safeguards in place to ensure that the
government's subsidies in support of online fora and speech are distributed
in a manner free from partisan or other inappropriate influence. In the case
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Congress assigned a
"nonpolitical nature" 595 to the organization, and requires that its board of
directors be comprised of a politically balanced and professionally and
geographically diverse membership.596 The CPB also is required to adhere
to strict grant- and financial-reporting guidelines in order to ensure fairness
and transparency.59 7 As noted in Part III.B.2, the American public
broadcasting model has not been without political controversies, but on
balance, the system has delivered democratically and socially valuable
content not otherwise available to citizens. A new fiscal agent to administer
federal funds in support of affirmative government interventions online, such
as the Corporation for Public Broadband proposed above, should be required
to comply with CPB-like requirements ensuring transparency, accountability,
and the filtering out of partisan or other inappropriate political pressures.
In addition, in an era of unprecedented federal budget deficits and
widespread criticism of federal spending, significant federal subsidies in
support of the proposals in Part III will probably meet with opposition. An
effective response should, of course, acknowledge the longstanding
593. Id. at 829 (citation omitted).
594. See Goodman, supra note 581, at 243 n.83 (discussing the germaneness principle
as applied in Rosenberger).

595. 47 U.S.C. § 396(f) (2000).
596. See id. § 396(c)(l)-(2) (requiring that no more than five of the nine board members
be from the President's political party and that they "be selected so as to provide as nearly
as practicable a broad representation of the various regions . . . , various professions and
occupations, .. . talent and experience appropriate to the functions" of the CPB).
597. See id. § 396(i)(1)-(2) (detailing annual reporting requirements); id.
§ 396(k)(1)(A)-(/)(1)(D) (providing financial disclosure, auditing, and open records and
meetings requirements).
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government commitment to the subsidization of public, noncommercial
spaces for democratic engagement. Just as so much human interaction has
migrated from terra firma to cyberspace, so too should the government's
interventions in support of the creation and maintenance of accessible,
noncommercial public discussion spaces expand into the digital realm. The
nature of direct federal financial support for broadband proliferation as a
vital and necessary investment in the nation's economic future is also
important. As noted above, some estimates place the cost of the nation's
lag in broadband proliferation at $1 trillion in economic growth. 598 Delays
in providing broadband service to large areas .of the nation significantly
impeding the ability of businesses in underserved or unserved areas from
competing successfully against broadband-connected companies elsewhere
in the United States and around the globe.5 99 The federal government's
massive investments in the building out of key elements of the nation's
infrastructure-the electric grid, the interstate highway system, railroads,
and post roads-were repaid many times over by means of increased tax
revenues generated by the economic growth spurred by the proliferation of
the power and transportation networks. So too should the government's
subsidization of broadband proliferation be repaid in increased economic
activity, and resulting tax revenue, down the road.600
C. BridgingAutonomy with Civic Republicanism
Political scientist Alan Wolfe postulates that the core dilemma vexing
Americans today is "how to be an autonomous person and tied together
with others at the same time. 60 1 Professor Wolfe's assessment echoes
Tocqueville's warning that the autonomy and individualism so defining
American democracy in its adolescence are at once its strength and its
weakness.60 2 The American Experiment survives, and can thrive, if we
598. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 404, at 1-10, 16; see also Travis, supra note 446,
at 1699 ("As much as $1 trillion in economic growth may be delayed due to structural and
legal limitations on U.S. broadband access.").
599. See Hesseldahl, supra note 480 (reporting that businesses in nonbroadband areas of
the nation are at a disadvantage in attracting new clients, and that counties across the nation
are finding that "a broadband blackout can also hobble economic development").
600. See Crawford, supra note 167, at 390 ("Our national economic policy, which looks
for opportunities for increased economic growth, should be closely tied to communications
policy that facilitates the interactive, group-forming attributes of the Internet.").
601. Galston, supra note 377, at42.
602. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 482 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (describing American
individualism as "a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate
himself from the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side.., so that after having
thus created a little society for his own use, he willingly abandons society at large to itself');
see also DAVID R. HILEY, DOU3T AND THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 26 (2006)

(noting scholars' reception of Tocqueville's observations about individualism in American
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manage to reconcile our individuality with our membership in a republic
dependent on engaged, deliberative civic participation. It withers when our
individualism overtakes our civic identity.60 3
The regulation of broadcasting was rooted in an administrative impetus
to build local, democratic civic life-to use the public airwaves to promote
a civic republican, communitarian vision of the First Amendment. By
contrast, the Internet, by both technological design and regulatory
forbearance, has evolved into an instrument of hyperindividualism and
personal autonomy. While broadcasting convenes and focuses, the Internet
atomizes and fragments. Broadcasting was to promote democracy, and the
Internet was to promote autonomy. But, as illustrated in Parts I and II,
neither regulatory paradigm has fully realized its aspirations. While
technological, commercial, and legal impediments make it impossible for
broadcasting to deliver an electronic platform for deliberative democracy,
the atomistic nature of the Internet, the prevalence of private censorship,
and the lack of localized civic spaces online have made it impossible for
the Internet to deliver an electronic free marketplace of ideas.
The Internet provides an unprecedented opportunity for government to
assume an interventionist, supportive role in promoting electronic
democratic engagement while avoiding the hazards that bedeviled the
broadcast public interest standard since its inception. Professor Robert Post
has written that the problem with government forays into the promotion of
democratic engagement and debate is that they tend to "permit the state to
define the agenda and parameters of public debate" as if "to presuppose an
Archimedean point that stands outside of the process of selfdetermination., 60 4 He argues that putting the government in the position of
"pedagogical state" would be "incompatible with democratic selfgovernance" since "citizens engaged in collective self-determination
through participation in public discourse are not students to be taught, but
autonomous masters of their fate. They are adults, not pupils. 6 °5 By
aggressively proliferating broadband access and making it possible for
more locally oriented, public spaces for democratic deliberation to exist
online, the government acts more as a facilitator than paternalistic arbiter.
It acts more like a convener than teacher. The proposals in Part III avoid a
culture).
603. Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain suggested in 1995 that we had already
reached a point of disequilibrium. She wrote that "our American democracy is faltering"
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN,
with "exhaustion, cynicism, opportunism, and despair."
DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 1 (1995).
604. Robert Post, Equality andAutonomy in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,95 MICH.
L. REV. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)).
605. Id.

ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W REVIEW

[61:1

paternalistic, pedagogical role for government by respecting the autonomy
of Internet speakers while providing more, noncoercive opportunities for
local democratic engagement.
In addition, the proposals do not entail the subordination of the First
Amendment rights of one set of private speakers to the rights of others, as
is the case with the floundering public trusteeship model in broadcasting.
Although the Internet is far from an embodiment of a fully accessible and
inclusive free marketplace of ideas, it at least has the potential for
delivering that vision, unlike broadcasting, which is structurally incapable
of serving as a platform for popular democratic engagement and
deliberation. Moreover, the Internet has demonstrated its ability to serve as
a check on government as well as the dominant media. Much of the
broadcast public interest standard's requirements, on the other hand, were
eliminated by an FCC captured by the extraordinarily influential broadcast
lobby, with the acquiescence of a Congress chastened by the power of local
broadcasters to shape the path of political careers.
At the same time, the proposals in Part III acknowledge that the
autonomy and civic republican views of the First Amendment are not
mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the Internet is uniquely positioned as
a medium that, unlike broadcasting, can reconcile the dialectic tension
between autonomy and civic republicanism. Autonomy, after all, should be
seen not as an end in itself but as a means to freedom and enlightenment.
While Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California often is
cited as support for an autonomy-rooted view of the First Amendment, in
fact Brandeis reasoned that autonomy was a prerequisite for a deliberative
democracy: "Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that
in its
' 60 6
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
This view of autonomy as a means toward-instead of a counterweight
against--civic engagement and communitarianism is in harmony with the
conceptions of the First Amendment of many prominent free speech
scholars and is the dominant paradigm in contemporary free speech
philosophy. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn valorized personal autonomy
in the speech marketplace as a necessary conduit for civic engagement and
collective self-government. 607 Professor Owen Fiss wrote that "[t]he
606. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice
Brandeis continued: "They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." Id.; see also
Rainey, supra note 12, at 317-23 (discussing the tensions between "individualist and
communitarian" views of liberty and Whitney v. California).
607. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1410-11 (1986) ("Autonomy is not valued by Meiklejohn and his followers because of what
it does for a person's development (self-actualization), but rather because of the contribution
it makes to our political life.").
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autonomy protected by the First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by
individuals and the press is not an end in itself, as it might be in some
moral code, but is rather a means to further the democratic values
underlying the Bill of Rights. 6 °8 Professor Fiss argues that "the state may
in circumstances
have to act to further the robustness of public debate
60 9
speech.,
stifling
are
state
the
outside
where powers
Other notable scholars have theorized that the proper role of government
in the speech marketplace is a proactive one that optimizes access and
promotes civic engagement, in ways that resonate with the proposals in
Part III. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., for example, argued that
"affirmative action by the government" is required to ensure that the
marketplace of ideas functions optimally, just as the government intervenes
in commercial marketplaces to ensure access, fairness, and a wide and
dynamic trade. 6 10 Professor Sunstein has long recognized an affirmative
government obligation to provide speech opportunities-a "New Deal" for
speech in which the government proactively facilitates more deliberative
democracy. 6 1 He argues that the public forum doctrine not only creates a
right of speakers to access public spaces for expressive activities, but more
essentially "creates a right, not to avoid governmentally imposed penalties
on speech, but to ensure government subsidies for speech. ' '612 Similarly,
Professor Jack Balkin theorizes that the purpose of freedom of speech is
not merely autonomous self-actualization but individual development
through civic engagement. He argues that the objective of free speech is
the promotion of a "democratic culture" that is "about individual liberty as
well as 14collective self-governance. ,,613 Other scholars hold harmonious
views.

6

Finally, the proposals in Part III that aim to create more opportunities for
shared experiences online, and the presentation of valuable democratic,
608.

OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 83 (1996).

610.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 471-77

609. Id. at 3-4.

(1947). Professor Chafee wrote that "a free market requires regulation, just as a free market
for goods needs law against monopoly." Id. at 475.
611. SUNSTEIN, supra note 214, at 241.
612. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 28 (2001); see also id. ("There is no question

that taxpayers are required to support ... expressive activity.").
613. Balkin, supra note 588, at 3. Professor Charles Fried has written that "this
fundamental liberty [of speech] is one that must to some extent be designed and engineered
by the state after all."

CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT

107 (2007).
614. Professor Baker has taught, "Although the First Amendment ought to restrict
purposeful suppression of speech, it should not and has not restricted structural interventions
designed to improve the quality of the press." C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND
DEMOCRACY 4 (2002). Professor Fried similarly acknowledges that the fundamental liberty
of speech in public spaces "is one that must to some extent be designed and engineered by
the state after all." FRIED, supra note 613, at 107.
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noncommercial content that citizens otherwise would not seek out on their
own, are very much in harmony with recent scholarship on the importance
of affirmative government measures to enhance exposure diversity in
today's atomized digital marketplace. Professor Ellen Goodman's work in
particular underscores the need for proactive media policy to address actual
consumption of valuable content instead of access alone.615 The digital
communications ecology has reversed the broadcast paradigm of scarce
spectrum and abundant attention into one in which content is abundant but
attention scarce. As a result, Professor Goodman argues that "[t]he
appropriate policy response" to the failure of the digital marketplace to
provide local, democratic content "is proactive[] in that it seeks to expose
people to content that they do not, at least initially, demand" and that
"influence[s] demand, cultivating public tastes in ways that support
democratic ideals. 6 16 This is an especially important function of
government in the digital realm insofar as the marketplace of ideas, when
left to the devices of commercial actors alone, tends not only to privilege
commercial expression but also to manipulate and form the audience's
tastes and preferences for content.6 17
In the broadcast regime, the government's promotion of viewpoint,
source, and content diversity by promulgating production-side regulations
took for granted that its efforts would result in a diversity of exposure.6 18
Because broadcast channels were limited, any affirmative interventions by
government to promote local, public interest programming, or
noncommercial fare on public stations, were assured of an audience of
viewers and listeners who would seek out the programming or stumble
upon it in surfing the dial to see "what's on." These serendipitous
encounters with democratically valuable and noncommercial content are
much rarer in the atomized, fragmented Internet. The proposals in Part III
would promote online exposure diversity by boosting access, creating new
common spaces online, and, most importantly, drawing localized attention
to public interest, noncommercial content online that citizens otherwise
may not seek on their own. In addition, they would help counteract the
Internet's propensity to accelerate the deterioration of American civic
engagement and communitarianism bemoaned by Professors Sandel and
Putnam.
615. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 364 ("If media policies are to effectuate proactive
goals in the digital era, what is required is a new emphasis on content consumption, as
opposed to mere content availability.").
616. Id. at 364, 366.
617. BAKER, supra note 614, at 87-95.
618. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 370 ("When public television broadcast a
documentary or when commercial stations held political debates, a good number of viewers
who did not initially demand the content would nonetheless stumble across it.").
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CONCLUSION

Initial overoptimism about the power of emerging communications
technologies to transform the world is nothing new. Likewise, there is
nothing novel about the concern that a new technology harms rather than
helps society. In Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates expressed alarm at how the
spread of literacy would undermine wisdom and the value of firsthand
observation, allowing readers to appear "very knowledgeable when they
are for the most part quite ignorant., 619 The invention of the printing press
in the fifteenth century led some to bemoan its effects on memory and
intellect. 620 And the advent of the recording industry in the late nineteenth
century caused composer John Philip Sousa to warn that "talking machines
are going to ruin the artistic development of music in this country" and
cause the "vocal chords [to] be eliminated by a process of evolution. 62'
In more modern times, the power of broadcasting to provide a point of
common focus in homes across the nation instilled both awe at the
medium's promise to transform democracy and fear at the power the
medium gave the entities that controlled it to shape public tastes and the
content of our discussion.6 22 Today, as detailed in Part II, the Internet is
seen as both enhancing and harming democracy and society in significant
ways.
The modern state has played an important role in promoting the
democratic and social benefits of emerging technologies while dampening
their perceived harms. In broadcasting, the broadcast public interest
standard has been government's affirmative effort, still underway, to
"promote and realize the vast potentialities '623 of the powerful, pervasive,
and central broadcast medium. It endeavored to realize broadcasting's
potential as a democracy-enhancing instrument while mitigating its
antidemocratic effects. As discussed in Part I, the broadcast regulatory

619.

PLATO, PHAEDRUS AND THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH LETTERS 96 (Walter Hamilton

trans., Penguin Classics 1973). Socrates feared that "because [readers] are filled with the
conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to society." Id. at 96-97.
620. See generally Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid?, ATLANTIC, JulyAug. 2008, at 56 (referencing Socrates and literacy, as well as the alarm caused by the
arrival of the printing press).
621. Arguments Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. & H.R., Conjointly, on the Bills
S. 6330 and H.R. 19,853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
59th Cong. 24 (1906) (statement of John Philip Sousa). Mr. Sousa testified, "When I was a
boy ... in front of every house in the summer evenings you would find young people
together singing the songs of the day or the old songs. Today you hear these infernal
machines going night and day. We will not have a vocal chord left." Id.
622. See BOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that American broadcasting regulation
was premised both on the concern that broadcasters would "control the content of public
discussion" and that the marketplace alone would be unable to keep that power in check).
623. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
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regime has been far from a model of regulatory effectiveness. Although it
has had some success at promoting universality of broadcast service,
localism, competition, and diversity on the broadcast medium, commandand-control broadcast regulation has failed to deliver the electronic free
marketplace of ideas envisioned by regulatory optimists at the dawn of
broadcasting.
The failure of the broadcast public interest standard to achieve its
laudable and lofty objectives, however, should not argue against
affirmative government interventions into the broadband realm to "promote
and realize the vast potentialities" of the technology for civic republican
and communitarian ends. Quite to the contrary, the current state of the
Internet as a platform for expression and democratic engagement calls for
significantly more, and not less, proactive government intervention.
Whereas there is a scarcity of true democratic deliberation and localized
public fora online, private censorship, fragmentation, and atomization of
attention abound. Although the broadband realm has enabled millions to
create and receive democratic and other forms of expression and
information, broadband remains out of reach for many Americans,
especially minority, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.
As a result, the digital divide has become a democratic divide, with
Americans living in radically different information environments
depending on their ability to access and use high-speed Internet service.
Hannah Arendt wrote that "political freedom, generally speaking, means
the right 'to be a participator in government,' or it means nothing. 6 24 As
the broadband realm becomes even more of a forum for democratic
expression, political engagement, and self-governance, those without
access to broadband will be without an opportunity for full political
In addition, as with broadcasting, the Internet-and
participation.
especially broadband-offers significant economic, educational, and other
benefits that make universality of access all the more important to the
nation.
The broadcast public interest standard failed to achieve its objectives
fully, not because those objectives were invalid or because a proactive
government role was inappropriate, but because the structural,
constitutional, and technological particularities of the broadcast medium
were incompatible with the standard's objectives. By contrast, the Internet
presents the government with a unique opportunity to pursue and achieve
the overarching objectives of the broadcast public interest standard without
many of the significant constitutional, structural, and other impediments
that bedeviled the broadcast standard. Broadband provides a technological
624.

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 221 (1965).
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platform that would accommodate, and is very much in need of,
government intervention in support of localism, noncommercial fora, and
democratic deliberation in a universally accessible, diverse, and
competitive online marketplace of ideas.
The proposals for a broadband public interest standard discussed in
Part III would enable the federal government to address, in a substantial
way, the failure of the commercial marketplace to realize the democratic
promise of broadband. The proposals recognize that, in today's converging
media ecology, broadband Internet has emerged as a central medium for
human interaction and engagement, rendering the Internet exceptionalism
at the heart of the government's noninterventionist disposition obsolete and
counterproductive. The United States needs a new affirmative orientation
toward broadband that sees it as more than just another widget in a
regulatorily unbridled commercial marketplace. A policy that valorizes
broadband-as the government has valorized broadcasting since the
1920s-is a vital tool for enhancing democracy; for enfranchising,
engaging, and informing a diverse electorate; and for enriching civic life.
Broadband can deliver the electronic free marketplace of ideas that was
the elusive, and perhaps impossible, dream of the broadcast regulatory
regime. But it will not be able to do so without the significant and
The commercial
proactive involvement of the federal government.
marketplace alone will not deliver the democracy-enriching and ubiquitous
electronic free marketplace of ideas we have long sought and that, finally,
is within reach.

ERRATUM
In Volume 61:1 (2009) of the Administrative Law Review, the following
errors occurred during the editing process in Toward a Broadband Public
Interest Standardby Anthony Varona.
In footnote 175, quotation marks were incorrectly adjusted by editors on
a quote by Plato. The correct quote should be "democracy is the worst so
far as law abiding is concerned and the best for flouting the law."
In footnote 401, several quotation marks within parentheticals were
incorrectly removed by editors. The correct quotes are:
* (declining "to find that high-speed or advanced services . . .
satisfy the criterion that supported services be essential to
education, public health, or public safety ....
")
* (noting that "the points of distinction... have been hotly
contested in policy circles")
* (contending that the "distinction is an unfortunate policy choice
based on out-dated regulatory terminology").
On page 133, a quotation was incorrectly adjusted by editors.
correct quote should be "vocal cord[s to] be eliminated. .."

The

